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Abstract
The aim of this research is to understand local service delivery in Thailand’s post2006 national political crisis. The researcher collected qualitative data in four
municipalities in Khon Kaen Province. The analytical framework covered five
moderating variables: political institutions, civic engagement, political leadership,
governance, and political economy. The results were mixed. Local service delivery
suffered from weakening electoral mechanisms, suspended local autonomy, weakened
civic participation and policy networks, insecure local administrators, worsened centrallocal trust, and the detrimental effect on local economies. However, there were
opportunities for improved, or maintained, local service delivery through the lessening of
administrative procedures, a fast-track mechanism for citizen complaints, stronger
collaboration among local governments and with the private sector, local citizen
initiatives, effective local leadership, and increasing trust between local governments and
their constituents. In conclusion, national political crisis caused not only negative
impacts, but also created opportunities for improving or maintaining local service
delivery.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Context of Local Government Service Delivery in Thailand
Public service delivery is recognized as a core responsibility of local governments
in Thailand and in many countries around the globe, especially where decentralization is
brought into the institutional structure (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2000; Mansrisuk, 2012;
Oates, 1999; Sudhipongpracha, 2014; Varanyuwatana, 2006; World Bank, 2012). In the
past, public service delivery was mainly handled by the central government and
governmental offices located at provincial and local levels. The patterns of public service
offered by government are “one-size-fits-all services,” with little consideration of specific
needs of citizens who live in different conditions and contexts (Osborne & Gaebler, 1993,
p. 168). Decision-making authority regarding public policy and public expenditures is
based on a top-down structure with central government as the main actor in centralized
governing processes (Boex et al., 2016).
Due to social complexities and government administration failures,
decentralization, as one of governing instruments in governance approach, has
prominently influenced government service delivery reform (Oates, 1999). Importantly,
decentralizing public service delivery from central to local governments is an important
tool for improving government service delivery, enhancing citizen participation,
decreasing poverty, and expanding economic development (Channa & Faguet, 2016;
Denhardt & Denhardt, 2003; Lewis, McCulloch, & Sacks, 2016; Oates, 1999; Robinson,
1

2007). Citizens understand the needs and problems of their local area, so local
governments can work closely with them. Local governments play a vital role in
providing public services and serving the specific needs of their local residents and can
usually perform this role much better than the central government (Lewis, McCulloch, &
Sacks, 2016; Oates, 1999).
In addition, decentralized public service delivery enhances the role of local
citizens. Local citizens play a key role in local government affairs. For example, they are
involved in political decision-making processes, public policy processes, and even
coproduction in public service provision (Osborne & Gaebler, 1993; Stoker, 1998). As in
the case of local citizen involvement in a municipality in northeastern Thailand, local
citizens become the main actors in a co-production project‒ specifically a road
construction project. This public service allows local citizens to engage in the service
delivery decision-making process and to participate in community activity
(Sudhipongpracha & Wongpredee, 2016).
In general, local government service delivery includes local roads, sanitary
facilities, water, garbage collection, hospitals, local security, culture, education, tax
collection, etc. (Robinson, 2007; Rodrigues, Tavares, & Araújo, 2012). For fiscal
decentralization autonomy, local governments are allowed to collect taxes and gain
revenues from some services, while partial funding comes from the central government.
For political decentralization autonomy, local citizens can vote for the mayor and local
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councilors who represent them in local public service operations (Mansrisuk, 2012). This
indicates a vital impact of local government service delivery on citizens’ roles.
In Thailand, like many developing countries, public service delivery was initially
handled by central government (Unger & Mahakanjana, 2016). The decentralization
provision was adopted into the 1997 Constitution in pursuit of improving government
service delivery performance, enhancing local self-government, strengthening local
democracy, and stimulating economic development (Balassiano, 2011). Consequently,
government structure was reformed and centralized public services were transferred to
local governments (Mansrisuk, 2012). The main duties of Thailand’s local governments
include: (1) providing fundamental infrastructure (e.g. road, public transportation, water,
sewage, public works, and city planning); (2) developing and sustaining quality of life
(e.g. education, public health, recreation area, park, career training, and social welfare);
(3) providing community security (e.g. fire protection, consumer protection, and disaster
management); (4) promoting local investment, trade, and tourism (e.g. local strategic
planning, technology transfer, permit issuance, etc.); (5) protecting and preserving the
environment and natural resources (e.g. community forest, pollution, wildfire protection,
water protection, etc.); and (6) preserving and promoting local culture, tradition, and
wisdom (e.g. local museums and archives, local festivals, etc.) (Thailand Decentralization
Plan and Process Act, 1999, B.E. 2542). The background of Thailand’s decentralization
and local government is further described in Chapter 2.
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Notably, the purposes of decentralizing local government service delivery in
Thailand are to promote local self-government, political institutions, civic engagement
and citizen empowerment, collective decision-making, political leadership, collaboration,
and local economy (Mansrisuk, 2012). These factors reinforce one another and they are
instruments for local governments to enhance effective local service delivery. More
importantly, political and institutional stability are important factors for maintaining
effective local government service delivery performance (North, 1990).
Since 2006, local government service delivery has faced challenges. Recurrent
national political crises in Thailand have been a critical concern not only for Thai society
but also internationally (Human Rights Watch, 2016; United Nations, 2016; Whiteman,
2014; Yaxley, 2006). The prolonged national political crisis has affected institutional
breakdown and economic decline (Norton, 2012; Sussangkarn & Nikomborirak, 2016)
For an institutional breakdown, political crises have caused government failures
and a growing democratic deficit (Kurlantzick, 2011). Importantly, the military
interventions—the military coup in 2006 and in 2014— caused constitutional suspensions
and set back the progress of full democracy by constituting semi-democracy through
constitutional design (Pathmanand, 2008).

4

This virtually constant political crisis1 tremendously affected the economic
downturn because people decreased their spending, while central government suspended
some social policies and reduced the expenses of development projects (Sussangkarn &
Nikomborirak, 2016). In addition, political turmoil also created uncertainties for
businesses and investors. For example, foreign tourists avoided traveling to Thailand
during political protests and investors lacked the confidence to expand their businesses
during political turmoil (Sethapramote, 2014; Sussangkarn & Nikomborirak, 2016).
The effects of Thailand’s national political crisis have prompted concerns about
its effects on local governments service delivery performance. Due to an institutional
relationship and governmental structure, central and local governments in Thailand are
not independent from each other. Local governments are considered as arms of central
government. Importantly, the central government still influences local governments
through political institutional alignment, financial support, and social policy affiliation
(State Administration Act of 1991).
Moreover, political crises likely create negative effects on local government
service delivery and other public affairs. For example, Madagascar suffered from a
prolonged national political crisis during 2009-2014. The effects of this turmoil

1

I recognize that it can be argued that there have been multiple crises since 2006, with two coups, two
democratically elected governments, and one government put in place by questionable means during that
time. There was unrest during each of the elected governments, so, in effect, there has been a continuous
period of turmoil. For that reason, I elected to use the singular crisis when referring to the “post-2006
political crisis” throughout this dissertation.
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undermined government public services such as education, health service, food security,
and water. In addition, political crises tremendously affect microeconomic activities and
induce the decline of public investment (World Bank, 2006). Similarly, in Zimbabwe a
2008 political crisis delayed local political transition. Local governance remained stuck in
the old administrative style, resulting in poor local service performance (Bland, 2011).
Little is known about possible positive effects of national political crises in
Thailand. In the earlier cited work by Sudhipongpracha and Wongpredee (2016), the
local citizens actively engaged in a coproduction project, road maintenance, which was
operated collectively among societal actors in the local community. This coproduction
project helped transform citizens from “passive citizens” to “proactive citizens” (p.311).
As observed, the effects of crises, both political and economic, which occurred in the past
have been mixed, creating both positive and negative effects for local governments
(Khoman, 2005). Interestingly, many of these studies do not highlight any moderating
variables. These variables are influential on improvement of local service delivery
performance (Batonon, 2015; Curristine, Lonti, & Joumard, 2007; UNDP, 2016). The
importance of these moderating variables will be described next.
Despite its importance, local government service delivery has often been
overlooked in times of national political crisis. Local service delivery is where crisis
meets citizen. Obviously, citizens are affected by conflict. With the matters of local
government service delivery and concerns of what political crises affect help address the
6

research question, “How has Thailand’s national political crisis affected local
government service delivery?” This study aims to enhance the understanding of the
effects of Thailand’s prolonged national political crisis on local government service
delivery. Then, the study explores the impacts of five moderating variables that influence
effective or ineffective performance of local government service delivery.
Moderating Variables for Local Government Service Delivery
To frame this inquiry, this study focuses on five relevant moderating variables:
political institutions, civic engagement, governance, political leadership, and political
economy. These five moderating variables are the variables that may influence effective
or ineffective local government service delivery performance (Avis, 2016; Lieberman,
2012; Yilmaz et al., 2008; Manda & Mwakubo, 2013; O’Neil et al., 2014). These
variables are thus both practically and theoretically important variables to explore the
effects of Thailand’s prolonged national political crisis on local government service
delivery. These five moderating variables are the factors that interact with political crisis
to influence local service delivery process. Since this study is interested in local service
delivery as an outcome variable, this study looks at the antecedent conditions for local
service delivery rather than local service delivery itself.
To understand why these five moderating variables are important for exploring
the effects of national political crisis on local government service delivery, the author will
examine them in depth. Core definitions will be provided for each of these variables, key
7

reasons for using these variables, their impacts on local service delivery, and at what
level in the system do moderating variables operate. In addition, the effects that the
national political crisis has had on these variables and how they can affect local
government service delivery performance are described. Figure 1.1 helps illustrate the
relationship of how national political crisis relate to local government service delivery
performance and indicates where these moderating variables are involved.
Figure 1.1 Analytical Framework
National Political Crisis
[Resulting Changes in Politics and Policies]

Moderating Variables
(1) Political Institutions
(2) Civic Engagement
(3) Political Leadership
(4) Governance

Ind
ire
ct
(5) Political
Economy

Local Government Service Delivery Performance

The term “political institutions” refers to the interconnections of individuals or
groups within political society mediated by laws and norms that shape human and social
interactions (March & Olsen, 1989). These laws and norms are important institutional
instruments that help provide clarity to institutional actors (North, 1990). Political
institutions include both formal and informal institutions in the political realm. Formal
institutions are the formal laws, constitutions, etc., whereas informal institutions are the
norms, social agreement, cultural aspects, etc. These informal institutional tools also
shape human interaction (Dobler, 2011; North, 1990).
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This study focuses on formal institutions. Formal political institutions, in this
study, are those established by Thailand’s constitutions, the State Administration Act of
1991, the Decentralization Plan and Process Act of 1999, Thai national government,
public policies, legislature, electoral rules, etc. Formal political institutions are operated
at all three levels within governmental structure—national government, provincial
administration, and local administration. Informal political institutions are the political
norms, political values, political trusts, political participation, political responsiveness,
political understanding, etc. (Narayan et al., 2000).
Civic engagement, in this study, refers to patterns and opportunities that local
governments provide to their citizens to share their interests in political decision-making
processes, public policy processes, and local government service delivery (McLaverty,
2011; Putnam, 1993). This moderating variable is important for this study because active
civic engagement helps shape local administration and local community. More
importantly, this mechanism assists in providing effective local service delivery and the
growth of local values within the community through collective actions (Adler & Goggin,
2005; Putnam, 1993). This study employs the civic engagement factor to investigate how
local citizens engage in political activity, community service or voluntary activity, local
coproduction or collective action activity, policy decision-making processes, and network
building (Adler & Goggin, 2005; Pahad, 2005).

9

In addition, the researcher employs the spectrum of public participation to
examine how and at what level local governments engage citizens in local government
service delivery. The spectrum consists of five levels; informing citizens, consulting
citizens, involving citizens, collaborating with citizens for decision-making processes,
and empowering citizens to make decisions (IAP2, 2014). Civic engagement is minimally
operated at the national level but is mainly operated in local government and the local
community level by emphasizing local government-citizen interactions. In this study, the
civic engagement mechanism helps examine whether political institutional breakdown
and political fears affect civic engagement in local government service delivery.
Political leadership refers to agency by actors with positional resources intended
to improve local service delivery, especially in the contingent situations (Northhouse,
2010; Wart, 2003). In addition, effective political leadership should be able to cope with
complicated public problems and uncertain conditions, for instance political crisis.
Notably, political leadership requires capacity to maintain political accountability,
facilitate local government officers, sustain organizational alignment, and make
appropriated decision in public service delivery (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2011; Fiedler,
1996; Wart, 2003).
This study examines the traditional patterns of political leadership—leaders at the
individual level (e.g. local government leaders, local officers, and community leaders)
(Boin et al., 2017; Denhardt & Denhardt, 2000; Denhardt & Denhardt, 2003). In this
10

study, the political leadership factor is operated mainly at the local and community level
and it helps examine whether national political crises and institutional breakdowns affect
local government service delivery.
Governance variable, as used here, refers to new governing processes in public
organizations that emphasize the matters of interdependence between local governments
and societal sectors in enhancing effective public service delivery. The analysis within
this moderating variable is based upon patterns of new public governance including
jurisdictional collaboration, multi-network, and collective actions that local governments
employ for improving service delivery (Bevir, 2011; Rhodes, 2007; Stoker, 1998). In this
study, the governance variable is operated at the national, provincial, and local levels
because the governing processes of local governments are interdependent with all three
levels.
Finally, political economy refers to economic conditions that shape incentives and
determine the distribution of resources. Political economy perspective emphasizes two
dimensions. First, internal political economy focuses on internal mechanisms of
economy, i.e. economic processes and norms of efficiency that affect internal
mechanisms of the polity such as political structure and processes, political leadership,
and political institutions (Stern & Reve, 1980; Wamsley & Zald, 1973). Second, external
political economy emphasizes external mechanisms of economy, i.e. economic conditions
and competitiveness that affect the external mechanism of the polity such as political
11

climate, influences of external actors, inter-organizational interactions, and power sharing
(Stern & Reve, 1980; Wamsley & Zald, 1973). It is important to note that these two
dimensions have reinforcing effects on one another. In this study, the political economy
variable is operated at the national and local levels because political economy of local
governments is interdependent with the national economic conditions.
Research Objective
This study aims to improve the understanding of the effects of the national
political crisis in Khon Kaen Province, Thailand, on local government service delivery.
The study examines five moderating variables that interact with the political crisis to
influence effective or ineffective local government service delivery performance.
Additionally, this study is relevant not only to the cases of the municipality in
northeastern Thailand but can also develop a framework for analysis and generate
questions as sources for large-scale quantitative and mixed methods research in the
future.
Research Question
To understand whether and how Thailand’s national political crisis affect local
government service delivery, the overarching research question is: “How has Thailand’s
national political crisis affected local government service delivery?” In answering this
question, the virtually continual national political crisis from 2006 until the study’s
endpoint in 2016, is an independent variable that impacts local government service
12

delivery as an outcome variable. The five moderating variables used in this study are not
hypotheses or theories, but rather are widely-studied antecedent conditions that are
considered relevant to the study of local service delivery. In addition, this study used five
moderating variables to build a framework for inquiry and a system for organizing the
data, not to establish a hypothesis based on a particular theory that this study would test.
The questions to be answered are whether local government service delivery will
experience a negative impact, a positive impact, no impact, or some combination thereof
during the political crisis.
Value of the Study
The impact of this research is both theoretically and practically valuable for the
field of public administration and for policy implications. Theoretically, it is useful to
understand if the case studies of Thailand’s local public service delivery under political
crisis could generate a framework for analysis that might have wide applicability to
research in political crises and local government service performance, civic engagement,
political leadership, local governance, crisis management, political economy or other
related theories in public administration and public policy. It is important to emphasize
why this study matters: 1) the past ten years and counting of Thailand’s history involve
political crises; 2) crises in Thailand are recurrent and the current crisis will likely
continue and it may shed light on past episodes; 3) there is applicability to other cases in
Thailand and other countries.
13

Structure of the Dissertation
This dissertation is organized into six chapters. Chapter 1 presents the
introduction and statement of the problem, followed by the research objectives and the
research question. The chapter concludes by addressing the significance of the research
and dissertation structure. Chapter 2 provides background and literature reviews as well
as the theoretical framework. Chapter 3 explains research design methods, chosen
research approach, case selection, and data collection and analysis method. Chapter 4
describes the findings on how national political crisis creates threats to local government
and demonstrates the case performance analysis. Chapter 5 describes the findings on how
national political crisis creates opportunities for local government and demonstrates the
case performance analysis. The final chapter, Chapter 6, provides a conclusion and
discussion.
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Chapter 2
Background and Literature Review
This chapter presents the background of Thailand’s local government structure
and the contemporary context of Thailand’s national political crises. The previous
research on local government service delivery under political crises that provide the
findings of research done in both global context and Thailand’s context are addressed.
The last part provides the conceptual framework that is built upon three theoretical
approaches, including the institutional theory, governance theory (including civic
engagement, and public leadership), and political economy theory.
Local Government Structure and Central-Local Relations
Thailand local government is structured under the concept of the unitary system,
which identifies local government as a dependent hierarchical entity within the model of
central-local relationships. National government maintains the authority to control and
mandate the local government (Agranoff & Radin, 2014). In Figure 2.1, there are three
different circles. Each circle represents a level of governmental jurisdiction. For
Thailand, the smallest circle is the local government, which is instituted within the largest
circle of national government. The largest circle refers to a single national government
that institutionally controls the smaller circles.
The provincial administrative authority in the second circle is the branch of
national government and central ministries located at the provincial level. The heads of
provincial offices, for instance the provincial governor and chief executive officer of the
15

district, are appointed by the national government. They act as supervisors for the local
governments, but their authority and responsibilities to provide public services at the
local level are mandated by the national government.
Figure 2.1 Model of National, Provincial, and Local Relationships in Thailand

National Government

Provincial Administration

Local Government

Source: Adapted from Wright’s model of inclusive authority
dependent hierarchy in Agranoff & Radin 2014: p. 140.

The circle representing the Provincial Administration has an additional circle to
identify the boundary and relation of provincial administration, which acts as the central
government but is located in local areas. The model illustrated below is represented in the
form of Thailand’s administration structure, which is derived from the State
Administration Act of 1991 and the Local Administration Act of 1914. The Act of 1991
promulgated the local authority as one of the state administrative branches (see Figure
2.2)
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Figure 2.2 Thailand Administration Structure

National Administration

Central government agencies
- Office of Prime Minister
- Ministries
- Departments

- Etc.

Unitary System

Provincial Administration

Local Administration

Central government agencies in the province
- Provinces (Changwat)
- Districts (Amphure)
-Local administration units under provincial agencies
- Sub-districts (Tambon)
- Villages (Moo-Ban)

Local government agencies
General form
- Provincial Administrative Organizations (PAOs)
- Municipalities (City/Urban/Sub-district)
- Tambon Administrative Organization (TAOs)
Special form
- Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA)
- Pattaya City

Source: Compiled by the researcher based on the State Administration Act of
1991, the Local Administration Act of 1914, and the Determining Plan and
Process of Decentralization Act of 1999

The State Administration Act of 1991 provides for three administrative fields. At
the top level, the national administration is comprised of the Office of the Prime Minister,
and various ministries and departments. The national government agencies are mostly
located in Bangkok and exercise their power primarily through the provincial
administration, but also through local agencies. The policy processes and regulations are
usually carried out at the provincial level (Mansrisuk, 2012; State Administration Act,
1991; United Nations, 2004)
The second level, provincial administration, is a branch of central government and
the central ministry branches that are located in the local areas. However, those agencies
are not part of the local government. The provincial administration exercises its power
through the provincial governor and the chief executive officers of districts, who are
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appointed by the Ministry of Interior, a national ministry. In addition, there are two local
administration units under the provincial administration. Those agencies are the subdistrict (Tambon) and the village (Moo-Ban). Even though the head of Tambon (Kamnan) and the headperson of village (Phu-Yai-Ban) are elected by the community
residents, then they are approved and officially appointed and paid by the provincial
administration. Though they work with the local governments, they are responsible to the
provincial administration and, ultimately, the central government. Their duties include
community leader, community security, conflict mediator, and central government
representative in the community, whereas local governments provide public services
(Mansrisuk, 2012; Nagai, Funatsu, & Kagoya, 2008; State Administration Act, 1991).
At the lowest level, the local government is considered an administrative branch
of the central government. It is a creature of the constitution, which values the democratic
society and decentralization to subnational government. Thailand’s local government has
two forms. One is a general form that is composed of the Provincial Administration
Organization (PAO), Municipality, and Tambon Administration Organization (TAO).
Another is a special form that is comprised of Bangkok Metropolitan Administration and
Pattaya City and only exists in those two jurisdictions (Determining Plan and Process of
Decentralization Act, 1999; Mansrisuk, 2012; Nagai, Funatsu, & Kagoya, 2008; State
Administration Act, 1991).
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Decentralization and Thailand Local Government System
The decentralization provision in Thailand is a policy creation, which was
provided in the Thai Constitution of 1997. It aims to delegate the authority and
responsibilities of the central government to local government. In addition, it aims to
enhance local community involvement in the policy decision-making process, political
activity, citizen participation, and economic development (Constitution of the Kingdom
of Thailand, 1997; Krueathep, 2004; Mansrisuk, 2012; Rondinelli, 1981). From a service
delivery perspective, decentralization is beneficial for local citizens because public
policy, public service delivery, and public welfare would be allocated into the locality to
serve the differing needs of local residents (Rondinelli, 1981; Saito, 2011). From a
democratic and political standpoint, it is an opportunity for citizens at the local level to
participate in political activities and in public decision-making processes that occur in
their communities (Rondinelli, 1981; Saito, 2011).
Impact of Decentralization on Local Service Delivery
To implement the decentralization provision, the legislature enacted the
Determining Plan and Process of Decentralization Act of 1999. This act has defined the
forms, types, and responsibilities of local government. This law has a significant impact
on the authority transfer from central to local government— including political authority,
administrative authority, and fiscal authority (Determining Plan and Process of
Decentralization Act, 1999; Krueathep, 2004; Nagai, Funatsu, & Kagoya, 2008).
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Local Structure and Political Authority
Local government in Thailand exists in two forms. First, the general form of local
government is responsible for providing public services in most areas of the country and
consists of PAO, municipality, and TAO. A second is a special form of local government
is responsible for serving the special and strategic areas. Bangkok Metropolitan
Administration provides the public services in the capital city area, as it is the
government center, business center, and gateway to the country. In addition, Pattaya City
serves the industrial and tourism area east of Bangkok (Krueathep, 2004). Figure 2.3
illustrates the local government structure as well as the intra-governmental relationship in
Thailand.
Figure 2.3 Local Government Structure and Intergovernmental Relationship
Central Government

Provincial & Local
Administration

Province (Governor)

District (Chief Officer)

Sub-district
(Headman)
or Kamnan
Village (Headman)

Local
Government

PAOs (Chief Executive)
(76 Units)/Upper tier

Municipality (Mayor)
(2,441 Units)/Lower tier

TAOs (Chief Executive)
(5,334 Units)/Lower tier

Bangkok (Governor)
(1 Unit)
Pattaya (Mayor)

Line’s Definition:
Control and Steering

(1 Unit)

Strongly Control
Support & Collaboration
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Source: Compiled by a researcher based on the Local Administration Act of 1914, the
State Administration Act of 1991, the Determining Plan and Process of Decentralization
Act of 1999, and the Image Model of Thai State Administration (Nagai & Kagoya, 2011).
The local government units are collected from local government data as of May 18, 2017.
Link: http://www.dla.go.th/work/abt/index.jsp.

Local residents accept the political authority of the local government because they
feel it provides education and strengthens the foundations of democracy at the local level.
More importantly, moving government closer to citizens is the best way to improve
government performance and to respond to the different needs in local communities.
Within this structure, Nagai and Kagoya (2011) explain that a characteristic of Thailand
local administration is “the dual existence of various field agencies of central government
and local government” (p. 138). This means that provinces and districts, as the branches
of central government, remain the authorities for local governments and maintain control
over various aspects of governance, such as annual budget approval, local planning, local
administration, councilor removal, and so forth. In addition, we can view the relationship
between local governments (PAO, Municipality, and TAO) and local administration units
(Tambon and Mooban) as the parallel agencies within this structure (Nagai, Funatsu, &
Kagoya, 2008).
Local Functional and Administrative Authority
The Decentralization Act of 1999 has mandated the responsibility of providing
public services to local government, which were previously operated by central
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government and provincial agencies, in six dimensions: (1) providing fundamental
infrastructure; (2) developing and sustaining quality of life; (3) providing community
security and preventing crime; (4) promoting local investment, trade, and tourism; (5)
protecting and preserving the environment and natural resources; and (6) preserving and
promoting local culture, tradition, and wisdom (Krueathep, 2004; Office of the
Commission on Local Government Personnel Standards).2
This means that local government has discretion over local management and
public service delivery based on the mandated duties stated in the Determining Plan and
Process of Decentralization Act of 1999. In addition, each type of local government can
recruit and hire the employees to serve in local government offices and public service
tasks (Determining Plan and Process of Decentralization Act, 1999; Nagai, Funatsu, &
Kagoya, 2008).
Local Discretion and Fiscal Authority
After a decentralization law is enacted, a high degree of decision-making should
occur at the local level (Krueathep, 2004; Rondinelli, 1981; Saito, 2011). The Thai
Determining Plan and Process of Decentralization Act of 1999 devolves and transfers the
decisions regarding fiscal authority to local government. As a result, local government
can develop and enact local planning and regulations, especially the fiscal plan. In

2

Source: Office of the Commission on Local Government Personnel Standards. Link:
http://www.local.moi.go.th/webst/botfam1.htm
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addition, local government can collect fees for public services such as water, sewage,
garbage, electricity, public transportation, document issuance fees, etc. According to the
tax collection authority, local government can collect some local taxes, like property tax,
sign tax, permit tax, and business tax (Determining Plan and Process of Decentralization
Act, 1999; Nagai, Funatsu, & Kagoya, 2008).
Context of Thailand’s Political Crises
In Thai political history, most political crises initially arose from strains and
struggles within elite groups and the military. Political crises have become normal events
for Thai political society (Fry, 2014; McCargo, 2000). The current political crisis is more
complicated and dynamic than most of those in the past. There are various groups
involved in the political networks. As Uwanno (2011) mentioned, we can see these
networks through the dynamics of Thai politics. He explained that there are four groups
that influence each other within “dynamics of Thai politics” (Uwanno, 2011, p. 19).
These four groups include: 1) the monarchy, 2) the military and bureaucrats, 3) middleincome people living in urban areas and having better market bargaining power and
resource accessibility, and 4) people living in rural areas and having low negotiating
power. They interact with each other and exercise power through these networks. These
four groups are the vital mechanisms to influence both government formation and even
government destruction (Uwanno, 2011).
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To illustrate the patterns of Thailand political crises, McCargo (2000) classifies
the typology of Thai political crises from 1985 until 1997. This typology demonstrates
the causes of political crises, for example, internal disagreement among groups within the
military, people’s dissatisfaction, political corruption, and economic collapse (McCargo,
2000). As observed, for recurrent political crises, those causes remain in existence and
become more powerful.
Thailand’s Political Crises in Post-Democracy
A political event that occurred in 1932 is considered a major turning-point of Thai
politics. Even though the reform was bloodless, it caused a major change in the Thai
political system. The absolute power initially held by the King was transferred to a
government installed by the military and by the educated class. The form of political
system was changed from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy, in which
the King had less power in administrative and political roles. The King played a greater
role as an institutional and ceremonial symbol under the Constitution of 1932 (McCargo,
2000).
In addition, the strong bureaucratic system and centralized state structure eroded
the progress of democracy. Political crises were most often ended by using military
power (Paribatra, 1993). Thai history shows that since 1932, Thailand has experienced 19
military coups (Brown, 2014), with 13 of them being successful (Chambers, 2015). The
most recent coup d’état, carried out by General Prayut Chan-o-cha, occurred in 2014.
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Political conflict instigated this most recent coup d’état, when the military decided that a
coup was the most appropriate choice to resolve the political crisis in that turbulent time
(Fisher, 2014).
Over the course of history, Thailand’s political crises caused changes to political
society in different ways and marked many historical events in each era. For example,
Black May, in 1992, was a political protest which occurred in Bangkok against the
illegitimate military government ruled by General Suchinda Kraprayoon (Pineda, 2010).
The impact of this political uprising led to popular reform in Thai politics that extensively
involved the citizens and political sectors to project the future of the country by drafting a
new Constitution in 1997. This Constitution has been called the Constitution of the
People (Chambers, 2015; Keyes, 2015).
Recurrence of Thailand’s Political Crisis and the 2006 Military Coup
Thailand, after the 1997 Constitution, seemed to enter into a period of peace and
freedom. People actively engaged in political activities and freely exercised their basic
rights. In the year 2001, the Thai Rak Thai (Thai Love Thai Party), led by Thaksin
Shinawatra, won the national election. His populist policy attracted the voters who were
mainly from his political base in north and northeastern Thailand, which, combined, are
home to the largest percentage of the population in the country. He was able to
accomplish much during his first administration (Blondel & Thiébault, 2010;
Chachavalpongpun, 2014; McCargo, 2002).
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Figure 2.4 Timeline of Thailand’s National Political Crisis

P.M. Thaksin was removed
from power by the coup d'état
and this marked the beginning
of political conflict between
the Red & Yellow Shirts.

Effects of political turmoil on
social, political, economic, &
democratic development.

The Twin Coups
5 Democratic governments
2 Military installed government

2006 Military Coup

 Limited freedom of expression
 Electoral suspension
 Ruled by the National Council
for Peace and Order (NCPO)

2018 Military Government

2014 Military Coup

P.M. Yingluck was overthrown
by the junta and political unrest
remains.

After the 2001 general election, which was a landslide victory for Thaksin, there
was a short period of calm. In 2006, during the second term of his administration, another
political crisis arose (depicted in Figure 2.4). The middle-class and elite groups, called
“Anti-Thaksin” in Bangkok, became not only displeased but were frustrated with
Thaksin’s administration. After a short period of demonstration and protest instigated by
the Yellow Shirt. His administration was toppled down by the military in 2006. He was
prosecuted for corruption and conflict of interest with his populist policies. This political
crisis not only affected economics, government stability, and public policy, but it also
affected the unity of Thai society (Phongpaichit & Baker, 2004; Pongsudhirak, 2008).
During this political crisis, people generally divided into two groups based on
their political advocacy. The first group was the members of Thaksin’s government who
identified themselves as “Red Shirts.” Most of them were geographically from northern
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and northeastern Thailand. Basically, these people have been seen as a grassroots group
because of their rural origins and generally low income. The opposition group protested
with the aim of removing Thaksin’s government due to alleged corruption and the lack of
effective governance. The anti-Shinawatra people were mostly from Bangkok and the
urban areas. Many of them were from southern Thailand, which has been a large voter
base for the Democrat Party. This group identified themselves as “Yellow Shirts.” These
two “colors” battled one another in major street protests. Sometimes the conflict was seen
as a short-term political game, but repetitive political confrontation finally evolved into a
prolonged national political crisis (BBC News, 2012; Bremmer, 2016; Prasirtsuk, 2010).
When crisis conditions lead to deadlock among groups, a military coup is seen as
a conventional solution in Thailand, and this strategy was eventually employed (Baker &
Phongpaichit, 2014). On September 19, 2006, while Thaksin was attending a meeting at
the United Nations in New York, the elected government of Thaksin Shinawatra was
overthrown by the Thai military. The national political crisis became a threat to
economic, social, and political development and had extensively affected central,
provincial, and local government entities (Mydans & Fuller, 2006; Ockey, 2007).
Political Unrest and the 2014 Military Coup
In July 2011, Yingluck Shinawatra, Thaksin’s sister, accepted the nomination to
run a political campaign for the position of prime minister. Eventually, her party, the
Pheu Thai Party, won the national election and she became the first female prime
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minister of Thailand (Low, 2012). However, the anti-Thaksin group remained critical of
her, calling her Thaksin’s nominee. As they did before, leadership opposition came out in
the streets and began to protest in Bangkok due to their dissatisfaction with her decisions
relating to the Amnesty Bill, a bill that aimed to provide an amnesty for political offenses
and political prisoners who were arrested and persecuted after the coup in 2006 (Marshall
& Szep, 2014).
Unfortunately for Yingluck, her administration was unable to hold power. Under
the political pressure and with the development of a new political crisis, she decided to
step down and call for a new election while her interim government remained in power.
However, the election never happened because the opposition party and its protesters
(Yellow Shirts) demonstrated to prevent it. The protest finally became more violent and
out of control. As is common in Thailand, the conventional wisdom, a coup, was again
used by the military (Jones, 2014).
In 2014, General Prayut Chan-o-cha led the coup d’état and called for national
reform and the drafting of a new constitution. In addition, he was positioned by the junta
to rule the country as the unelected prime minister. Currently, all junta-proposed national
reform activities are still in process. The military government expects to complete the
reforms within the given timeframe and will allow the general election in 2016, or a year
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after completion of a new Constitution3 (Associated Press, 2014; Crispin, 2016; Fuller,
2014).
The political situation is still controversial, especially the new constitution and the
reform. Moreover, most of local government elected officials who ended their
administrative term during this reform period were requested by the junta to continue
serving in their positions until the central government finishes the reform mission
(National Council for Peace and Order, 2014). Suffice to say, many things within the
governmental structure could be affected due to political turbulence, even though the
political unrest seems to be abating because the military government is still in power. So,
crisis does not necessarily mean active political conflict but major unresolved
constitutional issues and a factionalized regime. In reality, the political crisis remains just
below the surface; it could emerge again any time after the military government steps
down (Chachavalpongpun, 2014; French, 2016; & International Crisis Group, 2014).
It is important to state that the military coups in 2006 and 2014, those that Baker
(2016) called “the twin coups,”4 have had extensive effects not only at the national level,
but they have also had a tremendous effect on economic, social, and democratic
development throughout the country (Baker, 2016, p. 389; Pongsudhirak, 2014;
Sethapramote, 2015; Yueh, 2014). During this period (2006 up to the completion of the

3

As of the final review of this thesis (February 2018), this has not happened.
The author states that he called them “the twin coups” because the sources of these two coups were from
the same groups of people and the same conditions. These two coups have a tight interrelation.
4
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research analysis in 2016), Thai society has suffered severely from the prolonged political
crisis that caused economic downturn, decline of investment, political uncertainty and
fears, etc.
To conceptualize the context of Thailand’s political crisis, Table 2.1 integrates
two frameworks that include the elements of crisis addressed by Boin, t’Hart, Stern, and
Sundelius (2017) and the aspects of crisis provided by Krieger (2001). The first
framework provides three elements of crisis; “threat, urgency, and uncertainty” (Boin,
t’Hart, Stern, & Sundelius, 2017, p. 5). As Boin, et al. (2017) explain, these three key
elements help identify the different patterns of crisis. First, the threat helps us to perceive
and locate position and space in which such a crisis occurs. Next, urgency helps identify
the status of crisis. It helps us to evaluate the degree of severity that such crisis causes
and the needs for responding. Finally, uncertainty triggers fears. Nevertheless, uncertain
conditions help produce strategic measurements and management processes for crisis
response.
The second framework has three components including “systemic crises,
confrontation crises, and decision-making crises” (Krieger, 2001, p. 182). System refers
to the whole structure that consists of socio-political interactions, norms, and
regulations—institutions. Confrontation refers to the disputes that are caused from the
challenges between two opposition parties. It may occur when the bargaining cannot
reach common agreement. Finally, decision-making refers to the consequences of
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unsuccessful policy making processes that governments conduct. The results of these
components cause problems for their citizens and for political stability (Krieger, 2001).
The implications of the two frameworks develop the new, integrating framework for
introducing the context of Thailand’s political crisis. In Table 2.1, the framework
explains how Thailand’s political crisis matters and increases an understanding of context
of Thailand’s political crises.
Table 2.1 Theoretical Dimensions of Thailand’s Political Crises
Threat to
System

Confront
ation

Decision
making

Uncertainty about

Urgency of

 Threat of system
and institutional
collapse, loss of
capacity, and
weakness
 Threat to political
consensus in army
elites, in society,
and in state society



Uncertainty about
status, future, and
behavior of
institutions



System/state is
KEY to political
stability and
development



Fear of what other
side will do



 Threat to ability of
government to make
decision on public
problems



Uncertainty
whether decisions
government made,
when, how



Danger of social
conflict that has
long term
consequences
(divided society) +
longer it goes on
harder to fix
Public problems not
solved cause public
bad (e.g. garbage
not collected causes
disease)

To understand the context of Thailand’s political crises, the framework provides
three integrative explanations. Thailand’s political crises since 2006 were obviously
addressed through military interventions. The effects of these political crises triggered a
system crisis, and the system crisis created threats to specific systems and institutions.
For example, political shocks caused by military coups dynamically induced institutional
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turbulence and even collapse. The shocks also created threats to political and social
systems. The government had administrative and political weaknesses. The government
also lost the capacity to handle political instability and maintain policies. In addition, the
system crisis created uncertainty about the status, future, and behavior of institutions. For
example, citizens were uncertain about the status of the new constitution and future of a
national election. The system crisis stimulated Thai society into realizing that threats
caused by political crises are undesirable and dangerous to political stability and
democracy. Political crises have to be addressed as an undermining factor to social and
political development. Therefore, they need to be resolved as soon as possible. Political
systems and civilian government should be the key to institute political stability and
development (Boin, ‘t Hart, Stern, & Sundelius, 2017; Krieger, 2001).
Second, Thailand’s political crises are considered confrontation crises because
sources for political crises were created by two conflicting parties—i.e. between
government and an opposition party and between government and the military. Both
sides were unsuccessful in negotiating within legislative means and failed to decide on a
way forward. Consequently, this unresolved confrontation created a threat to consensus
in army elites, in society, and in government. The confrontation between two political
factions also created fear of what the other side would do. For instance, government
feared large anti-government protests or of military reaction. Eventually, society
experienced the threat created by the confrontations that triggered the danger of social
conflict that has long-term consequences—e.g. divided society or violence. The longer a
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political crisis goes on, the harder it is to fix. Political crisis is an urgent agenda that
needs every party to find a way out as soon as possible (Boin, ‘t Hart, Stern, & Sundelius,
2017; Krieger, 2001).
Finally, the prolonged political crisis in Thailand is considered a decision-making
crisis. Political crises create a threat to the ability of government to make decisions on
public problems and to determine a way forward. These crises trigger an uncertainty
about government decisions being made, when they are made, and how they are made.
Government is uncertain about making decisions on social policies that may have a risk
of non-compliance. The anti-government people and military elites closely watch policies
and strategies that government decides to do. As a result, public problems are not solved
properly. Those public problems then cause negative consequences—e.g. garbage is not
collected, causing disease (Boin, ‘t Hart, Stern, & Sundelius, 2017; Krieger, 2001).
Literature Review
Studies on Effects of Political Crisis on Local Government Service Delivery
To better understand the opportunities for this study, this section explores
previous research on the effects of political crisis on local government service delivery.
The previous studies in this area encompass two aspects: (1) the effects of political crisis
on local government service delivery from international experiences; and (2) the effects
of political crisis on local government service delivery in Thailand.
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The related literature on the effects of political crisis and how it has affected local
public service delivery and socioeconomic factors is examined. The emphasis of previous
studies centers on how the breakdown or decline of national political institutions and
political leadership affects local government service delivery and socioeconomic factors.
The first part presents research done in the global context, followed by a discussion of
previous studies specific to Thailand.
After reviewing various sources, there appears to have been very little study done
on the effects of political crisis on local government service delivery. Numerous studies
emphasize how economic or financial crises negatively affected local governments (e.g.
Carboni & Milward, 2012; Greer, 2010; Nelson & Balu, 2014; Reschovsky, 2004;
Stenberge, 2011; United Cities and Local Government, 2009). However, only a few
available studies look at the effects of political crisis on local government. Most studies
were conducted in countries that were already experiencing fragile conditions, such as
Somalia, Ukraine, and Zimbabwe. It is important to emphasize that the existing literature
is insufficient to establish any working hypothesis but only useful to organize data
collection into threats and opportunities and into the five moderating variables.
Studies in the Global Context
Regarding political institutions, Kynev (2006) investigated the effects of the 2004
national political and institutional crisis in Ukraine on “the system of local selfgovernment” (p. 32). After the regime change, the impact of institutional change affected
local administrative systems; that is the local council members are elected by local
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citizens but local leaders are appointed and dismissed by the central authority. This
change caused political monopoly controlled by central authority (Kynev, 2006).
Importantly, Kynev (2006) stresses the importance that the 2004 political crisis in
Ukraine developed a sustainable solution by strengthening “institutional mechanisms”
because strong institutions help protect public interests from the intervention of a
“monopoly of power by any single group” influenced by the central government (p. 37).
Consequently, the stable institutions increase local authorities’ capacity in providing
services.
In the case of the political crisis in Zimbabwe, Musekiwa & Chatiza (2015) note
that “political polarization” tightened the relationship between national and local
politicians because they were from the same political party, hence the local councilors
were not interested in, or even ignored, public participation in local activities (p. 130). In
addition, institutional breakdown caused policy interventions of central government on
local authorities. Muchadenyika (2015) conducted research on the effects of “allocation
of housing land between 2000 and 2012” on cities’ service delivery in four major cities in
Zimbabwe (p. 1219). The results revealed that prolonged political and institutional crisis
in Zimbabwe created gaps for the central government’s struggles to intervene in the
operations of local authorities, for example housing services. Local authorities were
limited and some local services were transferred back to a central authority and/or
contracted out to the private sector (Muchadenyika, 2015).
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Regarding civic engagement, political crisis in Zimbabwe undermined civic
engagement at the local level because political crisis caused “political polarization” that
made a tight relationship between the national and local governments (Musekiwa &
Chatiza, 2015, p. 130). This may seem to be a positive effect, but actually it is not
because national and local politicians are from the same party. They felt like they had
enough stability to maintain political power, so the local politicians were not interested in
building civic capacity and engagement in their local governments (Musekiwa & Chatiza,
2015)
Moreover, during political crisis local residents tried to respond to the decline of
local service capacity. Local citizens tried to help local authorities to provide services by
setting up civic engagement mechanisms and affiliated organizations. Unfortunately, due
to political circumstances, local authorities lacked capacity to handle the needs of citizens
and low management capacity of citizen-led organizations (Musekiwa & Chatiza, 2015).
Börzel and Risse (2016) argue that “weak or limited statehood or dysfunctional
institutions does not necessarily lead to weak or bad governance,” especially at the local
level (p. 2). In addition, the research employed three kinds of trust (personalized-trust,
group-based trust, and generalized-trust) as informal institutions to examine the existence
of governance at the local level, although the status of the national political institution is
weak and dysfunctional (Börzel & Risse, 2016, p. 4).
In their research, Börzel & Risse (2016) reported that “personalized trust within
close-knit communities enables effective and legitimate governance at the local level in
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the absence of functioning state institutions” (Börzel & Risse, 2016, p. 156). In addition,
they argue that each kind of trust could support the other in order to maintain the degree
of governance, especially when collective groups are strong and work across boundaries
at the local level, even though national political institutions are in a dysfunctional phase
(Börzel & Risse, 2016).
For governance, Kynev (2006) states that the national political crisis triggered
negative effects on the governance system and destabilized social unity of the country.
Moreover, during the political crisis central government intervention undermined local
transparency. Some local public services, such as housing services, were transferred from
the local authority back to the national government, making it difficult for local
councilors to exercise checks and balances or even be involved in management processes
(Muchadenyika, 2015).
For political economy, political crisis in Somalia caused “state collapse” and
“intractable conflicts” (Menkhaus, 2007, p. 357). Menkhaus (2007) states that the
prolonged political crisis caused the civil war in the country. Due to the fighting, local
communities were ruined and basic public services, such as hospitals, found it difficult to
serve people. Citizens lived in poor conditions and lacked even basic sanitation,
eventually causing disease and health problems within their communities (Menkhaus,
2007).
Musekiwa and Chatiza (2015) studied the relationship between the decline of
local public service and the progress of citizen engagement during political turbulence in
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Zimbabwe. Due to the prolonged political instability, local authorities encountered
financial deficits and lacked resources, which led to the decline of local basic service
delivery.
In addition, Muchadenyika (2017) stressed that Zimbabwean national political
breakdown created negative effects in both central and local service provisions. At the
local level, municipalities were unable to provide and maintain basic public services such
as roads, sewer, water, electricity, and housing, and also lacked the capacity to stimulate
economic activities and employment (Munzwa & Wellington, 2010, p. 139).
Interestingly, Munzwa and Wellington (2010) emphasize that prolonged political crisis
caused the decline of good governance, inducing “unemployment” and other hindrances
to public service operations (p. 140).
Other studies done in the global context also reported negative effects of political
crisis on local government public service delivery. Very few have shown a positive effect
of dysfunctional state institutions on local governance. But Börzel and Risse (2015) and
Musekiwa and Chatiza (2015) show that there are ways to have a “non-effect” via coping
mechanisms at the local level, especially in civic engagement. Most cases obviously
indicated the linkage between national political crisis and low capacity of local
governments for providing basic public services. However, it is imperative to review the
studies done in the Thai political context and address research opportunities for exploring
the effects of national political crises on local government service delivery in Thailand.
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Studies in the Thai Context
After reviewing the recent Thailand-specific literature on political crisis and how
it has affected local government service delivery, my observation is that available studies
were primarily conducted more about the effect of economic crisis on government
functions and civil society than the effects of political crisis on local service delivery.
Nevertheless, these examples are important and useful for guiding research opportunities
because political economy is the indirect way that national political crisis affects local
government service delivery.
This section begins with the effects of economic crisis on public services and civil
society. When the economic crisis in Thailand arose 1997, it widely affected public
agencies, business sectors, and social policies. One study reveals that negative effects of
economic crisis led to unemployment and wage cuts, poverty and inequality, and
reduction in health services and educational opportunities (Jung et al., 2003, p. 97).
Similarly, there was a study examining the effects of economic crisis on the
development of local government in Thailand. Khoman (2005) notes that even though
economic crisis created negative effects at both the organizational and individual levels,
“not all of its effects were negative” (Khoman, 2005, p. 58). The negative effects of
economic crisis triggered financial deficits, decline of investment, layoffs, currency
instability, and so forth. Surprisingly, the effects of the crisis also created an opportunity
for government to work closely with citizens and strengthen the government-citizen
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relationship. This stimulated Thai government to become more “transparent and
responsive to public concerns” (Khoman, 2005, p. 58).
This crisis triggered Thailand political reforms that included the progress of
citizen empowerment and decentralization in Thailand (Khoman, 2005). This case
illustrates that we can see that a crisis may help offset some of the negative effects it
produces. While crises cause negative effects on the one hand, on the other they may
produce some benefits.
As mentioned, previous studies about the effects of national political crisis on
local government service delivery in Thailand are rare. In order to investigate “social and
political dynamics” at the local level and integration of the concept of “coproduction and
community empowerment,” Sudhipongpracha and Wongpredee (2016) examined the
effects of coproduction on community empowerment in two Thai municipalities (p. 3023). This research found that empowering local citizens to coproduce local services
transformed them from “passive/reactive citizens waiting for government services and
opportunity to voice their opinions to active/proactive citizens” (Sudhipongpracha &
Wongpredee, 2016, p. 311).
In addition, this research noted that even though the effects of “national political
climate” may create threats for “citizens’ political engagement” in the municipalities,
some local activities, such as road maintenance projects, successfully engaged more
citizens into coproducing processes than other local activities (Sudhipongpracha &
Wongpredee, 2016, p. 312). This is considered as an opportunity for local governments to
40

maintain a local government-citizen relationship and strengthen civic engagement in local
public service delivery. In addition, this research emphasizes that in “urban
municipality,” the degree of coproduction was moved from simply working together to
co-management by creating an informal committee that included local political leaders,
community leaders, citizens, and local officials (Sudhipongpracha & Wongpredee, 2016,
p. 313).
On threats, the literature presents how the economy has declined since the 2006
political crisis and how it has affected socioeconomic factors. Sussangkarn and
Nikomborirak (2016) affirm that prolonged political crisis in Thailand obviously creates
negative effects on the Thai economy as a whole. Political crisis induces uncertainty for
both Thai and foreign investors to expand their investments in Thailand. Due to an
unclear direction of the political situation, the export growth has been declining
dramatically compared to times of stable political conditions. In addition, political
turbulence and “declining competitiveness” labels Thailand as the “sick man” of the
region (Sussangkarn & Nikomborirak, 2016, p. 41). It is inevitable for local governments
as public service providers to avoid these threats because a declining economy surely
affects local revenues and discourages local investments.
Based on the data presented by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), since
2006 Thailand total investment (percentage of GDP) has been declining due to political
instability (International Monetary Fund, Thailand World Economic Outlook Database,
2017; Sussangkarn & Nikomborirak, 2016).
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The continuing political crisis since 2006 has undermined foreign and local
investments. Manufacturers and investors lack confidence to invest and expand their
businesses and especially to make capital investments. Instead, the investors prefer to
increase their labor force rather than investing in machines; human labor being cheaper
than machines in the short term. Additionally, labor forces are flexible to mobilize and
demobilize when the situation is uncertain (International Monetary Fund, Thailand World
Economic Outlook Database, 2017).
In summary, the literature reflects the effects of political crises that entail both
opportunities and threats. Public service delivery is an important and a major
responsibility of Thailand local governments. There continue to be concerns that the
prolonged national political crisis in Thailand will affect public service delivery based at
the local level. Many studies conducted in the global context reveal that political crisis
creates negative effects on local affairs and basic public services operated by local
authorities. In the Thai context, a few studies show how national political crises affected
institutional breakdown, political participation, and add to a declining economy. Few of
these studies spotlight specific intervening factors, for instance political institutions,
citizenship, governance, political leadership, and economic factors that may affect local
government service delivery. Addressing this gap is something that this current study will
attempt to do.
This study explores how national political crisis, a fact of life, to some degree,
since 2006, has affected local government service delivery in Khon Kaen Province,
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Thailand. The five moderating variables employed in this study are not used to formulate
a hypothesis, but rather are used for looking at the antecedent conditions for local service
delivery. The specific questions to be answered are: (1) whether local government
service delivery experiences a negative impact, a positive impact, or some combination of
the two; and (2) which moderating variables explain this. In order to guide the conceptual
framework of this research, the following section addresses the relevant theories in
political science and public administration.
Theoretical Foundations
While the intent of this study is not to test any hypotheses, it is necessary to use
certain established theories to build a foundation for the analysis used in this study. There
are three theoretical approaches that must be examined; institutional theory, governance
theory (including civic engagement and public leadership), and political economy theory.
Their theoretical implications for local government service delivery under political crises
are also addressed. First, the discussion describes the broad concept of institutionalism
and then concentrates on formal institutions and laws, and looks at the concept of
decentralization. Next, governance theoretical approaches explain the core concepts of
new public governance, civic engagement, and public leadership. Political economy
theory is explored to provide an understanding of the institutional interrelation between
politics and economics and explore how change in political institutions triggers change in
economics or vice versa. Finally, how these three relevant theories are related to each
other is studied and their implications for current research summarized.
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Institutional Theory
Defining Political Institutions. Institutional theory plays a vital role in political
studies, economics, and governance studies. The essence of institutional theory provides
the sophisticated framework to reflect public policy processes, behavior of individuals in
political society, and impacts of changes within political institutions (North, 1990; Peters,
2011; Peters & Pierre, 1998; Putnam, 1993). Scholars have presented approaches to study
institutions using various assumptions. Nevertheless, they commonly agreed that the
institutions do matter (Peters, 2011, p.79; Teske, 1991).
To understand the complicated patterns of institutions, North (1990) characterized
institutions into two forms; formal constraints and informal constraints (p. 4). The
constraints generally are created by individuals or groups in order to contour human
interaction and narrow the choices. In addition, those constraints are the sources to form
institutions. For example, the formal rules generally are developed from traditional and
social norms or agreements. They are evolved and institutionalized due to the constraints
and social complexities (North, 1990).
The patterns of formal institutions include constitutions, formal laws, political
rules, economic rules, and contracts (North, 1990, p. 47). These formal institutions are
created in order to guide and shape human interactions and behaviors, especially at the
individual level. The impacts of formal institutions create the interrelations within
institutions. For example, the formal political rules trigger economic compliances or vice
versa. Typically, the formal institutions are officially written down and constituted
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through the legislative process such as constitutions and laws (Dobler, 2011; North,
1990).
For this research, I focus on the formal institutions, or what North (1990) called
“formal constraints,” because much of the informal institutions are considered as
governance (p. 46). The formal institutions can help us understand whether change or
instability in formal political institutions affect Thailand’s local government service
delivery performance or even social economics in times of national political crisis.
Theoretical Implications. The institutional theory helps guide the analysis in this
study. Political institutions rest in an analytical framework as one of the moderating
variables that are affected by national political crisis, so that the result may affect the
effectiveness of local government service delivery (March & Olsen, 1984; Peters, 2012).
To examine whether political institutions impact local government service delivery, the
institutional theory helps explain how changes in formal rules, systems, and procedures—
e.g. constitution, laws, elections, voting—at the national level influence citizens’
interactions, individual behaviors, local political institutions, and civil society (March &
Olsen, 1984; North, 1990; Peters, 2012).
The literature on political institutions in Thailand generally shows that Thailand’s
political institutions influence the patterns of politics (i.e. policy making processes), the
political structure (i.e. centralized structure and authority), and “bureaucratic autonomy”
(Hicken & Selway, 2012; Painter, 2004, p. 377). In recent decades, due to political
instability, formal political institutions in Thailand such as constitutions, formal laws, and
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the electoral system are unstable and fragile, and are undermined by political unrest. The
institutional formations and distortions are influenced by various actors such as
bureaucrats, civil society, the military, and the judiciary. Prominently, the military and
judiciary are the most influential actors in political institutional progress (Kuhonta &
Sinpeng, 2014; Ockey, 2009).
For example, Kuhonta and Sinpeng (2014) argue that political institutions in
Thailand are designed and steered by not only the “usual suspects such as the military,
but from unexpected actors, such as the judiciary and civil society” (p. 334). The
prominent evidence shows that the military and constitutional courts are influential actors
in changing political institutions by legitimizing the two military coups in 2006 and 2014.
Consequently, the constitutions and other formal laws, as formal political institutions,
were changed or suspended. The new institutions were drafted and constituted by the
same actors in order to serve their own political interests (Kuhonta & Sinpeng, 2014).
A change in one influential political institution affects the function of other
institutions, such as the suspension of the constitution affecting the electoral system and
political parties (Dalpino, 2012; Waitoolkiata & Chambers, 2015). In addition, Kuhonta
and Sinpeng (2014) emphasize that the formation of Thailand’s political institutions
seemingly serves specific political interests of the military and political elites rather than
protecting citizens’ rights and promoting good governance. Further, Bureekul and
Thananithichot (2012) argue that political institutional instability in Thailand reduces
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confidence among citizens and undermines social interactions. This becomes an obstacle
to successful reconciliation.
To understand the influences and interrelation between institutions and local
governing processes, the following section discusses governance theory, which includes
governance, civic engagement, and political leadership.
Governance Theory
Defining Governance. The meaning of governance has been discussed widely
across academia and in studies of modern government practices. Some scholars identify
the meanings that help illustrate the core features of governance as a “new process of
governing” (Rhodes, 1996, p. 623). Stoker (1998) defined governance as “the
development of governing styles in which boundaries between and within public and
private sectors have become blurred” (p. 17). In this sense, governance is not only
utilized for the public sector, but also the private and voluntary sectors. For public
sectors, the meaning of governance refers to the interdependence between roles of
governments and societal sectors in providing public services. The traditional styles of
governing, i.e. “bureaucratic hierarchy” and command and control, have been replaced by
multi-jurisdictional collaboration, networks, and collective actions (Bevir, 2011; Rhodes,
2007; Stoker, 1998).
In the private sector, governance refers to the process of “corporate governance”
that derives business concepts to apply to government practices and public service
delivery (Rhodes, 1996, p. 654). The voluntary sector refers to governance as “self47

governing networks” (Rhodes, 1996, p. 658). Self-governing organizations play a vital
role in providing service delivery by replacing or supporting the works of government
through societal networks and partnerships. The lifetime of a self-governing organization
is short because it is easily influenced by interest-groups or potential members (Hirst,
2000).
Even though the definitions of governance are diverse based on levels of use and
forms of institution, I conclude that governance and institutions are not equivalent terms.
Rather, governance is about the values of collective actions and collaboration for
common goals. In theory, excessive power of central government is restrained by
individual citizens and civil society in pursuit of improving quality of public services,
expanding policy networks, enhancing social equality, increasing transparency, and
promoting accountability. To understand the evolution of the foundations of governance,
the following section illustrates the development of governance theory, from a statecentered approach to a society-centered approach.
Effect of the Evolution of Governance Theory on Public Service Delivery
Governance is considered a new paradigm of public management that developed
out of traditional public administration (Osborne, 2006). Due to social complexity and
various needs of public service delivery, government is no longer a major policy actor
and a main public service provider. Governments have to blur boundaries and connect to
societal actors and professional service providers in order to cope with complicated
services and improve the quality of public services (Klijn, 2002). Still, a new paradigm
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evolves by overlapping or interconnecting with existing paradigms. The shadow of
hierarchy remains influential in the operation of traditional public administration and
public management (Klijn, 2002; Osborne, 2006). The evolution emphasizes three main
stages: public administration, new public management, and new public governance.
Public Administration. Traditional public administration sees government as a
main actor in the process of governing, as well as policy processes. Economic and
societal sectors are also steered by the central government (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2003;
Peters & Pierre, 1998). Public service delivery and policy decision-making are controlled
and dominated by the central government through the ministries (Hirst, 2000). As a
central actor, government exercises power through formal institutional procedures.
Meanwhile, subnational governments and societal sectors are controlled through
hierarchical structures (Renn, Klinke, & Asselt, 2011; Stoker, 1998). In addition, “public
institutions offer one-size-fits-all services” to citizens and societal sectors (Osborne &
Gaebler, 1993, p. 168). As mentioned, the hierarchy is a governance mechanism that is
used within governmental administration (Osborne, 2006, p. 383). Also, bureaucracy
plays a dominant role in policy decision-making processes and policy implementation
(Osborne, 1993; Osborne, 2006). The public administrative systems are designed and
directed by bureaucratic concepts in order to facilitate public administrators and civil
servants rather than citizens and society (Osborne, 1993; Osborne & Gaebler, 1993).
When society is more complex and traditional public service provisions are
challenged by diverse needs and expectations of civil society, government no longer has
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as large a role in service delivery and public problem-solving (Renn, Klinke, & Asselt,
2011). Plus, when government encounters fiscal hardship for expanding public services
and even lacks budget to subsidize subnational governments such as states and local
governments, most public services are transferred to local governments without funding
(Osborne, 1993). These factors push government to change administrative approaches in
order to improve their performance (Osborne, 1993). In order to deal with these
challenges and also improve government performance, government employs business
administrative approaches in public organizations in pursuit of enhancing efficiency and
effectiveness of public services (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2003). The poor performance of
bureaucracies and old administrative techniques are increasingly criticized and attacked
by the public, and eventually the old public administration is transformed to new public
management (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2003; Osborne & Gaebler, 1993).
New Public Management. New public management (NPM) is developed based
on “managerialism” that values privatization and business administrative approaches as
the core of governing process in the public sector (Rhodes, 1996, p. 655). Government
employs the successful concepts of business administration and market-based strategies
to improve public service provision (Peters & Pierre, 1998). The constraints and poor
performance of traditional public administration put pressure on governments to expand
networks and horizontally coordinate with other sectors to provide services (Rhodes,
2007). In addition, most government-led programs depend on “market mechanisms” and
focus on the outputs rather than procedures (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2003, p.13 & Hood,
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1991, p. 4). NPM emphasizes customer-centric and performance-based management.
Public-private partnerships encourage out-sourcing activities that help reduce public
investment and improve the quality of service delivery. To accommodate this process, the
government devolves authority and service provision to quasi-public organizations and
the private sector (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2003; Heinrich, 2011). More importantly,
political leadership is one of the key success factors for achieving NPM because public
leaders need to have “political entrepreneurship” in order to coordinate with both public
and private networks (Peters & Pierre, 1998, p. 227).
Even though NPM is asserted to be a reconnecting mechanism between theory
and practice (Frederickson et al., 2012), NPM is still criticized by many public
administration scholars. As Osborne (2006) stressed, NPM is merely a transitory stage,
which transforms public administration to new public governance. Government uses
NPM as an instrument to merely maintain intra-public organizational performance rather
than being of public value (Osborne, 2006; Rhodes, 1996).
Even though most public services are devolved to other public organizations and
even the private sector, the shadow of public institutions, e.g. bureaucracy and hierarchy,
remain influential because the government wants to ensure that public services are fairly
and efficiently distributed (Moe, 1984). In addition, to be successful, government
management has to understand and implement monitoring and measuring processes for
those service provisions that have been contracted to the private sector. Some contracted
activities may result in poor performance or may not respond to the needs of society.
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Additionally, management failures can cause problems to government (Hefetz & Warner,
2004; Moe, 1984). Moreover, some are concerned that NPM may create a channel for the
private sector to take advantage of public service provisions rather than provide “cheaper
and better services for all” (Hood, 1991, p. 9).
The call for more collective action and societal collaboration prompts
governments and society to shift orthodox and business administrative approaches to new
public governance that values social interaction and networks. The sense of customer
service in NPM is shifted to the sense of serving citizens in new processes of governing
(Denhardt & Denhardt, 2003). Due to theoretical and practical transition, new public
governance emerges as a new process of governing in the public sector (Kickert, 1997;
Rhodes, 2007).
New Public Governance. New public governance (NPG or “governance”) is a
recent administrative concept of government that challenges, and even replaces, the
limitations of traditional public administration and state-centered approaches (Rhodes,
2007; Stoker, 1998). NPG values collective action and network-based management.
Government mutually shares power, authority, and resources with “multi-actor
networks,” especially in public policy—i.e. policy network, and public service provisions
(Enroth, 2011; Peters & Pierre, 1998; Renn, Klinke, & Asselt, 2011, p. 233).
In this new process of governing, government changes its role from one single
actor to having multiple interactions with societal sectors from both public and nonpublic sectors that have diverse roles, levels, and institutional settings. More specifically,
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these governance networks are dynamic and work across boundaries (Renn, Klinke, &
Asselt, 2011). Peters and Pierre (1998) stated that new public governance helps enhance
policy engagement, public-private partnerships, and voluntarism in public service
provisions. Governmental structure is less hierarchical and a top-down administrative
approach is replaced by a bottom-up approach (Kickert, 1997).
In addition, new public governance influences the features of institutions because
the new process of governing induces dynamic and collective patterns of human
interactions and behavior. The actors within collective interactions are more diverse in
terms of goals, needs, and interests, so that institutions are more adaptive and flexible to a
dynamic society. More specifically, the interactions link not only the actors within
institutions, but also those from outside. New public governance emphasizes coordination
and networks across boundaries (Peters, 2011).
Collaboration
The new governance approach creates new procedures and opportunities for the
public sector to flexibly collaborate with various actors and networks across boundaries.
To pursue effective collaboration in public service delivery, governance stimulates active
interactions among actors through collaborative decision-making processes in order to
enhance effective policy engagement and achieve collective goals (Bevir, 2011).
Additionally, institutional design and formal rules are important factors to help the
progress of collaborations because the scope of collaboration is bounded not only by the
public sector, but also the private and non-profit sectors (Bingham, 2011). The following
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section addresses the key definitions of collaboration as theoretical and practical
dimensions in governance perspective and then discusses the features and impacts of
collaboration on public service delivery.
Defining Collaboration. From a governance perspective, collaboration refers to
interactions among collective actors as partners from both inside public organizations and
“outside a single organization” in order to reach an achievement of policy objectives and
public service delivery (Bingham, 2011, p. 386). Bevir (2006) underscored that
collaboration is a new governing approach that is a consequence of the change from
“laws and commands to negotiation and diplomacy” and from “a monolithic bureaucratic
hierarchy toward multilevel institutions” (p. 426 & 434). Collaboration occurs when the
actors interplay and exchange skills and resources across organizations in order find
better solutions and innovations. Collaboration stimulates public engagement in policy
discretion and administration. The stakeholders who are involved in collaborating
processes are from different facets of civil society, for example, the public sector, the
private sector, and non-profit organizations (Bevir, 2006; Bingham, 2011; Emerson,
Nabatchi, & Balogh, 2012). To truly understand the importance and impact of
collaboration on public service delivery, we must examine the forms of collaboration that
occur between various sectors (Bingham, 2011).
Collaboration among Multiple Sectors. Collaboration is an important governing
mechanism to improve effectiveness of public service provisions. Government no longer
acts alone in service delivery due to lack of capacity and resources, hierarchical barriers,
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and ineffective bureaucratic instruments (Bingham, 2011; Sirianni, 2009). Collaboration
creates space for linking strategic partners from multiple sectors and different
institutional settings to work together in partnerships (Bevir, 2006).
To understand the distinctive features of collaborative partnerships, Mackintosh
(1992) presented three models of partnership as mechanism to develop effective
collaboration; “synergy,” “transformation,” and “budget enlargement” (p. 213). Even
though the model is developed to explain public-private collaborative partnerships, the
implications of this model are useful for today’s collaborative governance. The synergy
model emphasizes collaboration among diverse stakeholders across boundaries by
sharing and exchanging skills, resources, and goals in pursuit of gaining mutual benefits
and producing innovations (Mackintosh, 1992, p. 213; Pollitt, 2003). Additionally,
Tschirhart, Amezcua, and Anker (2009) suggested that resource sharing is important for
effective collaboration. Nevertheless, public managers should be concerned about
“functionality,” that those resources can be utilized effectively (p. 17). Resource sharing
should be viewed as an important factor for achieving organizational purposes. Tangible
resources provide a source for estimating an availability of resources before sharing them
with other partners (Tschirhart, Amezcua, & Anker, 2009).
Secondly, the transformation model offers mutual opportunities for both public
and private sectors to exchange or adapt values and practices between one another as a
“joint venture” partnership (Mackintosh, 1992, p. 216). The public sector can take this
opportunity to encourage the private sector to better understand public value and public
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interest. Conversely, the private sector should also try to transfer useful practices and
successful experiences to the public sector so that these lessons help encourage the public
sector to perform efficiently and accountably (Mackintosh, 1992).
Finally, the budget enlargement model is a strategic approach for collaborative
partnership that is used for gaining financial support from a third party, such as central
government (Mackintosh, 1992, p. 217). In this sense, the public sector lacks the budget
to operate public services or infrastructure programs, while the private sector is
concerned about failures and risks. In order to minimize risks and increase financial
feasibility, these two parties seek to build common agreements and collaborative
partnerships in order to be in a better position to request financial subsidies from central
or local governments (Mackintosh, 1992). Pollitt (2003) argues that joined-up
government, or what Mackintosh (1992) called joint venture, is not a one-size-fits-all
approach. The public sector should carefully employ a joint approach to use for certain
types of projects based on contexts and conditions because the effective collaboration
relies on these contextual factors and appropriations (Connick & Innes, 2003; Gray,
Jenkins, & Leeuw, 2003).
For collaboration among multi-sectors, Ansell and Gash (2008) argue that this
form of collaboration is considered an informal collaboration. It is developed based on a
conventional approach that emphasizes an achievement of partnership through informal
connections between the public sector and interest-groups rather than collective decisionmaking and public agreement. In contrast, formal collaboration refers to collaborations
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that focus on building public consensus among the various stakeholders, i.e. citizens,
public sector, private sector, non-profit sector. These are facilitated through the “formal
forum”—e.g. town hall meetings, council meetings, etc. (Ansell & Gash, 2008, p. 547).
The literature on governance in Thailand generally shows that initially
government played the role as the main actor in the public sphere. The centralized
bureaucratic system and hierarchical structure influenced policy processes and public
service delivery. National government and ministries in Bangkok were the actual powerholders in public administration (Painter, 2004; Wongpredee & Sudhipongpracha, 2014).
Later, government was faced with economic and political constraints. These challenging
factors pressed Thai government to improve administrative performance to increase the
efficiency and effectiveness of public service. Most of the public services were
transformed to quasi-organizations or even to the private sector in order to enhance
collaborative governance and quality of public service (Bowornwathana, 2000; Painter,
2004).
In addition, Thailand political reform triggered a new pattern of governing
process that valued the role of the citizen, self-governance, transparency, and
accountability. The decentralized governing process (written in the 1997 Constitution)
was adopted as a mechanism to improve public services, enhance local self-governance,
and stimulate citizen participation (Bowornwathana, 2000 & Sudhipongpracha, 2016).
Nevertheless, Thailand’s national government remains an influential actor in resource
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allocation and political power, impeding the progress of governance and decentralization
(Marks & Lebel, 2016; Sudhipongpracha & Wongpredee, 2015).
Civic Engagement
As a result of the decompressed nature of authority in the governance framework,
civic engagement and public leadership have emerged as important and related
frameworks of research.
Governance creates new patterns and chances for engaging citizenry in public
policy processes and public service provision (McLaverty, 2011). Civic engagement
becomes a vital element of new political and governing processes that value the role of
citizens as primary participants in designing policy and public service. Civic engagement
also generates positive impacts on democracy and the public policy process (Michels &
Graaf, 2010; Holmes, 2011). In addition, some scholars emphasize that the life of public
service agency and civic community are shaped by active citizen participation in order to
develop effective public service and progress community value (Putnam, 1993; Adler &
Goggin, 2005).
The characteristics and practice of civic engagement can be seen in various ways,
depending on the organizational and institutional settings. Furthermore, it can be different
in terms of public or private entities (Holmes, 2011). To understand the meaning of civic
engagement, scholars define civic engagement in various ways depending on the
purposes and aspects of engagement activity (Adler & Goggin, 2005). The following
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section discusses the definition of civic engagement theory and theoretical implications
of civic engagement on this current study.
Defining Civic Engagement. To narrow down the specific definition of civic
engagement, Putnam (1993) defines civic engagement as when “citizens in civic
community devote and share their interests by performing active public participation in
public affairs” (p. 87). Citizens in civic community should abandon the sense of selfinterest and increase the value of mutual interests. To be citizens in civic community, it is
not necessary for obligating every citizen to remove self-interest or hold to selflessness.
However, citizens should not use their self-interest to advantage over the interests of
other citizens. The sense of self-interest should be preserved for protecting personal
rights rather than harming the rights or interests of others (Putnam, 1993). The benefit
sharing within civic community is a useful definition of civic engagement. Public space
should be open to every citizen to engage in public activity, no matter who they are,
where they are from, or to what political party they adhere. Eventually, the public
interests gained from civic engagement will benefit every citizen and citizen group within
civic society.
Spectrum of Public Participation. To classify the level of public participation in
public service delivery and also in civil society, the International Association for Public
Participation (IAP2) provides a spectrum of participation in order to identify the roles of
the public sector in public participation processes. There are five levels within the
spectrum, and each level indicates an “increasing impact on the decision” (IAP2, 2014).
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The first level of public participation is to inform the public about basic objectives;
information that helps them to comprehend the background of issues and proposed
solutions. The second level is to consult citizens to gain their input, e.g., options,
opinions, and proposals. The third level is to involve the public in working sessions. This
creates an opportunity for the public sector to work closely with citizens. The fourth level
is to collaborate with the public for developing tools for the decision-making process.
The fifth level is to empower discretional authority for the public to finalize the choices
that meet their needs (IAP2, 2014).
The literature on civic engagement in Thailand generally shows that citizen
participation is more recognized and influential over public and political decision-making
processes since the 1997 Constitution was promulgated. Bringing citizen participation
into the Thai Constitution was inspired by the participatory democratic era
(Bowornwathana, 2000; Krueathep, 2004; Munger, 2007). For example, Bureekul (2009)
argues that the formation of Thai political institutions since the 1997 People’s
Constitution valued citizen engagement as a foundation of participatory democracy. This
institutional reform enhanced the roles of citizens in policy making processes, political
processes, and legal processes at both the national and local levels. Specifically, at the
local level, Bureekul (2009) emphasizes that Thai citizens engage in policy and political
processes from beginning to end as well as exercising their roles in the process of checks
and balances (i.e. informing, consulting, deciding, checking, and removing).
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In recent decades, citizen engagement in public and political activities has
progressed dramatically because citizens understand and realize the importance of their
roles in policy and politics. Nevertheless, in certain political contexts, it seems like the
bureaucrats and the political power-holders remained reluctant to welcome citizen
engagement because engaging citizens in public activities paves the way for [potentially
unwanted] government transparency and accountability (Bureekul, 2009). In some local
communities, citizens engage more in interactive and co-productive activities in their
communities because they have a channel to express their voices and work together with
other local residents and local leaders (Mutebi, 2006; Sudhipongpracha & Wongpredee,
2016).
In conclusion, it is important to stress that civic engagement is an important factor
to increase trust and transparency in government. Citizens have confidence in their
government because they are involved in every process of decision-making. Having high
transparency in public organizations triggers better governance and legitimacy. Also,
eventually it helps improve public services and government performance (OECD, n.d.,
para.1).
Public Leadership
Leadership is an important mechanism for achieving the process of governing in
organizations, whether in the public or private sectors. In organizational administration,
competent leadership helps enhance quality and efficiency of public services (Wart,
2003). In new governance regime, leadership is a driver for furthering new public
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governance that values collaboration across levels and sectors. Effective leadership in
collaborative governance requires the capacity to create civic engagement, promote
motivation, and initiate mutual partnerships (Emerson, Nabatchi, & Balogh, 2012). In
public governance today, leadership encounters many challenges that are generated from
both internal and external events. These factors trigger changes in terms of senses and
features of leadership, especially leadership in public organizations, in order to respond to
complicated social problems and uncertainties in society (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2011;
Wart, 2003). This study investigates political leadership in local governments as a
moderating factor in public service delivery performance. To understand the meanings
and various patterns of leadership, the following section provides key definitions in, and
the relevance of, leadership theory.
Defining Leadership. The meanings of leadership are diverse and are based on
practices and contexts. To ascertain definitions of leadership in the context of public
organizations, scholars provide five meanings of leadership in administrative
circumstances. First, leadership refers to the processes of generating results mandated by
formal institutions and organizational structure. The administrative processes are
completed based upon effectiveness, efficiency, and compliance. This type of leadership
is applicable for frontline public administrators who perform their duties while
maintaining political accountability. Second, leadership refers to supporting and
improving processes that facilitate frontline officers who provide services. Next,
leadership refers to capacity of executives to control and maintain an organizational
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alignment with the changes and the stresses of external and internal circumstances.
Fourth, leadership varies based on specific roles and services that public administrators
are responsible for. Finally, leadership refers to the capacity of public leaders in
providing vision and unitizing skills for making decisions on public service provisions,
especially in difficult situations (Fiedler, 1996; Wart, 2003).
As can be seen, these meanings of leadership vary based on the contexts and
institutions in which the leaders are involved. In modern organizations, leadership can be
described through processes that allow people to use their competencies for solving
problems, collaborating with other organizations or networks, and responding to public
issues (Bao et al., 2012). It is essential that modern public service organizations, such as
local governments, should have this kind of a leader. The following section explains the
importance of leadership theory in public service, especially in times of crisis. To
understand the related leadership theories, I discuss contingency leadership and
leadership in crisis management.
Contingency Leadership. Contingency theory in leadership explains how
leadership styles differ and relate to specific contexts or situations. Northhouse (2013)
states that contingent leaders should be able to perform effectively when their leadership
styles are suitable to those situations or conditions. The contingency leadership theory
consists of two dimensions of leadership. The first dimension explains styles of
leadership, which include “task motivated” and “relationship motivated” (Northhouse,
2013, p. 123). Leaders with a task-motivated style likely aim to achieve goals, while
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those with a relationship-motivated style primarily concentrate on building relationships
among individuals and groups in organizations as mechanisms to achieve that goal
(Fiedler, 1971; Northhouse, 2013). The second dimension of contingency leadership
depends on three situational factors, which include leader-member relations, task
structure, and position power (Fiedler, 1971, p. 129; Northhouse, 2013).
According to Fiedler’s classical contingency model, leader-member relations are
evaluated based on the degree of confidence and faith of followers on their leaders in
such situations. Task structure is considered based on how well-organized the structure is.
The degree of leadership is highly acceptable when people feel comfortable with clear
directions. Position power explains a clear and strong relationship between positions and
power. This means that leaders should have executive power and decision-making power
in organizational administration (Fiedler, 1971). The current study employs contingency
leadership framework to investigate how leadership operates as a mechanism to affect
local service delivery performance in times of political crisis.
Leadership and Public Service. The concepts of leadership in new public service
have widely discussed the ways that patterns of leadership in the new governance era
should be in collaborative form, adaptive form, ethical concentration, and engaging form
(Denhardt & Denhardt, 2011). These new forms present a new objective of leadership
that is shifted from a traditional pattern, which emphasizes leaders at individual level,
power structure, formal authority, and steering (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2003; Denhardt &
Denhardt, 2011). The new patterns of leadership in new public service, rather, emphasize
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values in society, citizenship, empowerment, and collective actions where the public
organizations share these mechanisms with their citizens (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2003).
Similarly, Frederickson (1996) describes how the pattern of leadership in new
public administration is concerned with the effectiveness of public service professionals
and a fairness of public policy implementation. In addition, a new form of leadership is
proposed as a catalytic factor to achieve collaboration across sectors (Bryson, Crosby, &
Stone, 2006). In the current study, the concept of leadership in new public service is
employed to help explain how local government leaders and public service professionals
effectively provide and maintain public service delivery in times of national political
crisis.
Crisis Management Leadership. In crisis situations, the critical tasks that public
leadership needs to respond to are to reduce the effects of the crisis and to bring the
situation back to normal (Boin et al., 2017). In order to guide the effective and
appropriate ways that public leadership should employ when faced with a crisis, Boin et
al. (2017) propose five critical tasks for strategic crisis leadership; sense making, decision
making and coordinating, meaning making, accounting, and learning (p. 15).
To understand each critical task for strategic leadership, Boin et al. (2017)
describe that, for sense making, strategic crisis leadership should have a sense of
predictability by harvesting information, estimating causes and effects, and understanding
the situation. Once a crisis occurs, they can measure and select an appropriate tool to
strategically detect or minimize the effects of the crisis.
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In addition, making decisions and maintaining coordination in a crisis situation is
difficult because crises are not routine events. Strategic crisis leadership should have
thoughtful decision-making and careful responses. Gathering ideas and coordinating with
various groups and various levels of social and governmental sectors helps increase
leadership capability to cope with a crisis (Boin et al., 2017).
In a crisis situation, making sense of the situation is also necessary for strategic
crisis leadership. Public leaders should take immediate action to minimize the effects of
the crisis. Before doing that, public leaders should carefully consider details and define
the components of the situation. This task guides leaders to deal with a crisis in an
appropriate way and also increases credibility to the public (Boin et al., 2017).
Being accountable to the public is imperative for creating leadership trust because
crises may cause public uncertainties. Sometimes, citizens lack understanding and gain
insufficient explanation from public organizations. Therefore, it is important to give them
the reasons for the situation, share what is going on, and advise them what to do next
(Boin et al, 2017).
Lastly, a crisis situation is not always a bad thing. It creates an opportunity for
learning. This type of learning triggers experiences and lessons for future strategy.
Strategic crisis leadership learns from the past in order to build a better system for the
future. This learning helps strengthen not only leadership capacity, but also produces
inputs for forming policy and developing formal institutions (Boin et al, 2017).
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The literature on public leadership in Thailand generally shows that leadership in
public organizations focuses on the leader at the individual level and the leader within
power structure. For example, Charoensiri, Getsuwan, and Girdwichai (2016) argue that
leaders in public organizations in Thailand, especially in local government, are highly
competent to create a vision and respond to the needs of local residents. Because they
also live in the community, leaders tend to listen to the voices of citizens and react to this
input in order to solve problems. In addition, these leaders’ characteristics can help
enhance civic participation among local residents and encourage them to work together in
local government activities. This becomes a source for building new patterns of public
leadership that are derived from collective actions. Nevertheless, political institutional
circumstances and centralized resource allocation influence the progress of public
leadership at the local level. For example, local governments have to count on the fiscal
transfer from the national government, so this central influence can also impede the
development of local public leadership.
Further, Charoensiri, Getsuwan, and Girdwichai (2016) stress that external social
and political conditions in each community are diverse. Hence, local governments need
leaders who can see the contingencies and contexts and who can foresee and prepare for
rapidly-changing situations. Moreover, Krueathep (2004) argues that local leaders who
have business experience can create innovative administration for local government.
However, this leadership characteristic may not succeed in every context because leaders
with business backgrounds might use business tools in a negative way in order to further
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their personal interests. Local governments may also have leaders who have competency
to build networks with business sectors.
Political Economy
The concept of political economy provides an understanding of the institutional
interrelation between politics and economics. In addition, the political economy describes
the impacts of political and economic institutions on economic performance (North,
1994). The concept of political economy also helps us to understand the factors or
incentives that stimulate government to react to serve their citizens (Besley & Burgess,
2002). The following section presents the definition of political economy and describes
the relation between political economy and public service delivery. Also, the contribution
of the theory to this research will be discussed.
Defining Political Economy. Political science and economic scholars have
various definitions of political economy (Wamsley & Zald, 1973). Buchanan (1964)
stated that the concept of political economy originated in The Wealth of Nations, a classic
work of renowned economist Adam Smith. The original “political economy” in this work
refers to the circumstances of production where the fruits of the laborers’ work produced
wealth for the industrial barons. Importantly, the definition and characteristics of political
economy are described through the patterns of human activity that eventually trigger the
formation of institutions, for instance, laws and regulations (Buchanan, 1964).
Wamsley and Zald (1973) write that political economy is the relationship of
government to the economy that stimulates a “competitive marketplace” and promotes
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efficiency of resource allocation and production (p. 64). In a public policy and public
welfare perspective, political economy means policy options that efficiently benefit the
public at large (Wamsley & Zald, 1973). Hence, politics and economics influence each
other through interacting processes. Once one variable becomes turbulent, it could have
an effect the other as inter-dependencies between polity and economy occur (Arndt,
1983). To illustrate the components of political economy, the following section will
describe the dimensions of political economy that include internal and external political
economy.
Dimensions of Political Economy. The political economy can be illustrated in
two dimensions. First, the internal political economy consists of internal mechanisms of
economy—structure and processes of economy and norms of efficiency, and internal
mechanisms of polity—socio-political structure, political processes, leadership, and
political institutions (Stern & Reve, 1980; Wamsley & Zald, 1973).
Second, the external political economy includes the external mechanisms of the
economy—economic conditions and competitiveness, and the external mechanisms of
polity—political conditions, influences of external actors, inter-organizational
interactions, and distribution of power (Arndt, 1983; Stern & Reve, 1980; Wamsley &
Zald, 1973). Importantly, some factors such as proximity, capacity, differentiation,
concentration, and turbulence can be the environmental variables on the interactive
relationship between internal and external political economy (Arndt, 1983; Stern & Reve,
1980).
69

For political economy analytical strategy, Stern and Reve (1980) suggested that
the interactions between economy and polity are very important for an analysis of
political economy. So that economy and politics should not be separated from each other
in this analysis, this study employs the concept of political economy to investigate
whether politics and economics are the determinant factors of local public service
performance. The study also examines the interactions between national political
conditions and economic distribution at the local level during the prolonged national
political crisis in Thailand since 2006.
The literature on political economy in Thailand generally shows that Thailand’s
economy is shaped by political institutions. The interaction between politics and
economics impacts policy success or failure at both the national and local levels. Notably,
Thailand’s political economy can be observed through the process of decentralization,
especially fiscal decentralization, as Oates (1999) mentions in his essay on fiscal
federalism. In the case of Thailand, one of the purposes of the decentralization was to
promote local economy. In fact, fiscal decentralization remains limited and controlled by
the central government. Due to this constraint, it creates fiscal inequality in some local
governments and it also discourages local governments to improve the local economy
(Kamnuansilpa, Wongthanavasu, & Ando, 2013; Krueathep, 2004).
For example, Wongpredee and Sudhipongpracha (2014) argue that the formula
used to calculate the budget allocation from the national government favors those local
governments that have high capacity in revenue collection over those with a poorer base.
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Equitable budget allocation systems should prioritize the local governments with poor
financial capacity to solve their budget imbalances. Importantly, local budget allocation
processes are politicized and meddled in by politicians and bureaucrats who have close
relationships with the national government. In addition, Kamnuansilpa, Wongthanavasu,
and Ando (2013) argue that local governments in Thailand lack an incentive to promote
local economy because they are not only controlled by, but also looked down upon by,
the national government in terms of economic development capacity. They have been
treated by the national government as the recipients rather than the generators. As a
result, this causes in them a lack of incentive and capacity to stimulate the local economy
and attract investment. These examples help illustrate that national political institutions
shape economic performance at local level.
Conceptual Framework
The contributions of the three theoretical approaches discussed above help build
the conceptual framework in this study (See Figure 1.1). First, the institutional theory
describes the roles of formal institutions on social interactions and behaviors.
Specifically, this study emphasizes the impacts of changes in formal institutions during
political crisis on social interactions. In addition, instability of formal institutions may
affect the progress of decentralization, the interplay between local government and local
citizens, and the effectiveness of local governments in delivering public services.
Second, governance theory provides significant definitions of governance by
drawing the evolution and development of governance concepts from the public
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administration perspective to the new public governance perspective. Importantly, this
study employs three theoretical components of new public governance‒civic engagement,
collaboration, and leadership‒to guide the analysis in this study. Civic engagement
emphasizes collective action and socio-political interaction in order to enhance political
decision-making, improve effective services, create social capital, and increase trust and
transparency. Hence, it is interesting to see the patterns and levels of civic engagement in
local activities through the lens of both formal and informal political participation in the
midst of political crisis. In addition, collaboration provides the opportunities for building
networks and working across boundaries. The emphasis of this study centers on
collaboration among collective partners (informal collaboration) and collaborative
deliberation among multiple stakeholders (formal collaboration) in local service
provision.
The last governance component employed in this analysis is political leadership.
The scope of leadership emphasizes contingency leadership, public service leadership,
and crisis management leadership. Contingency leadership depends on style of leaders
and situational factors. Moreover, the patterns of leadership in new public services‒
awareness in social values, citizenship, empowerment, collective actions, effectiveness,
and fairness‒employed in this study concentrate on how local leaders and public service
professionals provide and maintain local services by using these leadership patterns.
Additionally, crisis management leadership provides a framework for strategic crisis
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leadership, which includes sensemaking, decision-making, coordinating, meaning
making, accounting, and learning.
Finally, political economy theory provides two major dimensions of political
economy that explain the inter-relationship and interactions between polity and economy.
These two dimensions include the internal political economy and the external political
economy. In this study, the relationship between politics and economics act as
moderating variables that could affect the effectiveness of local government service
delivery.
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Chapter 3
Research Methodology and Design
This chapter describes the research design and methods employed for this study.
The chapter consists of six sections: a rationale for an exploratory approach using
multiple case studies; the research design; the site and case selection strategy; the data
collection methods; data analysis methods; and data validity.
Rationale for Exploratory Approach Using a Multiple Case Study
This study explores how prolonged national political crisis in Thailand has
affected local service delivery. To answer this question, this study looks at the antecedent
conditions for local service delivery and considers national political crisis as an
independent variable that interacts with five moderating variables to influence local
government service delivery as an outcome variable. It is important to note that, in most
cases, interviews tend to be subjective, which is why there is not necessarily a definitive
difference between low- and high-performing cases on most variables. The question to be
answered is whether local government service delivery has experienced a negative effect,
a positive effect, or some combination of the two.
While the main focus of this study is not on the comparative analysis of how the
high-and low-performing cases are affected by the protracted national political crisis, the
author selected multiple cases for data collection. This helps to gain a better
understanding of phenomena and events across a range of municipal jurisdictions and
communities. In addition, the author feels that a multiple-case-study design provides
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multiple perspectives within a similar context, which may lead to future study of the
“relationships and interactions” among local government’s stakeholders (Buckwalter,
2014, p. 576). These stakeholders are both organizational and individual (e.g.
municipalities, municipal leaders, community leaders, local residents, and municipal
officers).
Data collected for this study are qualitative in nature and were collected by semistructured in-depth interviews and focus-group discussions. This sort of inductive data is
not suitable to use for testing hypotheses (Nishishiba, Jones; Kraner, 2014), but rather
provides “a more generalizable conclusion” about the cases themselves (Lawton &
Macaulay, 2014, p. 78).
As a multiple-case study, the fieldwork allows the researcher to interact with
selected participants from different municipalities. These participants provided an
“insider’s view” through face-to-face, in-depth interviewing and focus-group discussions.
Through this approach, the researcher gains direct information, e.g. real words,
interactions, emotions, or gestures, from the participants who live and work with and
experience those specific contexts or phenomena (Yin, 2014).
Research Design
To examine effects of national political crisis on local government service
delivery, there were four steps for conducting this research. The first was research case
selection. Using local self-collected revenue data available from 2009 to 2015, the author
identified four municipalities within Khon Kaen province. Employing the Statistical
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Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) program, the revenue data were used to stratify
the municipalities into two groups: high- and low-performing cases. Two municipalities
were selected from each of these groups, for a total of four municipalities in the study.
How the four municipalities were selected will be discussed in detail in the next section.
The second step was protocol preparation and participant selection. Based on the
research question, the author developed semi-structured questions for the in-depth
interviews and discussion guides for the focus-group discussions. Prior to the interviews,
the author tested the consistency of the questions by interviewing volunteers in order to
ensure the interview questions were appropriate and clear. Having these practice sessions
helped the author to become familiar with interviewing protocol and the interview
questions. Before doing the fieldwork, the author recruited the participants based on their
political or municipal stakeholder roles who were directly involved in local service
delivery—both from the perspectives of service providers and recipients. The author
specifically invited the participants who lived and worked in that municipality for at least
one year prior to the date of data collection.
In the next step, data collection, the author collected interview data from four
municipalities in Khon Kaen province. The participants for the in-depth interviews
included municipal leaders and municipal councilors. For the focus-group discussions,
the author invited community leaders, local residents, and municipal officers to
participate. The reasons the author conducted two methods of data collection were to
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ensure both efficiency of time utilization and breadth of coverage. Conducting only indepth interviews consumes a significant amount of time and resources but may not
capture the interaction of the members of the communities, whereas relying on in-depth
interviews alone may limit the boundary and multiple perspectives of data due to the
involvement of only one participant in each interview. Therefore, using both focus-group
discussions and in-depth interviews makes best use of the time allotted and captures the
diversity of data from individual as well as group perspectives, thus creating richness of
data for qualitative analysis.
For confidentiality and human subject requirements, every participant received an
explanation of the purposes of this study from the author and was provided a consent
form (see Appendix E). Once the form was signed, the author asked for permission to use
an audio recorder while interviewing, using those records for transcribing the interviews.
For the interview locations, the author was permitted by the four municipalities to use the
meeting rooms in the municipal offices to interview the participants.
The fourth step was data transcription analysis. After completing the two types of
data collection, the data were transcribed from the audio recorder into text format. Both
in-depth and focus-group discussion data reflected the opinions and experiences of the
participants. In addition, the author reviewed and classified the interview transcripts into
the systematic themes. The themes basically were built around the moderating variables
discussed earlier. For the focus-group discussion data, the author used thematic reading
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and summarized the transcripts into themes according the five moderating variables.
Moreover, the emotional interaction among the participants, i.e. gestures, sounds,
laughter, or other nonverbal reflections, was included in this analysis. For capturing this
kind of data, the author noted when the participants expressed such emotions during the
sessions. The notes taken from the focus group sessions were added into the audio
transcriptions.
For data collected through in-depth interviews, the author also coded them into
themes according to the five moderating variables. Based on these variables, each theme
was assigned a different color by using Post-it© notes and pens. The author removed the
names and the positions of participants from all transcribed documents before doing data
validity. In order to confirm the data validity, the author asked two graduate students
who have had experience with conducting qualitative research to review the transcripts.
Once the themes emerged and were consistent, the author started writing the
research report. In this process, some of the more important and closely-related quotes
from the interviews were identified and included in the report. These quotes provided
evidence to support the arguments and descriptions. For anonymity, names and personal
information of interviewees were removed from the quotes.
Research Site Selection
This research was conducted in four municipalities in Khon Kaen province. Khon
Kaen province is geographically located in the center of northeast Thailand and is the
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largest province in upper Northeast region. The justification of selecting Khon Kaen
province instead of the other provinces in the region included: (1) Khon Kaen is the
center of economic, commercial, transportation, and logistics in upper northeast
Thailand; (2) Khon Kaen is a hub of government service agencies, of which there are
about 450 government agencies consisting of agencies of the central government,
provincial administration, and local government; (3) Khon Kaen is the medical, health,
and educational center in the region;5 (4) Khon Kaen Province has 225 local governments
(1 Provincial Administrative Organization, 84 Municipalities, and 140 Tambon
Administration Organizations), the highest quantity of any province in upper northeast
Thailand6; and (5) Khon Kaen province is a major political base of the Pheu Thai party,
the ruling political party before being overthrown by the military coup of 2014. These
factors distinguish Khon Kaen Province from the other 19 provinces in the same region in
terms of social, economic, and political characteristics (see Figure 3.1).

5

Khon Kaen province strategic plan (2014-2017), link: http://www.khonkaen.go.th/
Khon Kaen province has 225 local governments, which compose of 1 PAO, 1 City (Municipality), 6
urban municipalities, 77 rural municipalities (sub-district municipality), and 140 TAO. Source: Department
of Local Administration as of March 9, 2015, link: http://www.dla.go.th/work/abt/index.jsp.
6
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Figure 3.1 Map of Khon Kaen Province and Research Sites

Source: Designed by the researcher, 2017.

The initial case selection was based on an attempt to find an objective measure of
local service delivery. The most suitable, in the author’s opinion, was local revenue
collected. This is considered to be a causal or cause measure of local service delivery and
is assumed to be an important input to local service delivery. To select four research sites,
the author therefore used local self-collected revenue data from 84 municipalities in Khon
Kaen province. These data collected covered the period from fiscal years 2009 through
2015. This was a period of significant national political events and changes in
governments and policies in Thailand (e.g. two democratic governments, the Democrat
Party and Pheu Thai Party; two coups d’état ending in military juntas, and significant
political violence). The objective of the author was to identify and select two groups of
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potential case studies (high performers and low performers), each group consisting of two
potential municipalities (research sites).
The average change in revenue of all 84 municipalities during 2009-2015, was
88%. Low performance was considered to be less than 88% and high performance was
above 88%. The author chose the top 10 high performers and bottom 10 low performers.
With these 20 municipalities identified, the next process was to select the two most
relevant research sites for each group by using cluster analysis, followed by pairedcomparison analysis. The cluster analysis was employed for calculating some basic
control factors that explain better revenue performance in the high than in the low. Then,
the author used paired comparisons for matching cases that shared similarities and were
relatively close. The cases that held the most similar control variables were selected for
the data collection process.
For the research, the author felt that two cases in each group would be sufficient
given the time allotted. Prior to paired comparison analysis, cluster analysis was used.
The control variables the author used for cluster analysis were from the categories of:
demography (population density); geography (distance to provincial town); history (year
established); and revenue transfers (general grant and grant for local government). The
author made these four categories worth 25% each and then used a scale of 1 to 7 for
each category, where 1 indicated the lowest level of self-collected revenues and 7 the
highest.
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The result of the cluster analysis showed that the three lowest high performers
were Nong Sao Lao, Nong Pai-Chumpae, and Kra Nuan, which could be paired with any
of the top low performers—Khao Suan Kwang, Nong Kae, and Don Mong. The author
used paired comparison analysis to identify the most relevant cases that share similarities
in terms of intuitive choices—e.g. culture, location, region, and other relevant factors.
Finally, two potential pairs (four cases) were identified.
The first pair was Kra Nuan Municipality and Khao Suan Kwang Municipality.
These two municipalities are located in the same region (northeastern part of Khon Kaen
Province). They also share similar community characteristics and culture, e.g., they are
considered semi-urban municipalities. Both have similar agricultural activities--e.g. sugar
cane, rice, and rubber trees. Culturally, they are Buddhist communities and speak a
dialect that is closely related to Lao. Kra Nuan is located along side of national highway
connecting Khon Kaen Province to Kalasin Province. Similarily, Khao Suan Kwang is
located along the national highway connecting Khon Kaen Province to Udon Thani
Province (see Figure 3.1).
The second pair is Nong Pai Municipality and Don Mong Municipality. They
share similar cultural and community characteristics as well as location and direction.
Both are located in the Western region of Khon Kaen Province. Nong Pai is on a national
minor highway which connects to a major national highway connecting Khon Kaen
Province to the northern provinces of Thailand (Maliwan Road or Highway 12). Don
Mong is located on this highway (see Figure 3.1). As in the first group, the residents
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speak the same Lao dialect and Buddhism is the main religion. Local people are
predominantly farmers, with some working in local industries. The author used all the
above information for research site selection to finalize the two pairs.
Data Collection
In this study, the data were collected from two types of interviews. For in-depth
interviews, the participants included municipal leaders and municipal councilors. For the
focus-groups, the author conducted the discussions with community leaders, local
residents, and municipal officers
The first step was face-to-face, semi-structured interviews with three participants
in each municipality:
Municipal Mayors. The author had expected to interview four municipal mayors,
but only three were interviewed. The other mayor was not available at that time, but he
assigned a deputy mayor to substitute for him. The author interviewed the municipal
mayors in order to investigate their administrative experience, as they are local political
leaders and local policy decision-makers. The interviews took about 45 minutes each and
the interviews took place in offices of each municipality.
Municipal Councilors. The municipal councilors were interviewed in order to
explore their views and experiences as policy makers, local legislators, and neighborhood
representatives. The author interviewed one chair and one councilor in each municipality
by assuming that a chair and a councilor can provide different perspectives.
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Prior to the in-depth interviews, the author developed an interview guide and used
a semi-structured interview technique to conduct the interviews. Semi-structured
interviews helped the author to control an interview protocol by using an interview guide
(see Appendix C). Also, the author was able to adjust the interview questions following
each encounter. It is of note that all three interviewees from each municipality were
males. That notwithstanding, the interview data from these individual interviews
provided the author an in-depth perspective from different political and policy actors. The
in-depth individual interviews provided the author limited multiple perspectives of data,
so the focus-group discussions were an essential part of the process.
The focus-group discussions for the two groups of participants gave the author a
diversity of data useful for analysis. More importantly, focus-group discussions allowed
the author to gain “several perspectives at once from the population of interest”
(Nishishiba, Jones, & Kraner, 2014, p. 102). During the focus-group discussions,
participatory observation techniques were employed. This provided the author not only
interview data, but the ability to note the interaction and participation among participants.
In this study, the author conducted two focus-group discussions by dividing the
participants into two segmentations; heads of municipal divisions and local residents.
Heads of Municipal Divisions. The focus-group discussions conducted with the
heads of municipal divisions consisted of 5-6 participants from each community. The
participants were from various divisions within the municipality, e.g. fiscal and revenue
division, municipal personnel division, public health division, education division, public
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work division, and social work division. These participants provided the author with
various perspectives on local government management and public service delivery as
well as local-society relationships. For this group, the author selected the participants by
considering the divisions that worked most closely with the community and
intergovernmental agencies.
Local Residents. The focus-group discussions conducted with local residents had
4-6 participants from each municipal community. Each group consisted of some
combination of local resident(s), a village headman, a village health volunteer, and a local
entrepreneur. This group makeup provided various perspectives on citizen-local
interactions, social collaboration, civic engagement, local economics, political leadership,
and state-society relations. The participants were conveniently recruited and invited by
the municipalities. Table 3.1 illustrates the sites, number of participants, and sex of the
participants in the in-depth interviews and focus-group discussions within the four
municipalities.
Table 3.1 List of Research Sites and Interview’s Participants
Municipalities
Kra Nuan
Nong Phay
Kao Suan Kwang
Don Mong

In-depth Interview
3 (males)
3 (males)
3 (males)
3 (males)

Focus-group discussions
5 (male 4, female 1) / 4 (male 2, female 2)
6 (male 3, female 3) / 6 (male 4, female 2)
5 (male 3, female 2) / 5 (male 1, female 4)
5 (male 4, female 1) / 6 (male 3, female 3)

Before conducting the research, the author received IRB approval from Portland
State University. Before conducting the interviews, the author requested participants to
read and ask questions about the consent form or any other concerns they may have had.
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Everyone expressed understanding of the information the author provided. They signed
the consent form and seemed to be quite happy to participate in the interviews.
Importantly, every participant allowed the author to do an audio recording. The author
also asked them if they wanted a copy of the interview transcript for review, but no one
needed that.
Data Analysis
The digital recording files were transferred to a secured drive. Then, the interview
data were transcribed from the audio recorder into text format. For data analysis, thematic
analysis was employed to analyze the interview data based on the research question and
moderating variables as the analytical framework. In this study, the author employed the
processes of thematic analysis presented by Braun and Clarke (2006). There were six
steps in the analysis:
Familiarization with the Data. After finishing the interviews, the author
transcribed the data from the digital files into text. The author became familiar with the
materials by reading them and linking them to the analytical framework. Since the author
collected and transcribed the interview data, the author interpreted and understood from
the characteristics of data. The author also cross-checked in order to make sure that the
transcripts were consistent.
Generating Initial Codes. While reviewing and reading the interview transcripts,
the author summarized and interpreted them in a short version. Then, the author used
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some initial codes that helped develop the informal themes (see Appendix I). At this
point, the author was able to see the initial features of the data and identify them in a
systematic way.
Searching for Themes. The codes helped the author to develop themes by
grouping them in a systematic way. Initially, there were a lot of interconnected ideas, but
the author selected only the ones that linked to the analytical framework.
Reviewing Themes. In order to make sure that the themes selected were correct
and suitable for further explanation, they were carefully reviewed again and linked to the
interview data because those data can help support the themes when writing the report.
Defining and Naming Themes. The themes were defined in order to provide a
clear sense for readers. This helps people to read and understand what the themes mean.
In addition, it helped to organize the order of themes.
Producing the Report. In Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, the author put the themes in a
table. The table illustrates some examples of themes that linked to the data presented. In
this study, the author used the interview quotes to support the themes and related
arguments.
For data validity, there are several questions that could be asked‒whether the
municipalities represent Khon Kaen, whether the interviewees were given honest
answers, whether criteria settings and selection processes were influenced by a
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researcher, etc. In addition, there might be some concerns about reliability caused by
unexpected variations such as time, environment, etc. For example, the data gathering in
2016 may accurately portrait the situations existing during this period, but may be
different in the next 10 years.
In order to ensure data validity, data triangulation process through multiple
experts was used during data analysis in order to decrease “the potential bias that comes
from a single person doing data collection” (Patton, 1999, p. 1193). The author asked two
graduate students who have experience with conducting qualitative research to review the
transcripts. After the review, both of them agreed with the interpretation and the themes
the author had developed from these transcripts.
Initially, the original interview quotes were transcribed into Thai language. To
support the research findings, some relevant interview quotes that were significant and
related to each theme were later translated into English. To ensure that the original
interview quotes were correctly translated, the author asked an expert who had translating
experience and familiarity with qualitative research to proofread for the consistency and
accuracy of each quote. The names of interviewees remained anonymous throughout the
validity review process.
With regard to reliability, the author attempted to enhance the reliability by
practicing the interview protocol with the volunteers in order to get familiar with
questions and interview conditions. In addition, the author asked each municipality to
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create a positive environment for the interviews by providing a meeting room for
conducting the interviews. This reduced the possibility of unanticipated situations that
may interfere with the reliability of the data collected from the interviews. Time of
interview is also important for maximizing reliability. The author made appointment with
the participants on a date and time of their convenience so they were not concerned or
frustrated about business or personal situations they had to attend to at the time of the
interviews. The author also made sure that the participants who were the municipal
officers were granted permission to participate in the interviews so that they could
participate in the interviews without worrying about revealing their own personal
opinions.
While attempting to ensure that the reliability of data was not jeopardized, the
author, however, could not control the conditions as the effects of crisis rise and fall over
time. In other words, it is questionable whether a study a conducted in 2010 or 2012
would get the same findings. Similarly, if this study were to be conducted again 10 years
from now, would we still get the same results? Only future research can test the reliability
of the data and thus research results over time.
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Chapter 4
How National Political Crisis Creates Threats for Development
in Local Government
The research question asks how Thailand’s national political crisis has affected
local government service delivery. Thailand’s national political crisis since 2006 raises
concerns about its effects on local government service delivery performance. While there
were studies that pointed out to the detrimental effects of protracted political crises, none
of them looked at the interface of the moderating variables with political crises and the
service provisions of local government.
It is widely accepted that political crises are threats to social, economic, and
political development. The literature generally argues that a political crisis triggers
government failures and undermines the progress of democracy (see Kurlantzick, 2011).
Notable is that prolonged political turmoil due to military intervention causes formal
institutional suspensions (e.g. constitutions and electoral systems), inefficient public
services, and economic decline (Norton, 2012; Nikomborirak, 2016; Sethapramote, 2014;
World Bank, 2016). The following section explores how Thailand’s national political
crisis interacted with five moderating variables to have a negative impact on local
government service delivery.
It is important to note that one of the major themes that emerged from the
interviews was that stakeholders perceived both threats and opportunities, and threats and
opportunities were found in almost all cases. However, for the purposes of this study they
will be presented in two separate chapters. Even though threats and opportunities are not
90

conceptually distinct, they will be treated separately in this study. This chapter will deal
with threats and the next, Chapter 5, with opportunities.
Results
The preliminary results indicate that groups of local residents and groups of
municipal officials shared and understood the political crisis in the same way. Concepts
that participants saw as negative effects included: political and social conflict, political
violence, political protests, government policy and project suspension, economic
downturn, and military directives. The focus-group discussions were guided by
discussing prepared questions (see Appendix C). The discussions also prompted further
questions.
In this chapter, the results demonstrate that participants saw the national political
crisis as a threat to local service delivery. The data gained from the participants were
thematically analyzed and presented through five moderating variables: political
institutions; citizen engagement; political leadership; governance; and political economy.
Political Institutions
In this study, the literature on institutionalism focused on formal institutions (e.g.
constitutions, formal rules, laws, and political structure). The main debates in the
literature argue that changes in political institutions influence interactions among
institutional actors—individual citizens and groups (i.e. organizations) in society.
Importantly, these changes also influence the effectiveness of public service provision
(March & Olsen, 1984; North, 1990; Peters, 2012). Additionally, as Shah, Thompson,
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and Zou (2004) concluded, “institutional arrangement” (e.g. formal autonomy) impacts
the outcomes of local public service delivery, which include “efficiency and equity” (p.
12).
For Thailand, formal political institutions shape patterns of policy making
processes, government structure and authority, and bureaucracy (Hicken & Selway, 2012;
Painter, 2004). In some political contexts, formal political institutions (e.g. constitution,
electoral laws) are constituted to serve political interests of influential individuals and
groups in political society. The effects of change in one institution trigger constraints in
the functions of other institutions, e.g. constitutional suspension affects the electoral
system and political parties (Dalpino, 2012; Kuhonta & Sinpeng, 2014; Waitoolkiata &
Chambers, 2015).
Since 2006, the continuing national political crisis in Thailand has resulted in the
formal institutions (e.g. constitution, laws, bureaucracy, and political structure) being
suppressed at the local level. This institutional breakdown affected not only individual
actors, but also organizational actors—i.e. the status of local governments. The following
results describe the effects of the institutional breakdown that negatively influenced the
status of local government.
According to the data analysis, the post-2006 national political crisis created
particular threats to political institutions, which include a weakened electoral mechanism
and suspension of local autonomy. The main themes and samples of key responses gained
from the participants are presented and summarized in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1 Themes and Samples of Key Responses on Political Institutions


Themes
Weakened electoral
mechanism



Suspension of local autonomy

Samples of Key Responses
“...local people wanted to have a local election; they
probably feel frustrated...”
“Because they were elected, they had to be accountable
to their constituency and concerned about their voters…”
“...national government has lost interest in local
government such as budget allocation and the like.”

“We are limited to respond to what people need. Some
things are prohibited to do.”
“Nowadays, it seems like we are moving backwards.
They pretend to give us autonomy, but they still withhold it.”
“…they don’t fully decentralize authority to local
government. They still maintain their power, which includes
duties, responsibilities, and autonomy.”
Source: Samples of key responses in this table are selected from quotes from full interviews.

Weakened Electoral Mechanism
The main institutional threats arose from the suspension of local elections, the
removal of local control of budgeting, and a shift of authority from the local to the central
government due to a suspension of policies established by the previous elected
government. The participants described how the post-2006 national political crisis
weakened the electoral mechanisms (e.g. election law, party law, ballot type,
campaigning rules, electoral financial law, etc.) (Kreuzer, 2000).
Since 2006, elected governments and legislators in Thailand have existed under a
prolonged national political crisis. This was especially severe with the post-2014 military
coup, when political institutional failure instigated by the junta resulted in suspension of
regular elections at both the national and local levels. The military used the 2014 Interim
Constitution to replace the 2007 Constitution. One result was that the democraticallyelected national government and legislators were suddenly removed. The military
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authority, the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), then appointed a military
government. Thai election law as an important electoral mechanism was suspended and
replaced by a non-democratic process. The current political parties have not been allowed
to play any political role since. Politicians have been prohibited from becoming involved
in any political activities at both national and local levels. Especially noteworthy is that
local elections have been suspended until after the completion of a new constitution.
Due to the suspension of elections, local citizens lost their sense of representation
in both national and local political institutions. It was difficult to give feedback and voice
their preferences to the elected representatives. In effect, the representative role of the
national legislature was abolished; however, local residents still wanted to have an
elected government and elected legislature representing them at the national level. These
suspended political institutions are important for local development in terms of political
relationships, policy support, fiscal transfer, revenue collection, and infrastructure
projects. Regarding this point, comments from participants included:
“…Nowadays, it seems like we don’t have people who represent us. We don’t
have people who can help us. It’s broken and disconnected.” (Member of
municipal council, personal communication, August 24, 2016)
“…The relationship is apparently estranged because national government has
lost interest in local government regarding items such as budget allocation and
the like.” Member of municipal council, personal communication, August 24,
2016)
“Having national democratic representatives was good for us. We could follow
up and know who represents us from our community. Because they were elected,
they had to be accountable to their constituency and concerned about their
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voters…” (Member of municipal council, personal communication, August 24,
2016)
Since the post-2014 national political crisis, the NCPO suspended all local
elections. To maintain service provision during national reform, the NCPO extended the
terms of office for local politicians who were scheduled to end their terms during this
period.
According to the interview data, there was only one municipality that obviously
reflected the negative effects of the electoral suspension ordered by the NCPO. This case
is important to address here because the suspension of local elections caused frustration
among local citizens. Local people wanted to have an election. They should have had the
opportunity to decide who would be their next mayor and next local legislators. Notably,
the suspension of local elections undermined an accountability between local citizens and
their elected officials. An interviewee stated on this point that
“Currently, local people want to have a local election, they probably feel
frustrated. The mayor and some municipal councilors already finished their terms
of office but they remain in power. Local people raised a question! We just told
them it depends on the National Council for Peace and Order.” (Municipal
official, personal communication, August 24, 2016)
As observed, Thailand’s 2014 national political crisis had more of an effect on
political institutions than the 2006 political crisis, especially regarding the electoral
mechanism. The following section will discuss the negative effects on the suspension of
local autonomy.
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Suspension of Local Autonomy
The prolonged national political crisis weakened not only electoral mechanisms
but also local autonomy, especially regarding budgets, because of a suspension of
existing policies. National government policies are an important mechanism for
improving local communities, stimulating economic activities, and maintaining
intergovernmental relationships. Notably, Thailand’s post-2006 political crisis caused
changes in election policies and also undermined policy alignment between national and
local governments.
Following the 2014 military coup, the military-installed government suspended,
and even terminated, some social and economic policies created by the previous elected
government. Some municipal leaders mentioned that the political crisis created barriers
between local governments and national legislators in terms of financial support, budget
allocation flow, and degree of development. Local governments found it difficult to
request fiscal support from the national military-installed government. This relationship
differs from the time of elected governments in that those governments tended to be more
approachable and supportive. Regarding this point, some participants observed that:
“…We don’t have a national elected legislature. Due to political suspension, it is
difficult for us to ask for budget from national government to develop the local
community”. (Member of municipal council, personal communication, August 30,
2016)
“…If municipal administrators have good connections with national legislature
and government, we usually obtained the grants. It was difficult if they did not
know someone there.” (Municipal official, personal communication, August 24,
2016)
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“In the past, when we needed budget about 50-60 million baht for local
development. We took local residents to ask for financial assistance from elected
representatives.” (Member of municipal council, personal communication,
August 24, 2016)
Since the military government took power, local autonomy appears to be in decline,
with some local duties being recentralized under the authority of national and provincial
organizations. The decision-making authority became more highly centralized so that it
was difficult for local governments to operate their services. It is important to understand
that while there is less autonomy when the junta decides to get involved in governance, it
decides to get involved in local governance less often than prior to the coup. The result is
that while there is less autonomy for local government (which can be seen as a threat),
there is also less interference in local government (which can be seen as an opportunity)
as a result of central power not being exercised locally as regularly as in pre-coup
Thailand. Seeing less interference as an opportunity will be discussed in further detail in
Chapter 5. Regarding the decrease of local autonomy, an interviewee reflected that:
“The limitation of local administration is something like when we want to solve
some problems and respond the needs of local people. We are limited in our
response to what people need. Some things are prohibited. They (central
government agencies) just said it might be illegal.” (Municipal councilor,
personal communication, August 30, 2016)

Political turmoil since 2006 delayed the progress of decentralization, which was a
power-sharing mechanism connecting national and local political institutions. Often,
local governments have been accused of corruption and functioning as nontransparent
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organizations. The national government took this opportunity to interfere with some local
duties and to pull back local autonomy, especially regarding budgeting.
An interesting example given by some of the participants was the creation of a
politicized policy called the “Pracha-Rat Project” or “People’s State Project.” This policy
aimed to boost local economies and quality of life by allocating block grants through
ministries, provincial authorities, districts, villages, and business sectors instead of
directly distributing grants to local governments (Jikkham, Mala, & Sattaburuth, 2015).
This politicized policy eroded the progress made toward the decentralization to local
governments and its role in relation to the higher governing institutions. Most projects
granted by the national government invested in the fundamental infrastructure of local
communities. However, municipalities, as the main local service providers, were not
empowered to be responsible for these projects. Regarding this point, one of the
participants stated that:
“I personally thought that they (central government authorities) tried to pull them
back. Nowadays, it seems like we are moving backwards. They pretend to give us
autonomy, but they still hold it.” (Municipal official, personal communication,
August 30, 2016)
When the national government allocated grants for local infrastructure
development projects in local areas, the national government and provincial authorities
should have involved the local leaders in the funding process for that project, but they did
not. Instead, the national government reduced local autonomy on budgets by transferring
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the grant and mandated decision-making authority to the District Chief Officers, who are
appointed by the central government. On this point, a municipal mayor expressed that:
“No, they don’t [involve the local leaders], because this grant was transferred
directly to the District Chief Officer to implement government policy. If each subdistrict receives 5 million baht, right? They have to spend that grant for road
improvement projects following the needs of the local community. But they still
need our assistance in terms of construction specialists in order to calculate and
estimate the project construction costs. They still borrow our staff…” (Municipal
mayor, personal communication, August 30, 2016)
In addition, the suspension of local autonomy affected the local governmentcitizen relationship. For example, one municipality provided financial support to local
communities in order to promote local culture and tradition. During an elected
government administration, it was very common for local governments to support such
activities. Currently, municipalities have been prohibited from supporting or funding
these same activities. As noted by some participants, the Office of General Auditor of
Thailand suggested that traditional and cultural activities should be voluntary among
local citizens, thus financial subsidies provided by municipalities would be recognized as
an act of noncompliance. This limitation reduced the autonomy of local leaders to initiate
new policies or support similar activities for local communities. Some participants
presented these perspectives:
[Referring to a local sporting event] “If people are not the athletes, the law does
not allow us to buy them the sportswear. Last year, I just returned money to
government due to an act of non-compliance. When we had traditional and
cultural events, such as a Songkran Festival, we’ve not been allowed to provide
financial support for the local community in order to organize and decorate the
procession. The government said this kind of activity should be a voluntary
activity.” (Municipal mayor, personal communication, August 30, 2016)
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“It looks like we did everything wrong. Why do I have to do that? I can’t sleep
and I am concerned about doing what I don’t want to do. I want to do the things
that local residents agree are good for them. When we do something, the national
auditing office told us that we acted in non-compliance on that project. We’ve
encountered the difficulty. We would like to comply but at least they should
provide us the right regulations that help avoid the act of non-compliance. We’re
happy to have that.” (Municipal official, personal communication, August 24,
2016)
“One problematic issue that constrains our administrative mission is the activity
that is related to local tradition and culture. For example, on the Buddhist Lent
Day our municipality wanted the community to organize an activity. We cannot
provide them financial support because the Office of General Auditor of Thailand
does not allow us to do that. We cannot even support the costumes and make-up
for the traditional dancers…” (Member of municipal council, personal
communication, August 24, 2016)
“My point of view is that it is not a real autonomy. For decentralization, they
don’t fully decentralize authority to local government. They still maintain their
power, which includes duties, responsibilities, and autonomy. They like pushing
the fault to us instead of facilitating us to do it the right way. The regulations and
laws do not accommodate us to work properly. If we don’t do anything, people
complain and blame us. This affected us a lot. We work closely with people in the
local community, but we cannot respond their needs, so people complain about
us.” (Municipal official, personal communication, August 31, 2016)
The participants perceived that local autonomy, especially on budgets, has been
undermined. For example, the actions of the office of the Auditor General of Thailand (an
autonomous governmental sector) in one case lead to a prime example of this kind of
insecurity for local leaders. In this case, local governments were accused of corruption.
The national auditing agency actively began checking local administrative transparency,
especially regarding local expenditures and noncompliance issues. This auditing authority
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appeared to be very active during the administration of the military government, as
underlined by these comments:
“The current government created a lot of problematic issues for us. They became
government by a military coup. For local government, citizens elected us. We
don’t like that they are accusing us as the corrupted local government. It’s not
true! Each process follows transparent procedures. There is the rule. We do
everything following the orders and laws. When a mayor ordered or assigned
municipal staff to do something. If it is considered an act of non-compliance,
municipal staff just avoided doing it. They carefully protect themselves to do
that.” (Member of municipal council, personal communication, August 24, 2016)
Moreover, since 2014, the military government suspended some local
development projects and local expenditures even though those projects were needed for
improving local public services, such as supplying new fire trucks. Instead, the national
government provided financial support to provincial authorities (the governor’s office,
and the district, sub-district, and village agencies) for all development projects. All the
issues described above resulted in losing local autonomy. One of the participants
reflected that:
“There were the effects because our annual budget was not enough. We have
long term vision to do something but we cannot operate on that. It looked like we
lied to our people. If we received 35% of the annual grant, we could manage
everything. For example, nowadays we have two fire trucks. We wanted to buy
another but we cannot because we don’t have enough budget. We wanted to buy it
this year but all local project expenditures were terminated. Each project was
suspended. For example, some government policies wanted to stimulate
economy...” (Member of municipal council, personal communication, August 25,
2016)
Importantly, the participants emphasized that the important laws related to
decentralization and local autonomy were suspended. Centrally-elected legislators
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worked during these hard times because of the dissolution of the parliament. The
military-installed government and its legislators have focused on solving the political
crisis and conducting political reform rather than concerning themselves with
strengthening formal political institutions. Newly imposed legal constraints began to
threaten local decision-making in providing services. Due to new regulations, local
governments encountered difficulty in making decisions on budgets. Concerning this
issue, an interviewee expressed that:
“Local governments encountered the difficulty on spending local expenditures.
They [the current military government] don’t review and revise the laws and
regulations that are related to local expenditures. We have money we have saved,
about 50-60 million baht, but we cannot use that due to the non-compliance with
those regulations.” (Member of municipal council, personal communication,
August 24, 2016)
In addition, the existing laws were not able to respond to current complex problems,
which varied by community. The laws imposed by the central ministries limited local
autonomy. Problems in local communities should be solved by local people through local
governing processes, not by central ministries. The process of decentralization has been
reversed during the political crisis because central ministries have tried to suspend local
autonomy and designed the regulations without understanding local contexts and local
needs.
Local people realized that local governments are public service providers that are
closer to them than central governmental agencies. They expected that local governments
should have full autonomy to decide local policy and provide services. Local
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governments now have limited autonomy that is influenced by national and provincial
administration. Regarding this point, one of the participants stated that:
“Actually, local administration has a problem with the conflict between
regulations and implementers. Sometimes we cannot do anything because of the
limitation of regulations and laws. The auditing authority does not care whether or
not you are corrupt. They restricted the laws and regulations we are using.
Actually, a group of national government officials working at the national
authorities creates the laws and regulations. Nowadays, there is only that group
that influences and controls local government official. These officials work in the
departments within the ministries. They designed and made the laws and
regulations. This created the problem because they did not understand the real
problem and needs of people at local level. It does not get along well.” (Municipal
official, personal communication, August 24, 2016)
The national political crisis negatively affected not only political institutions but
also civic engagement at the local level. The following section will describe the negative
impacts of Thailand’s post-2006 national political crisis on civic engagement that can be
a moderating variable for effective local service delivery.
Civic Engagement
The central debates in the literature on civic engagement argue that engaging
citizens in the process of public decision-making enhances transparency and legitimacy.
Importantly, it induces effective public services and improves government performance
(OECD, n.d. para.1). In new public governance, civic engagement is one of the vital
mechanisms that helps promote public participation in policy processes and voluntarism
in public service provision (McLaverty, 2011; Peters & Pierre, 1998). In addition, new
governing processes value civic engagement as a way to build networks and coordination
between citizens and the public sector in public policy processes. It also creates a positive
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impact for the progress of participatory democracy (Bureekul, 2009; Holmes, 2011;
Michels & Graaf, 2010; Peters, 2011). Civic engagement is difficult in particular political
contexts because government and political power-holders are hesitant to engage citizens
in some public activities. Those political power-holders may be concerned about being
subjected to transparency and accountability laws that inspire citizens in a democratic
society (Bureekul, 2009).
To explore how civic engagement as a moderating variable impacts local service
delivery in the midst of national political crisis, the participants in both in-depth
interviews and focus-group discussions were guided by the interview questions (see
Appendix C). The findings show that Thailand’s post-2006 national political crisis has
created threats to civic engagement, which include three main themes: (1) reduced civic
participation; (2) weakened policy networks; and (3) increased civil conflict. These
findings are also presented and summarized in Table 4.2.
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Table 4.2 Themes and Samples of Key Responses on Civic Engagement


Themes
Reduced civic participation

Samples of Key Responses
“Nowadays it is prohibited to have a public
gathering of more than five people. This undermines
rights and freedoms of Thai people.”
“When we want to invite the villagers to patriciate in
some activities or share their voices, they feel fear to
join the activities.”



Weakened policy network

“They were not allowed to do any political activity
nor even meet with their advocates. How could they
know the needs and problems of people in local
communities?”
“Actually, the MP should be allowed to meet and ask
people what they needed and what problems they have
encountered with.”

“Nowadays, people divided themselves by colors.”
“Obviously, people can’t talk or even don’t talk to
each other. This change triggered increasingly conflict
among people in the community”.
“People don’t like each other. Also, the community
committee is from different side. It’s very difficult for
gathering or asking people to do activity.”
Source: Samples of key responses in this table are selected from quotes from full interviews.


Increased civil conflict

Reduced Civic Participation
The findings indicate that since Thailand’s post-2006 political crisis, the freedom
of expression of political opinions was reduced, if not totally prohibited, thus
discouraging the public from civic engagement. It is important to note that there are
differences in civic participation at the national level and at the local level. This study
indicates that civic participation in matters related to national affairs has declined,
particularly those related to politics. The situation is different at the local level, as citizens
participated more in local affairs. This point will be discussed in greater detail in the next
chapter.
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After the 2014 military coup, the military-installed government imposed martial
law to limit citizens participating in political activities. Citizens were no longer allowed
to talk openly about politics or gather in a group of more than five persons in public. As a
result, local citizens felt fear and anxiety around engaging in national political activities
or even just complaining about the government during this period.
Martial law also caused the decline of public engagement in local activities. For
example, when a municipality invited local residents to participate in public meetings that
required collective decision-making, the local residents were reluctant to attend because
they were afraid of being in a gathering of more than five people. This created barriers
blocking the flow of important public participation on public policy processes.
Surprisingly, some participants stated that even though local people disagreed with
certain military orders and laws, no one opposed the decision to enact these laws.
Regarding this point, participants shared their perspectives:
“It affects us a lot. There are changes in laws and regulations. In the past, we
have had freedom to gather and talk. Nowadays it is prohibited to gather
publicly with more than five people. This undermines rights and freedoms of
Thai people.” (Member of municipal council, personal communication,
August 25, 2016)
“Nowadays, municipality avoided organizing the activity that may involve in
politics. They were afraid of being investigated for a gathering of more than
five persons. Some people said, any activity that was organized by
municipality, I didn’t want go.” (Member of municipal council, personal
communication, August 24, 2016)
“…If there was a change in politics, then the law was enforced over the public
wishes. People cannot oppose that change. I heard people talk against this
change, but no one can oppose their power, because they feared the laws and
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regulations that were enforced by the military. They feared being arrested…”
(Municipal councilor, personal communication, August 25, 2016)
Since the military took over in 2014, most activities relating to politics have been
prohibited. Even though local governments and communities were allowed to organize
some public activities, such as sports, religious, social, and traditional activities, the
military government still keeps an eye on those events and explicit political activities
have not been allowed. Even though citizen input is vital for improving local service
performance, political fears have impeded local attempts to build effective citizenship
and find venues to share their thoughts or offer feedback. Some participants expressed
their notions regarding this issue as follows:
“…It’s different nowadays, with a government that was installed by the
military. When we want to invite the villagers to participate in some activities
or share their voices, they feel fear to join the activities. They are afraid that
the military may call them to the military fort. Nowadays, we cannot freely
express our voices as usual. This impeded the understanding of local people.
Some understand, some don’t. We are uncertain about talking to you openly.
We don’t like this type of political form.” (Member of municipal council,
personal communication, August 24, 2016)
“People are afraid of prohibitions, for example, after the military coups
people are not allowed to politically gather more than five people. People
respect the rule because of fears and anxieties. In the recent coup, people fear
the rules and orders of military installed government.” (Municipal councilor,
personal communication, August 25, 2016)
Political fears and anxieties resulted in not only a decline in freedom of
expression and municipal engagement, but also a decrease in political feedback from
local citizens. Since the military coup in 2014 and the military-installed government took
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power, Section 447 has been enforced. This law gave authority to the head of the NCPO
to rule the country and deal with all political and managerial problems, causing an
increased sense of fear and anxiety in the citizenry. Consequently, these fears and
anxieties decreased political awareness and reduced constructive forms of political
feedback. People lost interest in politics and public issues and abandoned the values and
responsibilities of citizenship. The participants expressed their perspectives on this point:
“In the past, we used to have a protest but after the coup d’état we didn’t have
it anymore. We are afraid of being carried to a cold room (military base). No
one wanted to challenge that. I feel that people get really tired of politics. It’s
different from the past; we had energy when we talked about politics.” (Local
resident, personal communication, August 31, 2016)
“This is an absolute power; nobody can say anything, right? Section 44 of the
interim Constitution has been enforced, so don’t talk too much.” (Municipal
mayor, personal communication, August 24, 2016)
“The enforcement of Section 44 affected some citizens. We don’t know how
they prove whether it is a real mistake or false mistake, if someone just
complains and reports some issues to government. During an investigation,
they enforced Section 44, so that person was suspended from his job.”
(Member of municipal council, personal communication, August 24, 2016)
During national political crises, local people are less interested in political news.
In the past, political issues encouraged people to follow the news. They wanted to know
what was going on and how politics would impact their lives. Currently, local people do

7

Section 44 refers to a section in the constitution that was promulgated by the NCPO in 2014, which gave
power to the head of the NCPO, who, as it happens, is also the Prime Minister (see Chapter 5 for complete
wording of Section 44). When the 2017 Constitution superseded the 2014 interim constitution, the powers
under Section 44 were transferred to Section 265. However, the term “Section 44” is still generally used to
refer to these powers.
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not want to even turn on the television, especially on Friday evening when the nationwide television channels broadcast the weekly address of the Head of the National
Council for Peace and Order and the Prime Minister of Thailand. It seems like they
refused to listen to news and information that is related to politics. Political fears and
uncertainties reduced feedback from local residents and also created barriers to receiving
information from the national government. Regarding this point, local residents expressed
their opinions:
“On Friday, I didn’t want to watch television. When I turned it on and saw that
program, I just wanted to turn it off right away.” (Local resident, personal
communication, August 24, 2016)
“In the past, during the new constitutional referendum, I didn’t see even the draft
of the new constitution. Give me a copy of the constitutional draft please? I’ve not
seen it even as of today. I don’t know whether or not it was distributed. I got
bored with politics. I don’t want to even read the news.” (Local resident, personal
communication, August 31, 2016)
An engaged citizenry offering feedback concerning local issues is important to
improving local government service delivery. Since 2006, the ongoing national political
crisis has created a political barrier for citizens to get involved in local public activities,
especially local political participation.
Moreover, political uncertainties and fears made local people lose trust in the
direction of the government and its economic policies, especially the policies created by
the current military government. This negative impact undermined the progress of social
trust and social capital in local communities. In developing democratic societies, public
trust is built upon active civic engagement. Civil society should have the confidence to
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interact and work closely (co-production) with public organizations without uncertainties
and fears. Also, active civil participation and a high degree of value sharing trigger the
improvement of social capital (OECD, 2011).
This study found that the political crisis created uncertainties and fears that
resulted in decreased trust in creating or expanding previously existing economic
activities. In addition, changes in the government and its policy discouraged local
people’s interaction with each other as well as with their government. They were also less
willing to form community networks. Sharing common values was impeded by political
uncertainty and fear:
“When we talk about the connection between local government and local
residents, we think that local government should have to provide an incentive for
encouraging local people to participate in municipal activities. That strategy is
wrong and it looks like we are stepping back. In reality, if people get benefits
(income) from what they are participating in, they are OK to come. Now, when
they participate in municipal activities, they have to leave their jobs and lose
income. So, municipality should consider having an incentive as compensation in
order to attract them to come…” (Municipal official, personal communication,
August 24, 2016)
As an interviewee mentioned above, it appears that local people lacked incentive
to participate in community activities, some ignoring all involvement in even social
activities. They believe that they should spend their time making money to take care of
their daily needs, rather than becoming involved in political activities and public
influence. In some municipalities, people considered money an important incentive for
them in deciding whether to attend and engage in public activities. The participants
shared these perspectives:
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“For social involvement, people are likely concerned about working and making
money to live from hand-to-mouth, so they lose interest in participating in social
activity. (Member of municipal council, personal communication, August 30,
2016)
“…Comparing the pattern of social involvement between nowadays and in the
past. In the past, we can gather our neighbors to help at harvest time. Nowadays,
we have lost that kind of activity, especially when we planted rice and harvested
rice. I think society and economy have been changed. People get in trouble and
become poor. They just wanted to make money.” (Local resident, personal
communication, August 31, 2016)
The political crisis undermined not only public trust and reduced local civic
participation, but its effects weakened interactions among social actors that are source for
policy networks.
Weakened Policy Networks
Participants expressed the opinion that political fears and uncertainties reduced
not only civil participation in local public service and local activity but also weakened
policy networks. Especially after the 2014 military coup, the military-installed
government has repeatedly used Section 44 of the interim Constitution to justify the
implementation of martial law to evade regular laws. As a result, the connection between
lawmakers and policymakers has been eliminated.
Some thoughts provided by the participants emphasized that national legislators
were not allowed to interact with local citizens. Most political activities were prohibited
by martial law and the military’s orders. Local citizens were not allowed the flexibility to
involve themselves in political activity. In contrast, under the previous elected
government, representatives usually met with their constituents at the local level in order
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to obtain engaging feedback regarding potential problems for the legislature. Now, due to
political institutional breakdown, state-social interaction has declined. Network and
policy actors at the local level are uncertain about initiating new policy ideas and
innovations. One participant observed that:
“Currently, the legislators are constrained by laws and regulations imposed by
military-installed government. They are not allowed to do any political activity or
even meet with their constituents. How could they know the needs and problems of
people in local communities? Does the current government believe that the former
elected legislators would try to further their political interests regarding this
movement? Actually, the MP should be allowed to meet and ask people what the
people need and what problems they have encountered.” (Member of municipal
council, personal communication, August 25, 2016)
When military officials replaced the former elected legislators, these legislators
were, of course, out of office. Nonetheless, they can still serve as the link between local
communities and central political institutions. Gathering feedback and maintaining the
coordination of local input was a collective and engaging mechanism within the policy
network of the previous elected government. The deconstruction of this policy network
reflects a declining state-society interaction under the military government.

Due to the constraints of new laws and regulations, local governments and citizens
became tired of the military government. The government did not attempt to rebuild
mechanisms to bring feedback from the local level to develop their national policies.
Instead, they created legal barriers to constrain the freedom of decision-making and civic
participation in local governments. As the participants mentioned, local governments
wanted to provide services for their local residents, but the limitation of laws and the
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orders enforced by the central government impeded local government to support those
policies, even though some local activities still remained from the previous government.
The constraints induced a weariness that discouraged local government and local citizens
from participating in public activities that would provide feedback to the central
government. The participants reflected their perceptions through focus-group discussions:
“In town hall meetings, local people agreed and needed to have something from the
municipality, but we cannot do as we agreed. For example, people needed to have
the ponds and the roads. When we asked, [the central] government did not agree. It
was not the right way to do so. We just followed the government’s directions
because our budgets relied on government subsidy…” (Local resident, personal
communication, August 24, 2016)
“…Each community has different problems and needs. [central] Government just
wanted them to do and have the same thing. For example, the government said that
this money should be used for buying fertilizer. All 98 villages of ... district just
bought fertilizer, even though some villages did not have any problem and they also
did not want to use fertilizer. This affected us a lot.” (Local resident, personal
communication, August 24, 2016)
“In the recent Songkran Festival, we could not organize a Songkran procession
because the Office of General Auditor of Thailand said a municipality cannot
provide budget to support Songkran activities. As a result, people did not
participate. Actually, local residents from each community want to engage in
particular activities, but laws and regulations imposed by the military-installed
government constrained civic engagement at the local level.” (Local resident,
personal communication, August 30, 2016)
The effects of the national political crisis not only undermined policy networks in
local government but also resulted in enhancing civil conflict among local residents who
have different political beliefs.
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Increased Civil Conflict

Discussions with the participants across the four municipalities reflected that the
prolonged national political crisis since 2006 has caused conflict among local residents,
especially for people who are politically polarized. The conflict in the national political
institutions divided people into two sides. People on each side identify their political
stance by the color of their shirts. A red shirt represents people who are advocates of the
Pheu Thai Party. Red-shirt people are also the major political supporters of the former
government of Yingluck Shinawatra and are influenced by Thaksin Shinawatra,
Thailand’s former Prime Minister in exile. Most red-shirt advocates are also based in
Northeastern Thailand, where my research sites are located. Conversely, a yellow shirt
represents people who oppose Thaksin’s administration. They also have political
connection to the Democrat Party and supported the military-installed government (BBC
News-Asia Pacific, 2012).

The political conflicts caused by political institutional failures appear to have
increased civil conflict within local communities. This civil conflict resulted in reduced
civic participation in local activities. One of the participants expressed this notion,
describing that:
“It is a long story for the conflict among citizens. Nowadays, people divided
themselves by colors.” (Municipal councilor, personal communication, August
24, 2016)
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In some local communities, political conflict among local residents discouraged
people from talking to those who oppose their political affiliation, creating increased
levels of animosity among local residents. In traditional forms of democratic society,
citizens express their opinions and needs at municipal town-hall style meetings. Since
2006, if people anticipated members of the opposite group coming to town-hall meetings,
they would avoid the meeting all together. This divided not only communities, but also
split families.

An interviewee mentioned that a husband and a wife watched different political
news programs because they had different political stances and could not bear media that
was sympathetic to the other side. This type of political conflict undermined any
productive sense of citizenship or pride in one’s local community and limited individual
interaction with local governments. Even though the status of the current political crisis
seems to be more peaceful, these conflicts have resulted in a declining interest in local
politics. It has resulted in creating a barrier for local governments to gain feedback from
its voters. Some participants explained the features of political conflict in their local
community as follows:
“I can say that it’s very obvious. People can’t talk or don’t talk to each other. This
change triggered increasing conflict among people in the community. People
obviously divided and identified their political belief by colors. It even happened
that people hate each other if they know they talk to the opposing group.” (Vice
Municipal Mayor, personal communication, August 25, 2016)
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“When we hold a meeting, the opposite side does not come when they know the
other group will be coming. This happened not only in our community, but also in
some families...” (Local resident, personal communication, August 25, 2016)
“If one group is doing something, the opposite side won’t come. It becomes a
problematic issue especially in [this] community. People don’t like each other.
Also, the community committee is from different sides. It’s very difficult for
gathering or asking people to participate in an activity. It’s not easy.” (Local
resident, personal communication, August 25, 2016)
The national political crisis caused not only a political institutional breakdown of
local government status and weakened civic engagement, it also resulted in the decline of
political leadership. The following section describes how the national political crisis has
eroded local political leadership.
Political Leadership
The main debates in the literature on political leadership argue that public leaders
who have leadership competencies help increase the efficient and effective organization
of public services (Wart, 2003). In addition, public leaders should have the ability to
control and maintain an organizational alignment with political changes and political
pressures from both internal and external forces. Leaders should have decision-making
skills on public service operation and provision, especially in difficult situations (Fiedler,
1996; Wart, 2003). In classical contingency leadership, public leaders should have full
autonomy that includes administrative power and decision-making power in order to
achieve organizational goals (Fiedler, 1971). In the literature on leadership in Thailand,
the patterns of leadership focus on contextual leadership and leaders at the individual
level who have leadership skills (e.g. skills of preparation and prediction for future,
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network building skill) to cope with contingent situations (Charoensiri, Getsuwan, &
Girdwichai, 2016; Krueathep, 2004). This study, however, investigates local political
leadership at the individual level.
To explore how local political leadership as a moderating variable affects local
service delivery in the midst of national political crisis, the participants in both in-depth
interviews and focus-group discussions were guided by the interview questions (see
Appendix C). Based on interviews of the participants, the post-2006 national political
turmoil in Thailand created particular threats for political leadership at the local level.
The findings present two main themes; reduced autonomy of local leaders and increased
risks for local leaders. The findings are presented and summarized in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3 Themes and Samples of Key Responses on Political Leadership


Themes
Reduced autonomy of local
leaders

Samples of Key Responses
“I want to do the things that local residents agree are
good for them. When we do something, the national
auditing office told us that we were non-compliant on
that project.”
“Its effects created inconvenience for local autonomy”

“People can complain that we don’t work”
“We work for local community and work closely with
local people. Unfortunately, we cannot serve the needs of
people. Eventually, we got complaints from local
people.”
Source: Samples of key responses in this table are selected from quotes from full interviews.


Increased risks for local
leaders

Reduced Autonomy of Local Leaders
The findings indicate that most local leaders had the capacity to maintain public
service provision, but they lacked confidence and were reluctant to use their autonomy
for making some policy decisions. Especially after the 2014 military coup, political and
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legal constraints did not accommodate local leaders to be able to respond to the concerns
of local citizens. For example, municipal mayors wanted to provide financial support for
local communities to organize traditional activities such as the rocket festival, Thai New
Year festival, etc. Formerly, local leaders had autonomy to approve local budgets to
support local activities without any national concern or investigation. Political
uncertainties and legal limitations suspended the capacity of local leaders to make the
decision to undertake similar projects. Local leaders perform routine administrative
duties, but they lack decision-making power. Regarding this point, some participants
stated that:
“It looks like we did everything wrong. Why I have to do that? I can’t sleep and I
am concerned about doing what I don’t want to do. I want to do the things that
local residents agree are good for them. When we do something, the national
auditing office told us that we were non-compliant on that project. We’ve
encountered difficulties. We would like to do right, but at least they should
provide us the right laws that help avoid the act of non-compliance. We’re happy
if we have that.” (Municipal official, personal communication, August 24, 2016)
“…Its effects created inconvenience for local autonomy…In the past, they [local
leaders] had done that …Nowadays, they can do nothing. Anyway, they are trying
to find solutions. It happened like that so it’s very difficult for their
administration.” (Local resident, personal communication, August 24, 2016)
The national political crisis reduced not only autonomy of local leaders, but also
increased risks for local leaders in making decisions and serving local residents.8 The

8

It is important to note that while overall leadership autonomy decreased, the roles of the mayors are more
recognized by the local citizens, thus elevated. The author will discuss about this point again in Chapter 5.
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following section will discuss how the national political crisis created risks for local
leaders.
Increased Risks for Local Leaders
The weakening political leadership became one of the negative effects caused by
the national political crisis. Local leaders lacked autonomy to make certain decisions,
especially regarding budget approval. Moreover, political turmoil and legal constraints
increased risks for local leaders in two aspects. First, due to these limitations, local
leaders have tried to solve problems and help out local residents to get financial support
from the municipality by using what autonomy they do have. This shows that local
leaders still have some capacity and autonomy to make decisions on local budgets, but
this may increase risks for local leaders in terms of fiscal non-compliance monitored by
centralized authority. For example, we can look at one important national event, the
National Day for Older Persons. Normally, the mayors can approve the budget to buy
mementos for older residents who attended the municipal activity. Recently, due to an act
of fiscal non-compliance, the mayors cannot use local budget to buy and offer mementos
to older persons. Regarding this issue, one of the participants reflected that:
“…This is our important national day but we [local leaders] cannot give anything
to them. Our decision is legally monitored by the National Audit Office. Actually,
we want to honor them. We have enough budget, but we cannot use it. This affects
municipal administration a lot.” (Member of municipal council, personal
communication, August 24, 2016).
The other risk political leadership constraints caused for local leaders was in
terms of public complaints and losing public trust. When some local leaders are faced
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with decision-making and problem-solving, especially on budgeting and some local
policies, they have the personal capacity to determine solutions and please local residents.
However, those local leaders who lack personal skills in problem solving and were
fearful of making the wrong decisions, so they made no decision. These local leaders
with low capacity then risked getting complaints from local residents, resulting in losing
leadership trust. Eventually, its effects could trigger negative impacts for future political
popularity (i.e. local elections) of those leaders. Regarding this point, one of the
participants expressed that:
“…Regulations and laws are not able to accommodate our work. But, if we don’t
do anything, this eventually affects us. People can complain that we don’t work.
We got a lot of effects from this issue. We work for the local community and work
closely with local people. Unfortunately, we cannot serve the needs of people.
Eventually, we got complaints from the people.” (Municipal official, personal
communication, August 31, 2016).
“…Last year I didn’t dare organize the Songkran Festival. We actually wanted to
stimulate local economy. If we had Miss Songkran Contest, we would have had 13
competitors. But giving rewards is prohibited, so we don’t have any reward for
this contest. In the past, we supported the festival with a budget for dressing up
and rewards for the processions.” (Municipal mayor, personal communication,
August 30, 2016).
Governance
The majority of the literature on governance argues that the term “governance” as
used in public organization refers to new governing process that values interactions
among societal actors, collective actions, inter-organizational collaboration, powersharing, and networking (Enroth, 2011; Peters & Pierre, 1998; Renn, Klimke, & Asselt,
2011). These new patterns of governing processes aim to replace the limitations of
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conventional public administration that emphasized state-centered approach (Rhodes,
2007; Stoker, 1998). The impacts of governance in public organizations help improve
voluntarism in public service delivery, state-local interaction, intergovernmental
collaboration (i.e. blur boundaries), and a bottom-up style of administration (Kickert,
1997; Peters, 2011). Thailand’s post-2006 national political crisis repeatedly entailed
changes in politics and policies at all levels of governance. A question has been raised
regarding its effects on governance as a moderating variable to local service delivery.
Importantly, having good governing processes induces effective public service delivery
(Bowornwathana, 2000)
In order to explore how governance mechanisms mediated local government
service delivery in the midst of political crisis, the participants in in-depth interviews and
focus-group discussions were guided by interview questions (see Appendix C).
Based on the viewpoints of participants, Thailand’s post-2006 national political
crisis entailed threats for governance in two ways: (1) decreased trust and communication
between central and local government; and (2) hierarchical interactions in internal
governance settings. These effects are presented and summarized in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4 Themes and Samples of Key Responses on Governance


Themes
Decreased trust and
communication between
central and local government

Samples of Key Responses
“When I looked at government policy, they wanted to
directly connect to local citizens without the influence of
local government.”
“…Currently, the military-installed government
empowered procurement authority to village headman to
manage the construction project without the supervision of
municipal construction staff.”
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“…we had close relationship and they [central
government] were easily approachable. Nowadays,
government officials don’t recognize us.”
“Those central authorities then ordered Ministry of
Interior. After that the Ministry of Interior delivered an
order to provincial and district authorities. The districts
then ordered local governments.”
“…when we have a provincial meeting. The chair of the
meeting is from Ministry of Interior. The Governor is a
representative from central government.”
“This person (Chief District Officer) has authority to
sign and approve our municipal budget.”
Source: Samples of key responses in this table are selected from quotes from full interviews.


Hierarchical interactions in
internal governance settings

Decreased Trust and Communication between Central and Local government
Since Thailand’s ongoing political crisis began in 2006, participants observed that
the administrative processes governed by the national government, especially the
military-installed governments, did not engage local authorities in some public service
provisions and policy processes. Thus, these processes became more centralized and less
accountable to local residents. In addition, the national government preferred ordering the
central and provincial authorities to complete their projects as fast as they could, resulting
in poor quality of the delivered projects. Its effects resulted in decreasing trust and
communication between national and local government. Regarding this point, some
participants expressed these perspectives:
“When I looked at government policy, they wanted to directly connect to local
citizens without any influence of local government. Those duties look similar to
what we usually do but they wanted to change responsible organizations from
municipalities to the district, sub-district headman, or village headman (provincial
authorities). In reality, the corruption still exists. It just becomes less accountable.”
(Member of municipal council, personal communication, August 25, 2016)
“…The things like this we [municipal council] have to check and debate for finding
the best solution and decision. The municipal executive members have to answer
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and clarify those questions raised by the council members. The meeting minutes
have to report to the provincial governor for review. That happened like this but
what they [central government] do we cannot check or investigate.” (Member of
municipal council, personal communication, August 24, 2016)
“…Currently, the military-installed government empowered the village headman
with procurement authority to manage the construction project without the
supervision of municipal construction staff. Government wanted them to run
projects by themselves. A community committee was appointed from local residents
in order to investigate the projects. My question is whether there is anyone to be
responsible for the projects? Is there anyone? Normally, if the municipality is
responsible for the projects, we have municipal regulations to control that, such as
road construction projects...” (Member of municipal council, personal
communication, August 30, 2016)
Interaction between the national and local governments is an important
mechanism for building effective local governance and local service delivery. In a strong,
democratic society, government and local society—e.g. local government including local
political actors and local residents—exist within a dynamic and interactive relationship in
order to fairly share power. The boundaries between central government and local
societal actors were somewhat blurred but interdependent. National and local
governments cooperated with each other mutually and horizontally. In addition, authority
was not one sided, as we believed that while the national government has greater
authority than the local, both sides can also influence each other (Kooiman, 2003).
Since 2006, the degree of interaction between the national government and local
societal actors has decreased, especially during the administration of the militaryinstalled government. Some participants mentioned that military governments imposed
special laws, for instance, martial law or Section 44 of the Interim Constitution, to
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monitor and push pressure on local governments. This caused uncertainties and fears for
local administrators and local residents, limiting the interactive relationship between local
and national governmental agencies and actors. Regarding this point, some participants
expressed that:
“It changed a lot. In the past, we had close relationship and they [central
government] were easily approachable. Nowadays, government officials don’t
recognize us. It seems to be far away, even though we stay close.” (Member of
municipal council, personal communication, August 25, 2016)
“People are afraid of prohibitions, for example, since the military coup, people
are not allowed to politically gather more than four people. People respect the
rule because of fears and anxieties. In the recent coup, people fear the rules and
orders of the military-installed government.” (Municipal councilor, personal
communication, August 25, 2016)
In addition, the military-installed government used direct orders to control local
governments and citizens. This interactive pattern appears overwhelmingly vertical rather
than horizontal. Societal actors at the local level have less power to bargain with central
government, such as the national government and the national legislative assembly, due
to the abolition of nationally-elected legislators. Moreover, those former elected
legislators and other political institutions have been prohibited from politically
connecting with their constituencies. Since 2006, the power of the national government
was primarily shared only with provincial authorities, a branch of the central ministries,
rather than local governments. Local governments and local citizens lacked any sort of
buffering mechanism to protect themselves from the consolidation of power in the central
government. Its effects clearly resulted in reducing trust and communication between two
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levels of governmental authorities. Eventually, losing trust and communication among
public sectors caused ineffective public service provision. The participants shared their
views on this issue:
“Currently the legislators are constrained by laws and regulations imposed by
the military-installed government. They were not allowed to do any political
activity or even meet with their constituents. How could they know the needs and
problems of people in the communities? Was government afraid that they would
pursue political gains? Actually, the MPs should be allowed to meet and ask
people what they needed and what were their problems.” (Member of municipal
council, personal communication, August 25, 2016)
“It affected a lot. People were happy with the past elected governments because
they received new things from government policy that addressed and responded to
their needs. In recent years, some important budgets, as people used to have,
were cut, such as healthcare policy and community loan programs. The patterns
of policies and programs were changed, even though those policies look similar,
they are not. One example was the budget for stimulating the economy. The
original aim was to help local people in creating business activities within their
community. In reality, they did not get benefits from this policy.” (Member of
municipal council, personal communication, August 25, 2016)
The national political crisis caused not only an institutional breakdown, but also
served as one of the critical factors disrupting the implementation of central government
policies. Although, municipalities retain some small degree of autonomy in designing
and implementing their own policies and in providing services that are empowered by the
central government, they nonetheless required a clear policy direction from central
government. Due to institutional breakdown, both national politics and policy were
turbulent and municipalities began to distrust the central government’s policy direction.
As one interviewee said, losing confidence in the central government affected political
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involvement as witnessed during the recent Thai constitutional referendum. Only 40-50%
of qualified voters cast a vote. Participants observed:
“My question is if they wanted to terminate the economy? Because they already
approved some government projects but they ordered us to stop them. Their
policies were discontinued. So that discontinuity caused trouble to the country.
We cannot continue to go forward.” (Local resident, personal communication,
August 31, 2016)
“In the past, municipalities were flexible and government was not strict on this
regulation. Previous governments were not too strict on the things that aimed to
facilitate municipal affairs or supported the communities. The current government
is very strict so that the municipal bureaucrats are afraid of acting in noncompliance.” (Member of municipal council, personal communication, August
30, 2016)
Hierarchical Interactions in Internal Governance Settings
Participants noted that in the midst of the national political crisis, the absolute
power of the military-installed government enforced specific directives on local
governments. The hierarchical structure and bureaucratic governance at the national and
provincial levels increasingly influenced municipal governing processes. This influence
undermined the responsiveness of local governments that needed some degree of
autonomy to cope with local issues and provide local public services in their
communities.
The increase of power in the central government and provincial administrative
authorities entailed not only the return of a staunch hierarchical administration, but also
the erosion of accountability. This means that local governments are placed in a difficult
position to be able to perform their jobs as usual, even though they had been providing
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these services prior to the military coups. The national government interacted with local
governments by using a top-down administrative approach. Some duties (e.g.
infrastructure development projects in local areas) initially operated by local governments
were recentralized and operated by national and provincial administrative organizations.
Some participants expressed that:
“These things are ordered by central government. The government directed central
ministries and central departments. Those central authorities then ordered the
Ministry of Interior. After that, the Ministry of Interior delivered an order to
provincial and district authorities. The districts then ordered local governments.
This is the pattern of their work.” (Municipal mayor, personal communication,
August 24, 2016)
“The problem is that who will do that duty. Today, I can tell you who will do that. I
can tell that they wanted the District Chief Officer to do that. Because of what? I
can tell when we have a provincial meeting. The chair of the meeting is from
Ministry of Interior. The Governor is a representative from central government.
Who sits beside him, you know? Medical doctor, civil engineer….” (Municipal
mayor, personal communication, August 24, 2016)
The reintroduction of this hierarchical structure of government eroded any sense
of accountability in the local citizenry. In some cases, municipal administrators seemed to
listen to the direct orders of national and provincial authorities rather than recognize the
legitimate power of their citizens. Municipalities tried to maintain good relationships with
upper levels in order to balance their bargaining power while pursuing mutual interests.
In some sense, we could consider this capacity as an opportunity; however, it is more
likely that this relationship channels other forms of corruption and non-compliance,
creating a threat to local governance.
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This happened because municipalities tried to avoid confrontation with higher
authorities, which had renewed influence on decision-making at the local level. For
example, one municipality maintained their political relationship with the District Chief
Officer and the Provincial Governor. The municipality offered a series of favors to these
offices in exchange for the passage of a local expenditure bill because the Governor of
province and the District Chief Officer now influenced the approval of all local budgets.
Regarding this point, a member of a municipal council said:
“…The district also requested financial support from us to organize Sport
Promotion for Anti-Drugs. We cannot say no to that request because municipal
administrators told us that the Chief District Officer requested that support. This
person [Chief District Officer] has authority to sign and approve our municipal
budget.” (Member of municipal council, personal communication, August 30,
2016)
In addition, the participants mentioned that the effect of the political crisis
increased national and provincial interventions into local autonomy. The top-down and
hierarchical patterns remained existing in the administrative system. The role of
provincial administrative bureaucrats was influential, but they did not concern themselves
with local development. Those government officials appear to value their own promotion
and job progress over concerns about the development of local communities. However,
local governments have to recognize them because their authority remains powerful and
beneficial for local administration. One of the participants reflected that:
“I understand them [provincial administrative officers]. They do for themselves
because they want to get promotions and progression in their career path from
Deputy Governor to Governor. This is what they do for themselves. Is it beneficial
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for local people, is it touchable? When you come, you come only four years. Then,
you’re gone. I saw and had experiences with almost ten District Chief Officers.”
(Municipal mayor, personal communication, August 24, 2016)
Moreover, local operational autonomy at local levels was redistributed to national
and provincial authorities, thereby recentralizing power. Central ministries and provincial
administrative units became more powerful while local governments floundered. It is not
difficult to explain this phenomenon as the history of Thai governmental structure is one
that evolved around the hierarchical power of the central authority down to the local
governmental entities. That said, this study found an increase in collaboration between
local governments during the political crisis, a point for discussion in Chapter 5.
Regarding the increase of hierarchical interactions, some participants addressed that
problem:
“...My question is who is responsible for this project? Normally, when local
government is responsible for this kind of project, we have our own regulations,
such as an annual plan to build roads. We also have processes for checks and
balances. For the project operation, we have professional staff to take care of
that. They have to check it carefully. They have to take responsibility if there are
mistakes.” (Member of municipal council, personal communication, August 30,
2016)
“The limitation of local government is the slow progress of decentralization. If they
fully decentralize human resources or money to local governments for example, the
system will be perfectly functional. Public service delivery would be more effective.
If human resources and money were fully decentralized, that would be responsive
to the needs of local people...” (Municipal official, personal communication,
August 24, 2016)

The national political crisis created threats to governance not only at the local level,
but also resulted in declining political economy. Economic and social weakening then
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undermined local revenues and social trust in one’s community. The next section
describes how the national political crisis undermined political economy
Political Economy
The main debates in the literature on political economy argue that political
economy is the interdependent mechanism between politics and economy. Once one
mechanism (e.g. politics) is disrupted, the effects could impact other mechanisms (e.g.
economy). This interaction is useful to explain the effects of political crisis on economic
status as a moderating variable to public service delivery (Arndt, 1983). The political
economy has two facets. First is that the internal political economy consists of an internal
economic mechanism (the processes and structure of economy) and an internal political
mechanism (the political structure and institutions). In addition, the external political
economy includes an external economic mechanism (economic environment) and an
external political mechanism (e.g. intergovernmental relations, interest groups) (Arndt,
1983; Stern & Reve, 1980; Wamsley & Zald, 1973). These two aspects of political
economy interact with one another. It is important to note that the interactions between
politics and economy cannot be separated from each other (Stern & Reve, 1980).
The prolonged national political crisis in Thailand had a detrimental effect on
political economy at the local level. Its effects resulted in low investment and a
production decline in local communities. This eventually decreased local revenue
collection and affected local public service delivery. In order to explore how the national
political crisis brought about negative effects on political economy as a mediated
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mechanism to local public service, the participants were guided by the interview
questions (see Appendix C). Based on the participants’ comments, the national political
crisis entailed particular threats for political economy in three ways: output decline,
revenue decline, and household financial weakening. These findings are summarized in
Table 4.5.
Table 4.5 Themes and Samples of Keys Responses on Political Economy


Themes
Output decline

Samples of Key Responses
“People don’t have income as usual.”
“…In harvest season, the current government
stopped helping people on the rice pledging policy
but local farmers already invested more than 1,000
baht per rai.”
“My wife runs a grocery store business; she said
her business was not good. She observed that local
people seem to have a decline in consumption.”



Revenue decline

“Opening a new shop during this time is not a
good idea due to the economic status.”
“The big investors can easily run their
businesses but the small enterprises (household
level) closed down their businesses.”



Household financial weakening

“Our household debt has increased compared to
the past.”
“My debts highly increases because of the failure
of growing rice.”

Source: Samples of key responses in this table are selected from quotes from full interviews.

Output Decline
The national political crisis resulted in a demonstrable economic turndown, not
only at the level of the national economy but also at local levels, undermining the
progress of the local political economy. The political crisis also caused a negative impact
on the relationship between politics and the economy. In the post-2006 national political
crisis, the main social policies created by elected governments were suspended and some
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programs were terminated. This situation created uncertainties and fears, triggering the
decline of the local economy. The local economy is considered a dynamic system where
one factor (politics) interacts with another (economics).
Even though the crisis induced economic weakening at the local level, some types
of businesses (e.g. franchise department stores) continued to run their businesses because
they have higher financial capacity than the local small and medium enterprises. Hence,
local entrepreneurs were careful when investing in local businesses. Small and medium
enterprises are the mechanisms that help strengthen local economies, but fears and
uncertainties caused by the political crisis made these people reluctant to increase their
investments. In addition, the decline of the political economy caused hesitation in the
local people to spend money for buying goods. This reluctance to purchase resulted in a
decrease of available money within local communities. Regarding this point, some
participants mentioned that:
“The current economy has been slowing down and is unpredictable, so that local
people have been waiting for change. It looks like local people don’t want to
invest in some businesses. We are talking about the local area. But the external
investors, such as Big C and Lotus department stores, have capacity to run their
businesses because they have a lot of money to invest. It’s different when we talk
about local people; they fear to invest and to do businesses with just a little
money like 100,000, 200,000 or 300,000 baht. They don’t have too much money.
In addition, they are concerned and uncertain about the market and customers.
They are afraid of the return and who will buy their goods. Where do local people
make their money from?” (Municipal official, personal communication, August
24, 2016)
“It affected us directly. It triggered a domino effect. Ten years ago, we paid 15
baht for a bowl of Chinese noodle soup, nowadays in [the local] area we pay 80
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baht for a similar bowl of Chinese noodle soup.” (Local resident, personal
communication, August 31, 2016)

In some municipalities, local people complained about paying property taxes. The
effects of the national political crisis caused a decline in personal income resulting in
decreasing personal income tax payments. The economic weakening during the political
transition created uncertainties within the local community. Therefore, as mentioned
earlier, local enterprises and local people were very careful about spending their money.
Local people unfavorably compared the economic situation under the current political
regime with the previously elected government. In the normal political situation, policy
and political stability induced economic growth. Local people were satisfied with their
stable revenues because local businesses performed well. People did not complain about
paying their taxes. Regarding this issue, some participants expressed that:
“During this time, people complained about paying tax and they didn’t want to
spend money, especially in the transition of a political regime. It differs from
Thaksin’s government. People were very happy and it was an economic boom!
After that, people complained about paying tax but we have to pay as we
expected. We paid tax during Thaksin’s regime; people didn’t complain much
because of economic growth. People can sell everything. It was so good for doing
business. Then they had money to pay tax. They didn’t complain and negotiate
about tax.” (Municipal official, personal communication, August 24, 2016)
“…Wherever I went, I heard people complain about economic constraints. It’s
difficult for them to make any money. It also affected me. My wife runs a grocery
store business; she said her business was not good. She observed a decline of
consumption. It looks like people work but they did not earn sufficient income.
When people have less money to spend, it caused the decline of money to spend in
our local community.” (Municipal councilor, personal communication, August
25, 2016)
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In addition, the national political crisis caused changes in the national policies.
Some major social policies initiated by the previously elected government were
suspended or even terminated, such as the rice pledging policy9. These changes also
created a negative impact on the price of other agricultural products such as rubber.
Local people invested a lot of money into growing rice and producing a wide-array of
agricultural products. Certainly, people expected to gain greater benefits from the
government’s policies. The political crisis caused government and legislative dissolution
that resulted in negative changes in how previous government policies were
implemented. Immediate change in politics led to an associated change in policy. As a
result, the price of and market for agricultural products dropped. The change undermined
the economic output of local communities. The participants shared some experiences that
occurred in their local communities:
“…In harvest season, the current government stopped helping people through the
rice pledging policy but local farmers had already invested more than 1,000 baht
per rai. To solve this problem, the farmers tried to sell it at a low price. They,
themselves, sold it at about 5,000-6,000 baht, while the investment cost had
already reached almost 5,000-6,000 baht per rai10. In addition, they have to pay
for hiring the harvesters, right?” (Local resident, personal communication,
August 31, 2016)
“People don’t have the usual income. For example, in the past they can sell
rubber at about 70-80 baht per kilogram, but nowadays it is just 20 or 30 baht
per kilogram. They cannot run this business profitably anymore. The solution was
just to cut the rubber trees because they cannot hire the labors for tapping the
rubber trees. The price was in decline. All money went into the hands of traders.
9

http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/thailand-crisis-in-thai-rice-pledging-scheme/
A Thai unit of measurement equal to 1600 sq. meters.

10
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Local people began to cut the rubber trees”. (Member of municipal council,
personal communication, August 24, 2016)
The national political crisis created a negative impact not only for the political
economy at the local level, but it also weakened revenues in local communities. The
following section describes how the national political crisis created threats to these
activities.
Revenue Decline
It is important to make clear at the outset that local self-collected revenue data was
employed as one of the criteria for case selection as described in Chapter 3. It also serves
as a proxy measure for local government performance. Therefore, a decline in revenue, in
this sense, is seen as an impact that was influenced by political economy, one of the five
moderating variables.
Policy discontinuity and political instability triggered weakening business activities
at the local level, especially concerning agricultural and local small and medium business
enterprises (SMEs). In this section, the participants emphasize that the political crisis
made people less willing to invest in and expand businesses. Even though the big
investors were able to maintain their businesses, most local SMEs slowed or even closed
down. In some cases, the weakening economy caused by the political crisis increased the
risk of declining tax revenue, especially from SMEs. Regarding this issue, some
participants stated that:
“Opening a shop during this time is not a good idea due to the economic status.
The economic and commercial activities within [the local] Municipality area are
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not good. People mostly sell chicken BBQ and that is OK for them. When we look
at the construction and appliance shops, it appears that their businesses are not
good...” (Municipal mayor, personal communication, August 30, 2016)
“… most businesses have to close down.” (Municipal official, personal
communication, August 24, 2016)
“The big investors can easily run their businesses but the small enterprises
(household level) closed down their businesses.” (Local resident, personal
communication, August 31, 2016)

The effects of changes in government policy created economic uncertainties and
fears. As a result, the price of goods in local markets increased, resulting in reduced
buying power on the part of local residents. Consequently, these changes negatively
affected business activities in local communities. Some local shops encountered difficulty
in running their businesses. Some of them reduced their business scale, while others
closed down, especially local manufacturing. Moreover, some participants mentioned that
when the price of local products increased, cheap agricultural products that were illegally
imported from neighboring countries took over local markets, undermining them. The
participants shared some evidence of business activities within their local communities
that were affected by political crisis as follows:
“Actually, it has large effects because the impact of the rice pledging policy
created by the previous government generated high incomes for local residents.
They had money for shopping and buying things in our municipal area. The local
shops and department stores earned a lot of benefits from their businesses. Then,
the business sectors had the capacity to pay tax. So that they would not complain
like. ‘Oh…the economy turns down!’” (Municipal official, personal
communication, August 24, 2016)
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“For agricultural products, the limes were so expensive in the past, right? So, our
community grew them by ourselves and sold them within our community.
Nowadays, they bring the limes in the van [from Laos]. They took the seats out and
put in bags of limes instead. They brought them through Thailand border and sold
them at a very cheap price. The green and red onions were also moved across the
border. Those agricultural products took over the Thai domestic products. Hence,
what happened to the farmers? What should they do? They cannot sell their local
products.” (Local resident, personal communication, August 31, 2016)
“We used to have a garment manufacturer in our community. It closed for long
time because of the effect of the economic downturn and the increase of minimum
wage policy. This business was operated by foreign investors. Their business got
affected since the minimum wage increased. Consequently, they closed and moved
to a neighboring country. In addition, after the opening of ASEAN community, it
caused a negative effect to our country.” (Local resident, personal communication,
August 25, 2016)
The economic downturn created a domino effect resulting in the decline of
business activities. Some local entrepreneurs reduced labor costs by hiring cheap,
undocumented laborers from neighboring countries such as Laos, Myanmar, and
Vietnam, instead of hiring local laborers. The increase of illegal laborers caused not only
a job crisis for local people, but also increased disease transmission and the rise of
unregistered and illegal migrants. Even though only a few participants from one
municipality mentioned these points, they are important to address in order to illustrate
the dynamic effect regarding business activities during the national political crisis:
“You can see there are a lot of Cambodians working in gas stations. They (Thai
employers) don’t like to hire Thai employees. The foreign employees work harder
and are cheaper than local employees.” (Local resident, personal communication,
August 31, 2016)
“We’re concerned about public health since the ASEAN community boundary has
been opened. Some neighboring countries, such as Myanmar and Laos, do not
have a good health service system like us. They could have disease when they
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come. Most of them are Burmese. I saw a lot of them in [this] province that made
me afraid of that.” (Local resident, personal communication, August 31, 2016)
The decline of business activities at the local level caused by the national political
crisis demonstrates the interactions between politics and socioeconomic conditions. The
effects of the crisis discouraged local entrepreneurs from investing in and expanding their
businesses. Its effects resulted in not only revenue decline in business but also household
financial weakening.
Household Financial Weakening
Turbulent economic conditions caused by the national political crisis increased
personal and household debt. The declining of local business activities and the
suspension of important economic policies contributed to household financial weakening.
In order to maintain their lifestyles during this time of crisis, local people participated in
loan programs from government and private money lending institutions. Some
households and enterprises incurred debt by borrowing from illegal money-lending
operations. Initially, local people tried to find jobs or invest in businesses within their
communities in order to cover their daily expenses, including debt repayments. However,
current economic conditions did not allow them to do so successfully. The participants
expressed their regard for this point as follows:
“In the current situation, I cannot get money back from people who’ve borrowed
from me. Some people borrowed things from my shop, but they’ve not paid me back
yet. The rubber price, rice production, and so on is declining. All trading activities
have been constrained. Either legal or illegal money lending has been spreading
over all local communities. In the past, during previous elected governments,
people did have debts. They [the government] helped us to eliminate the debts. I
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can say a baby was born without debt. Whereas, nowadays a baby has debt since
he or she was born.” (Local resident, personal communication, August 24, 2016)
“Our household debt has increased compared to the past. Some people have a
salary of only 1,000 baht. They can buy a motorcycle because they can pay in
installments. That’s right. However, they have to pay 3,000 baht monthly not only
for the motorcycle, but also Internet and telephone bill. All the money is gone!
Their monthly income equals their monthly expenses.” (Local resident, personal
communication, August 31, 2016)
“My debts greatly increased because of the failure of growing rice. Due to the
drought, we cannot grow rice. We also lost money from doing farming. The cost of
producing rice went up, while the market price considerably declined.” (Municipal
official, personal communication, August 30, 2016)

All the themes described above present the negative effects of the national
political crisis on local public service delivery mitigated by five moderating variables.
These patterns were shared by the participants from four municipalities through in-depth
interviews and focus group discussions. In this chapter, the data gained from various
participants within different municipalities provided us with an understanding of how the
national political crisis created threats to local public service delivery. The following
section illustrates the comparative characteristics of case performance that are analyzed
across four cases.
Comparison of the High- and Low-Performance Cases in Dealing with the Threats
Resulting from the National Political Crisis
Case performance analysis provides an explanation of how four selected cases,
which are categorized into two groups (two high-performance cases and two lowperformance cases), matter in this study. This analysis aims to map out the characteristics
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of two types of cases through five moderating variables: political institutions, civic
engagement, leadership, governance, and political economy. Local performance in this
study was measured by the rate of change in revenue between 2009 and 201511 of each
municipality under study. Again, it is important to emphasize that in this study, local
revenue is considered a proxy measurement of local economic performance. In analyzing
threats in this chapter, it is noted that both the high and low performers experienced
declines in their revenue. This implies that comparing them on the degrees of threats they
experienced would be a tautology. Therefore, this study will not try to compare the level
threat in this measurement between the high and low performers.
This analysis explores what characteristics of these cases minimize this threat. At
the beginning, this analysis employed “categorical aggregation” to explore the collective
patterns that emerged from the interview data that have related interpretations (Stake,
1995, p. 74). In addition, the patterns were categorized across two sets of cases (highperformance cases and low-performance cases) by using “cross-case synthesis” (Yin,
2014, p. 164). This form of analysis helps map out the similarities and differences of
characteristics between two groups (Yin, 2014). The cases indicated the same or different
characteristics through the five analytical dimensions. Then, those emerging

11

The formal data sources provided by the Department of Local Administration are available in the system
from years 2009 through 2015. Some missing and updated data were collected from each municipality via
telephone and annual reports provided on the municipal websites. Research case selection was described in
Chapter 3: Data and Methods.
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characteristics help answer the questions concerning high-performance cases versus lowperformance cases.
In Table 4.6, the key findings are summarized in order to illustrate the
characteristics of each group. Then, the analysis provides some explanation on the
similarities or differences between high- and low-performance cases through each
moderating variable.
Table 4.6 Case Performance Analysis (Threats)
Moderating
Variables

High Performance
(What characteristics of highperformance cases minimize
this threat?)

Political
Institutions

 Maintained interinstitutional relationships,
but not extremely reliant
upon central political
institutions
 Positioned in political
neutrality
 Maintained partnership and
network with nongovernmental alliance for
balancing and bargaining
political power
 Kept policy alignment
 Open for institutional
interactions and feedback
from actors and society
Same Characteristics
 Political fears and
uncertainties
 Political exhaustion and
ignorance

Civic
Engagement

Low Performance
(What characteristics of
low-performance cases
inability or failure to
minimize this threat?)
 Central government
dependency on fiscal
subsidy
 Stagnant fears and
uncertainties
regarding limitation
of political
institutions

Same/Different

Same Characteristics
 Political fears and
uncertainties
 Political exhaustion
and ignorance

Same
(Local citizens
remain engaged
in nonpolitical
activities, but
still have small
concerns. Highperformance
cases were less
likely to

Different
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Political
Leadership

Same Characteristics
 Responsiveness
 Maintained problemsolving capacity
 Valued collective decision
making
 Open for gaining feedback
 Inter-coordination and
resource seeking capacity
 Prioritized public interests
but still maintained internal
administrative capacity
Same Level but Different
Characteristics
 Maintained tight
partnership with local
citizens

Governance

Same Characteristic
 Maintained intergovernmental & interorganizational relations
 Maintained horizontal
collaboration with local
organizations
 Reactive to trans-boundary
issues
Same level but different
characteristics found
exclusively in highperformance cases
 Performed adaptive
governance capacity
 Avoided political
confrontation
 Accountable to voices of
citizens
 Reduced local service
procedures
 Increased internal coworking cultures

Same Characteristics
 Responsiveness
 Maintained problemsolving capacity
 Valued collective
decision making
 Open for gaining
feedback
 Inter-coordination
and resource seeking
capacity
 Prioritized public
interests but still
maintained internal
administrative
capacity
Same Level but
Different Characteristics
 Flexibility and open
for any possible
opportunity
Same Characteristics
 Maintained intergovernmental &
inter-organizational
relations
 Maintained
horizontal
collaboration with
local organizations
 Reactive to transboundary issues

minimize this
threat.)
Same
(Lowperformance
cases were able
to minimize this
threat as highperformance
cases did.)

Same
(Lowperformance
cases were able
to minimize this
threat as highperformance
cases did.)
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Political
Economy

 Stimulated external
investment
 Increased opportunity for
local entrepreneurs
 Facilitated investment
capital for local
entrepreneurial outreach
 Improved self-collected
revenue strategy
 Maintained fiscal selfreliance

 Absence of fiscal
and economic
strategy

Different
(Lowperformance
cases merely
addressed
economic
weakening in
their local
communities;
however, this
analysis did not
find any
significant
characteristic
that indicated
inability or
failure of local
governments to
minimize this
threat.)

Table 4.6 provides an explanation of characteristics found in both high- and lowperformances cases. The prominent characteristics were identified and summarized
through the five moderating variables. The case performance analysis in this study can be
explained as follows:
Political Institutions. During Thailand’s post-2006 national political crisis, the
relationship between national political institutions and local governments has declined,
especially the weakened electoral mechanism and the suspension of local autonomy.
Nevertheless, the high-performance local governments were able to minimize threats
caused by the national political crisis. They were able to maintain institutional
relationships between national and local political institutions. In addition, their local
policies were aligned with the policies of the national government and central ministries.
This policy alignment positively impacted grant subsidies.
143

Although, local governments inevitably began to turn away from the political
sphere, the high-performance cases placed themselves in a state of political neutrality in
order to avoid direct political effects that may arise after political institutional changes.
The high-performance cases utilized networking mechanisms through the National
Municipal League of Thailand to help bargain and balance power in relation to national
political institutions. Most of Thailand’s municipalities are members of this organization.
To maintain institutional value and trust, they provide easily accessible channels for local
citizens to interact with local political institutions and to receive institutional feedback.
The characteristic institutional dimensions of the low-performance cases
performed slightly differently from the high-performance cases. Although, the
relationship between national political institutions and local governments has declined in
the current political crisis, it generated threats to both the high- and the low-performance
cases. It was essential to maintain relationships and take opportunities to improve local
autonomy; however, low-performance cases failed to do this. They were more likely to
rely on fiscal subsidies from the central government rather than improved organizational
autonomy. In addition, they were fearful about institutional constraints, especially
regarding legal constraints and acts of non-compliance. Political fears and uncertainties
limited their capacity to cope with threats caused by the national political crisis. Based on
the different characteristics of the high- and low-performance cases as described above,
the low-performance cases failed to minimize threats as much as the high-performance
cases.
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Civic Engagement. Although, local citizens in both categories remain engaged in
nonpolitical activities held by local governments, they still have concerns. Based on case
performance analysis, civic participation remains weakened and it may negatively affect
other forms of civic engagement. To cope with this threat, both high-performance cases
and low-performance cases suffered from similar conditions. High-performance cases
rarely minimized political fears and uncertainties, reducing civic engagement. In these
contexts, local citizens avoided talking about politics. Fears, uncertainties, and constraints
caused by the national political crisis became critical factors that induced political
exhaustion and political ignorance within civil society. Its effects weakened policy
networks between local governments and societal actors. This seemed to be far beyond
these local governments’ capacity to minimize this threat.
For low-performance cases, this analysis similarly indicated that political fear and
uncertainties limited motivation as well as the capacity of local governments to minimize
this threat. Fears and uncertainties caused by political and legal constraints created
barriers to local innovation. Local people were less likely to express their voices
regarding politics as the political crisis caused conflict within civil society. Local
governments were less likely to perform their roles as mediators for resolving conflicts
among local citizens. Both high- and low-performance cases encountered difficulties
minimizing this threat.
Political Leadership. Even though the national political crisis threatened political
leadership within local governments, these governments provided a variety of responses
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that ranged in effectiveness. Based on the case performance analysis in this study, though
all four cases were affected by the threat caused by political crisis, both high- and lowperformance cases were capable of maintaining political leadership. For highperformance cases, local governments worked closely with local citizens and were
responsive to the needs and problems of the local community. Due to political and legal
constraints, high-performance cases prioritized public interests, but still maintained legal
compliance. Local leaders valued intra-organizational communication and internal
feedback and consultation before making their decisions. If some issues were beyond
their capacity, they were capable of asking for help from external connections to solve
those basic problems.
Moreover, it is interesting to observe that low-performance cases were able to
minimize this threat using the same strategies as the high-performance cases. They were
still responsive to the needs of local community. In addition, they maintained their
problem-solving capacity, even though they encountered political and legal constraints.
They were capable of seeking financial support from external sources in order to
maintain progress in local development activities. Low-performance cases valued
leadership as a vital mechanism during the transitional period and local leaders valued
feedback gained from frontline officers as part of collective decision-making. They
prioritized solving local problems by cutting municipal administrative costs. In
conclusion, both high- and low-performance cases shared similar characteristics
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demonstrating that the low-performance cases were capable of minimizing this threat as
much as the high-performance cases.
Governance. Case performance analysis revealed that high-performance cases
were able to minimize political threats to local governance. Local governments employed
adaptive governance to deal with changes in political institutions and policies. They tried
to be flexible with new governing procedures that were installed by the military
government. In addition, they avoided confrontation, instead creating more collaboration
with upper-level political authorities. To respond to local needs and seek collaboration,
they coordinated with internal and external networks such as neighboring local
governments, village headmen, provincial governmental agencies, the business sector,
and the National Municipal League of Thailand. They proactively dealt with transboundary issues that might affect local communities, even though those problems or
complaints did not fall under the province of their formal duties. High-performance cases
were likely to listen to citizen voices and stakeholders in order to encourage robust trust
and accountability. To maintain good performance of local services, they reduced
municipal service procedures. This helped increase trust and service satisfaction in local
citizens. Interestingly, they built co-working cultures and improved intra-organizational
collaboration so that municipal officers could work across departments.
Similarly, the low-performance cases shared the same characteristics as the highperformance cases. They tried to maintain working relationships with the provincial
offices of the central ministries. For example, the local governments provided their staff
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and financial support to provinces and districts when those organizations requested
assistance. In addition, the low-performance cases were capable of keeping close
connections with permanent officers from central government organizations, such as the
Department of Local Administration, Ministry of Interior. Those organizations were
important for accommodating local governments and connecting with policy makers in
the central government. They also influence budget and resource allocation at the
national level. Based on the data analysis, both groups of local government have the same
characteristics and they are both able to minimize this threat.
Political Economy. In this analytical dimension, the high-performance cases
were particularly capable of minimizing the political threats that caused economic
weakening in the local community. One of the cases tried to stimulate the local economy
by encouraging franchise department stores to invest in its municipal area. Even though
the investors in these businesses were not local, they nonetheless helped to develop
robust local economies. Additionally, local governments provided commercial spaces
like small, open markets for local entrepreneurs who lacked investment capital and also
helped them find funding sources by coordinating with local banking institutions to
provide loans to those who lacked investment capital. High-performance cases minimized
their financial constraints in the midst of the political crisis by improving tax collection
strategies, helping to increase self-collected revenue. Effective tax collection did not
merely impact economic factors, but also operational factors administered by municipal
officers. In this vulnerable situation, the high-performance cases maintained financial
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security by employing collective decision making that included local administrators, local
legislators, and municipal officers in the process.
However, this dimension was different in the low-performance cases. Both cases
merely addressed economic weakening in their local communities. The analysis
demonstrated an absence of fiscal and economic strategies. This assumes that the lowperformance cases lacked the ability to minimize this threat.
Summary
In conclusion, this chapter described the effects of Thailand’s post-2006 national
political crisis and the resulting threats to local government service delivery. The key
findings were illustrated through five moderating variables in “Graphical Representation
of Findings: How National Political Crisis Creates Threats to Local Government Service
Delivery” (see Appendix A).
First, political institutional breakdown of local governments weakened electoral
mechanisms at both national and local level. Institutional breakdown also caused the
suspension of local authority policies. Then, political fears and uncertainties reduced
civic participation and weakened policy network in local communities, thus increasing
civil conflict. Next, the effects of national political crisis reduced autonomy of local
leaders and increased risks for local leaders. Fourth, due to national political crisis, trust
and communication between central and local governments have decreased, resulting in
suspended decentralization and declining accountability. Also, hierarchical interactions in
internal governance settings were increased. Finally, political turmoil interactively
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induced negative impacts for political economy at local level. This caused local economic
output decline, revenue decline within local business sectors, and personal and household
financial weakening.
In the final part of this chapter, case performance analysis identified the
characteristics of high- versus low-performance cases. The analysis articulated both
similar and different characteristics found in each analytical dimension. Similar
characteristics were identified within the dimension of civic engagement, leadership, and
governance. It is important to note that the characteristics of both high- and lowperformance cases in the civic engagement dimension are similar in their negative results;
both the high- and low-performance cases failed to minimize the political threats posed to
civic engagement. The high- and low-performance cases within the leadership and
governance dimensions did share positive characteristics. In these dimensions, lowperformance cases were able to minimize the threat as well as the high-performance
cases. Differences in characteristics were identified within the institutional and social
economic dimensions. In this sense, the low-performance cases failed to minimize the
threat as much as the high-performance cases.
As mentioned at the outset, Thailand’s post-2006 national political crisis created
not only threats, but also opportunities for development in local government service
delivery. The next chapter will describe how the national political crisis created
opportunities for local government service delivery through five moderating variables
and case performance analysis.
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Chapter 5
How National Political Crisis Creates Opportunities
for Development in Local Government
The previous chapter presented the effects of national political crisis that created
threats to local service delivery. While the national political crisis was seen by
participants as overwhelmingly negative in its impacts on local service performance, they
also believed that it had created some opportunities for improvement.
In some cases, such as Thailand’s institutional breakdown, threats to formal
institutions, especially the existing constitution, were created. The military-installed
government imposed Section 44 of the 2014 Interim Constitution to address political
conflicts, eliminate certain laws, and remove certain appointed government officials from
their positions. This was considered a threat to the democratic institutions and
fundamental rights of Thai citizens (Forum-Asia, 2015). Nevertheless, these threats
created some opportunities for facilitating local service delivery. These opportunities
were embedded in the very same threats to local service performance.
In other instances, these opportunities arose separately from the threats. For
example, Khoman (2005) states that Thailand’s economic crisis that began in 1997 was
not necessarily considered a threat but its effects triggered opportunities for boosting
Thailand’s political reform and stimulating government to work closely with citizens.
The idea that crisis, disaster, or catastrophe can yield important opportunities for social,
economic, and even political development and performance has been widely studied by
scholars.
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For example, in “Antifragile; Things That Gain from Disorder,” Nassim Taleb
(2012) argues that systems that respond favorably to threats are called “antifragile” (p.
31). The concept of antifragile explains the positive things as opportunities gained from
turmoil or uncertainty. Threats create opportunities for building methods of prevention or
solutions for the future (Taleb, 2012). In addition, Horwich (2000) proposes an economic
recovery concept that was developed based on the experiences of the Kobe Earthquake of
1995. The recovery concept employs the idea of “accelerated depreciation,” by which a
crisis leads to a more rapid replacement and upgrading of outmoded systems (Horwich,
2000, p. 523).
In public policy perspective, Kingdon (2003) argues that change in “political
stream,” for example change in government and/or a change in policies, induces the
opportunities for an “open policy window” (p. 168). An open policy window is an
opportunity for revising or even changing policy and proposing policy initiatives.
Importantly, political crisis can be a vital factor that opens a window of opportunity for
rearranging political institutions (Kingdon, 2003). While crisis was seen as a negative
thing, it created opportunities for youth in Africa to express their ideas regarding policy
discontent, governance, and democracy. As a result, their voices were heard and became
a powerful mechanism that improved their roles in the social movement (Iwilade, 2013).
Results
Thailand’s post-2006 national political crisis entailed not only threats to local
governments but also brought opportunities. This chapter discusses how the national
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political crisis created opportunities for local service delivery. The results are presented
using the five moderating variables as the analytical framework. To substantiate the
findings, pertinent quotes from the participants are presented. At the end of this chapter,
as in the last chapter, the results from a comparative analysis of the low and high
performers are presented.
Political Institutions
The main discussion in the literature on political institutions argues that
“institutions do matter” to both individuals and organizations in civil society (Peters,
2011, p. 79; Teske, 1991). Political institutions influence political arrangements, political
structure, and autonomy. The results of institutional change may create both negative and
positive impacts to social interactions and behaviors as well as public local service
performance (Hicken & Selway, 2012; March & Olsen, 1984; North, 1990; Painters,
2004; Peters, 2012). Even though crisis is generally seen as having a negative impact at
the individual and organizational levels, opportunity is concealed within every crisis.
Generally, a crisis provides particular opportunities to political institutional evolution and
strengthens the institution-citizen relationship (Fry, 2014). For example, Thailand’s
political crisis in 1992 triggered positive impacts on political reform and the progress of
decentralization (Khoman, 2005).
According to the participants of the study, the opportunities to political
institutions created by political turmoil were described in three themes: (1) Section 44
reducing the need for a long approval process; (2) Damrongdharma Centers providing an
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outlet for local voices; and (3) Provincial Administration Organization (PAO)-local
institutional capacity. The themes and key responses on political institutions are
presented and summarized in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1 Themes and Samples of Key Responses on Political Institutions
Themes
Section 44 reducing the need
for a long approval process

Samples of Key Responses
“Section 44 can order and terminate the inconvenient
issues or the limitations of those regulations in order to
facilitate our work when we want to assist people.”
“When the current military installed government
enforced Section 44, the administrative system moved very
fast. People were satisfied on this point.”



Damrongdharma Centers
providing an outlet for local
voices

“Since the Damrongdharma Center was established,
people thought it helped them faster, so they just skipped the
municipal process and sent their complaints to this center.”
“…having this center [the Damrongdharma Center]
made them [the local people] feel safe…”



PAO-local institutional
capacity



“The sun never sets [for our local network]. The subdistrict administration organizations and the provincial
administrative organization are always welcoming us. We
can coordinate with them anytime.”
“Recently, the mayor asked for financial support from
the PAO in order to improve and develop a bigger
playground.”
Source: Samples of key responses in this table are selected from quotes from full interviews.

Section 44 Reducing the Need for a Long Approval Process
Thailand’s post-2006 national political crisis created particular opportunities for
institutional responsiveness. Positive influences arose especially after the 2014 military
coup. One of the participants noted that Section 4412 as used by the NCPO created an
opportunity for administration and decision-making at the local level. Section 44 states
that:

12

The Government Public Relation Department,
http://thailand.prd.go.th/ewt_news.php?nid=1581&filename=index
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“In the case where the Head of the National Council for Peace and Order deems
necessary for the purpose of reforms in various fields, for the enhancement of unity and
harmony among people in the country, or for the prevention, restraint, or suppression of
any act which undermines public order or national security, the Monarchy, the national
economy, or State affairs, irrespective of whether such act occurred inside or outside of
the Kingdom, the Head of the National Council for Peace and Order, with the approval of
the National Council for Peace and Order, shall have power to order, restrain, or perform
any act, whether such act has legislative, executive, or judicial force; the orders and the
acts, including the performance in compliance with such orders, shall be deemed lawful
and constitutional under this Constitution, and shall be final. When those have been
carried out, a report shall be submitted to the President of the National Assembly and the
Prime Minister for acknowledgement without delay.” (Thailand. Const. (Interim) § 44,

2014).
According to many participants, Section 44 provided a shortcut in decisionmaking and an administrative tool for local governments to serve citizens’ needs and
solve specific problems. In this sense, its impact was useful for local service delivery in
terms of legal facilitation and responsiveness. In the past, local governments needed to
gain approval from central ministries and provincial administrative authorities via many
hierarchical procedures prior to providing some services or undertaking certain public
projects. Section 44, when invoked by the Prime Minister, helped resolve legal and
technical problems and streamlined some complicated bureaucratic processes.
Nevertheless, there were many criticisms concerning the effect of using Section 44 in
government administration. A major criticism was that the fast-track operation and quick
decision-making may threaten accountability and transparency in both the national and
local governments. Some participants described their concerns:
“Frankly speaking, I would say that in the absence of an [elected] government,
when we needed something, Section 44 provided a convenience for us. It makes
things easier for us. It’s convenient. In the past, we had to get approval from the
provincial governor or district chief officer. Section 44 can order and terminate
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the inconvenient issues or the limitations of those regulations in order to facilitate
our work when we want to assist people.” (Vice mayor, personal communication,
August 25, 2016)
“When the current military-installed government invoked Section 44, the
administrative system moved very fast. People were satisfied on this point. They
like this pattern. Regarding economics, I agree that the military-installed
government was incapable of handling it like the general investors. For the
governmental administration, the military government performed well.” (Local
resident, personal communication, August 30, 2016)
According to the participants, the positive impacts of political crisis resulted not
only in reducing approvals within conventional bureaucratic procedures, but also
establishing formal institutional channel to receive feedback from local citizens.
Damrongdharma Centers Providing an Outlet for Local Voices
After Thailand’s 2014 military coup, NCPO established nationwide government
centers called Damrongdharma Centers 13 as a channel to receive citizens’ complaints,
handle civil conflict, and manage public interests. These centers had an impact on local
governments. For example, if local feedback has been given but the municipalities have
not reacted to it in a timely or appropriate fashion, citizens can then send their complaints
through the Damrongdharma Center located in provincial hall. At the provincial level, the
military authority can intervene and immediately respond to citizen feedback. On one
hand, military action may harm local government performance and credibility in terms of

13

The Damrongdharma Center was established by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO). The
center is national wide governmental organizations. It is located in each province in Thailand and is
responsible to the Ministry of Interior. The aims of this center are to represent NCPO for responding to
citizen complaints on governmental services, facilitate conflict resolutions, and protect public interests
(Links: http://www.mea.or.th/moi/pomc/doc/ncpo96.pdf and
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/news/national/aec/30243281).
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problem-solving capacity and responsiveness. On the other, having this center at the
provincial level increased local influence on public concerns. Importantly, military
authority became one of the vital mechanisms that helped stimulate local governments to
react to local problems and expand space for public participation. Some views gained
from participants were:
“Since the Damrongdharma Center was established, people thought it helped
them faster, so they just skipped the municipal process and sent their complaints
to this center. Then, the center ordered us [the municipality] to respond to
people’s complaints. It created a bypass and broke the line.” (Municipal
councilor, personal communication, August 25, 2016)
“Yes, having this center [the Damrongdharma Center] made them [the local
people] feel safe like they had the Prime Minister from military. They were
courageous to speak out and present their opinions.” (Municipal official,
interpersonal communication, August 31, 2016)
Even though these centers are seen as political instruments of the central
authorities in Bangkok, the end results satisfied local residents. Importantly, local voices
were heard and responded to through this channel.
PAO-Local Institution Capacity
Since the beginning of the political crisis in 2006, many local governments lacked
resources, especially money, and experienced a growing lack of autonomy. To respond to
the needs of their local residents and to maintain effective local service delivery,
municipal leaders coordinated with both lower and upper levels of local government as
well as governmental agencies, especially the PAO.
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The national political restraints created a positive impact for building local
institutional capacity. It was not necessary for local governments to wait for help from
the national government. At this point, the PAO, as an upper level of local government,
played an important role in assisting municipalities to maintain the quality of public
service. Participants discussed this issue:
“The sun never sets [for our local network]. The sub-district administration
organizations and the provincial administrative organization (PAO) are always
welcoming us. We can coordinate with them anytime. We, the local government,
surely can take care of each other. (Municipal councilor, personal
communication, August 24, 2016)
“The PAO’s legislators always contacted us. They tried to provide as much
assistance as they could. We asked for help through the PAO’s legislators.
(Municipal councilor, personal communication, August 30, 2016)
“For educational affairs, the mayor provided a budget for taking care of children.
The budget provided only for buying a small playground. Recently, the mayor
asked for financial support from the PAO in order to improve and develop a
bigger playground. Actually, we just signed the MOU with the PAO for childcare
development. (Municipal councilor, personal communication, August 30, 2016)
Civic Engagement
The literature on civic engagement argues that civic engagement in democratic
society can be seen in two forms. The first is formal civic engagement. This form
emphasizes the traditional, formal political participation that involves formal institutional
processes and structures such as voting, advocacy by political parties, political
candidates, etc. The second form is informal civic engagement, which is more flexible.
This informal form focuses on volunteer activities, cultural and religious activities, and
social movements (Pahad, 2005).
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In addition, civic engagement is a positive source for enhancing democracy and
effective public policy process at both national and local levels. In civic community,
citizens are the main players in forming policy and designing public service (Holmes,
2011; McLaverty, 2011; Michels & Graaf, 2010). Nevertheless, the pattern of civic
engagement is seen through the status of the political institutions, especially change in
political institutions. Institutional change affects suspension of electoral mechanisms and
political activities. These factors influence the pattern and form of civic engagement
(Dalpino, 2012; Waitoolkiata & Chambers, 2015). Moreover, when a political institution
is weak and faced with difficulties, it is not necessarily bad news for civic engagement. In
this sense, Börzel and Risse (2015) argue that strong collective actions help strengthen
local governance and increase trust in government.
Although citizens’ political engagement with national institutions and affairs in
local communities declined during the political crisis, the tightening relationship between
local governments and local citizens induced some degrees of progress in civic
engagement at the local level. Clearly, we have found an interesting phenomenon of two
contrasting social milieu where there is decline in civic participation in political affairs at
the national level, but at the same time a more active participation at the local level.
As a moderating variable, the effects of civic engagement resulted in improving
local service delivery. The study found four themes in this mechanism: Increased trust in
local government; increased formal (council) participation; increased informal (vocal)
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participation; and increased community building. These themes are summarized in Table
5.2.
Table 5.2 Themes and Samples of Key Responses on Civic Engagement
Themes



Increased trust in local government



Increased formal (council)
participation




Increased informal (vocal)
participation
Increased community building

Samples of Key Responses

“Local people realized that local government is involved
in their life from birth to death. Local government is very
important to us.”
“For the council meeting, when we [the municipal
legislators] debated budget cuts, local people came to listen
to us in order to ensure that this was not only a one-way
communication.”
“When local citizens attended the town hall meeting, they
were not afraid to speak out or perform their reactions.”

“When our municipality held activities that are involved
in local tradition and culture, most civil organizations, local
people, youth, local leaders, monks and other religious
leaders actively engaged in our activities.”
Source: Samples of key responses in this table are selected from quotes from full interviews.

Increased Trust in Local Government
In times of national political crisis, political institutional breakdown created
uncertainties and threats to local governments and local citizens. Conversely, a crisis is
an opportunity for local governments to work closely with their local residents in order to
build trust in local government. Political fears and uncertainties caused by the national
political crisis made local residents count on the local governments and vice-versa. As a
result, local residents felt a greater degree of safety and comfort because local
governments and local legislators stood beside them. The decline of responsiveness of the
national government during the political crisis caused many local residents to increase
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their trust in the ability of local government to address problems. One of the participants
stressed that:
“Local government is always beside local citizens. If they [local people] report to
us about the waterworks getting stuck, we have to take care of that by
coordinating with the provincial waterworks authority [not a local duty]. If a
power outage occurs, we have to fix it for our people [actually, it is not a local
duty].” (Member of municipal council, personal communication, August 24,
2016)
Local residents perceived that the national government, especially the militaryinstalled government, was far away from them. The local governments were seen by the
local citizens as even more easily reachable and closer than the national government. The
more local residents got closer to their local government, the more trust between local
citizens and local government developed. Having a high level of trust in local
government induces civic participation and also increases effective engagement in local
public service. Regarding this issue, the participants provided some examples:
“The local government is more functional and practical because local
administrators and local legislators live within the community. They know what is
going on in their community and react immediately in order to respond to the
needs of local residents. The responsiveness is faster than the central government.
Nowadays, if the central government or district remained responsible for local
duties, it would take longer for obtaining each road…This is reflecting that if they
[local residents] cannot get what they need rapidly, they will report to the top
administrator…Nowadays, for every issue including, raining, flooding, stuck
toilets, etc., people report to the municipality…” (Municipal officer, interpersonal
communication, August 25, 2016)
“We designed and framed our policy such as infrastructure development or
living improvements. We work closely with local people that we should not
depend on anyone else. Whoever comes to help us, we should be flexible with
them. When the municipality conducts business, we always inform people that we
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are volunteering to help. You may see before deciding to do something in our
local community, we are open for civic engagement. We open the stage for
everyone to share and propose their ideas. We then use these inputs to create the
municipal strategic plan so that we don’t encounter as many problems.”
(Vice mayor, personal communication, August 25, 2016)
“From my point of view, when we consider the closeness to the people of local
and central political institutions, we are closer to our local government than the
central government. They [local residents] said they have never even seen their
faces [central legislators]. We met the central legislators only once during election
season. How close are they? How can they know about local problems? But local
governments are more approachable. Local people can come to the mayor
directly. Even though some duties do not belong to us, for example, when the
water system had problems, people thought of us and came to us. Actually, the
provincial waterworks authority is not our duty.” (Mayor, personal
communication, August 24, 2016)
The closer relationship between local governments and local citizens in the midst
of the political crisis is not only advantageous for strengthening local political
institutional interactions but also increases trust in local governments. This change made
local citizens learn about and understand the role and importance of local governments,
especially the role of local government as a major public service provider within their
community. Local government was vitally involved in their everyday lives from birth to
death. As some participants said:
“Local people realized that local government is involved in their life from birth to
death. Local government is very important to us.” (Member of municipal council,
personal communication, August 24, 2016)
“Compared to the past, local citizens are more interested in local politics and
local government…Nowadays, they are eager to ask questions when we have
local political campaigns or when we meet with them in public. They request their
rights. Sometimes, they ask us that what we can do for them if they elect us as
local councilors.” (Municipal councilor, personal communication, August 25,
2016)
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“People mostly think of their municipality. They primarily think of local
government—i.e. local councilors or mayors. In … Municipality, the relationship
between our community and central legislators is quite low.” (Municipal
councilor, personal communication, August 24, 2016)
In addition, the norms of local citizens tended to change for the better when local
government played a vital role in and became a part of their everyday lives. They thought
of local government first when they had problems within their communities. Citizens
perceive that local government could help address their needs better than other public
institutions (Hall & Taylor, 1996). Citizens realized that local government and local
legislators are closer to them and respond to their needs faster than central political
institutions, and that they can conveniently approach local legislators and local services.
In addition, local governments tended to value the voices and power of local citizens as
input for policy design and collective decision-making. Citizens became key stakeholders
in policy processes and public service provisions. Regarding this point, some participants
share their experiences:
“…We are never far away from the municipality. They are close to us. Currently,
there are two types of political characteristics in Thailand, i.e. vertical and
horizontal. People now are interested in the horizontal form that is closer to them,
for example, mayors and local councilors. But the role of the vertical form is to
give order to the lower levels. Hence, the relationship is quite estranged.” (Local
resident, interpersonal communication, August 25, 2016)
“When they [local residents] have problems, they come to the municipality. They
don’t go to see politicians [central legislators]. They come directly to us or
sometimes they call directly to the mayor or the head of a department. They
report problems to us directly by giving us a call.” (Municipal official,
interpersonal communication, August 24, 2016)
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“If someone’s roof has holes, they come to the municipality. For flooding in our
community, we need help from the municipality to provide a drainage pump. We
come to municipality to report our problems. If we have wedding parties, we
invite the mayor and the councilors. Everything is here. I feel like the municipality
is like our parents, we depend on it.” (Local resident, interpersonal
communication, August 30, 2016)
“We can meet with the mayor directly whenever we have problems. Sometimes,
those problems are not municipal duties. For example, the provincial waterworks
authority is not under local jurisdiction. It is responsible to the provincial
administration, but local people primarily think of us. They call us when there is
an electric outage within their communities. We have to react and respond to
these problems because they call us, even though those duties are not our
responsibility…” (Mayor, personal communication, August 24, 2016)
A political crisis does not always result in a negative change in local political
institutions; it can also have a positive impact on local development. The relationship
between local citizens and local governments is more tightly constructed. Local citizens
understand the role of local governments, while local governments prominently value and
prioritize the interests and the needs of local citizens. A crisis also triggers positive
change in political norms and the political value of local citizens as well as municipal
officers.
Moreover, the positive impact gained from the political crisis created
opportunities for local government to build local awareness and a sense of local
citizenship. Local citizens increasingly cared about and were concerned with problems
occurring in their communities. They attentively reacted to the issues that affected not
only their individual lives but also their local society. Because of local trust, the feedback
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and concerns were frequently directed to municipalities for further improvement. Some
participants addressed this issue:
“Local people are increasingly engaged in municipal activities. They were also
interested in joining the activities that were organized by the municipality.”
(Municipal official, interpersonal communication, August 31, 2016)
“People saw the progress of their community, so that they were more concerned
[about it]. For example, a mayor has worked almost four years, what about his
performance? The municipality always gained the grant, but we didn’t see any
output. They compared the performance of this mayor to the previous mayor.”
(Local resident, interpersonal communication, August 25, 2016)
Civic engagement became a mechanism to generate robust dialogue between
citizens and local governments, especially in times of political instability. Outwardly, the
political crisis eroded the progress of political engagement. However, local governments
were capable of maintaining non-political engagement and encouraging local citizens to
participate in collective decision-making. Political instability stimulated local
governments to provide space for gaining feedback from citizens. As this study observed,
it created an opportunity for local citizens to build local awareness and improve their
sense of citizenship. The following section explains how national political crisis
increased formal institutional participation.
Increased Formal (Council) Participation
Participants saw the national political crisis as an opportunity for local
government to attentively engage local citizens in the municipal council meetings.
According to the public participation spectrum, municipal and local leaders informed
local citizens that they could attend the council meeting that were routinely held in the
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municipal office. Their attendance at the council meetings suggested that they were
becoming involved in decision-making processes.
Yet, based on council regulations, local citizens were not allowed to express any
comments while attending the meeting. They were simply observers. This process of
engagement guaranteed the citizens’ right to have at least some participation in the
decision-making of municipal administrative and legislative bodies. It also allowed
citizens to see how their local legislators performed during the meeting sessions. These
activities helped increase not only civic engagement, but also accountability and
transparency in local administration. Regarding this point, some participants indicated
that:
“Our municipality sent out a letter to the community committee and the
community leaders in order to ask them to announce the council meeting
schedule. If local residents want to attend the council meeting, they need to bring
a copy of the house registration or a copy of their identification card to show
municipal staff prior to the council meeting. We also explained the rules of the
council meeting to the citizens, namely that they cannot debate or express any
voice while attending the meeting.” (Member of municipal council, personal
communication, August 24, 2016)
“We were invited to attend the council meeting. We also helped them to spread
the word to other local citizens that if anyone would like to attend the council
meeting, they were welcome. They [the municipality] invited local citizens in each
community to attend the council meetings. If council members ask us something,
then we are allowed to speak out. We cannot vote in this meeting but we come to
listen to them.” (Local resident, interpersonal communication, August 24, 2016)
“For the council meeting, when we [the municipal legislators] debated budget
cuts, local people came to listen to us in order to ensure that this was not just a
one-way communication. We wanted them to know and see what happened in the
council meeting. If local people do not know anything about local administration,
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we cannot work effectively.” (Vice mayor, personal communication, August 25,
2016)
Moreover, local civic engagement seemingly advanced to higher levels when
local governments provided space for local citizens to give feedback and become
involved in municipal decision-making. In some municipalities, local citizens were
invited to serve as committee members or as members of the municipal operations team.
At this stage, local citizens can express their opinions, provide feedback, and even make
decisions on municipal development projects. This is not only to encourage local people
to get engaged in collective decision-making but also to build trust in local governments.
Participants provided their experiences regarding this point:
“When we had a town hall meeting, local citizens were actively engaged in the
meeting. They shared their thoughts on development projects.” (Municipal
official, interpersonal communication, August 25, 2016)
“For my duties—i.e. an employee of a municipal department, if citizens propose
the projects, they will be appointed to… [To be a committee member] … They
seem to be happy working with us. But if they did not know about the project or
were not involved, it was useless. It’s not useful and it wastes money. But if we
provide projects they need, such as the debris management project, people were
ready to work with us. If they don’t want it, it won’t happen.” (Municipal official,
interpersonal communication, August 24, 2016)
“People increasingly scrutinized our work. The past 10 years is totally different
from the time before. When we were the Tambon Administration Organization,
people were afraid of checking [the work of government]. Nowadays, people
actively check government work. They know their roles very well.” (Municipal
official, interpersonal communication, August 31, 2016)
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Increased Informal (Vocal) Participation
The political crisis triggered opportunities that resulted in not only the
improvement of formal civic engagement, but also the increase of engaging space, as
informal participation, for citizen feedback and accessibility in their local community.
Local people were eager to speak out in order to provide recommendations to the
municipalities for improving services. Local people routinely addressed feedback to their
local legislators or even came to the municipalities directly.
Some participants noted that changes in politics may not affect citizen
engagement, but civic engagement may be created from the understanding and awareness
that they’ve learned from politics. Participants provided their thoughts on this point:
“Civic engagement in the … Municipality is very good. When we hold municipal
plan meetings, they [citizens] usually bring public issues to the meeting. They
engage with us very well. They like to suggest how to solve problems in the
community. It seems like we receive more feedback from them.” (Municipal
official, interpersonal communication, August 25, 2016)
“When local citizens attended the town hall meeting, they were not afraid to
speak out or voice their reactions.” (Municipal official, communication, August
31, 2016)
“In the past 10 years, local people are increasingly willing to speak out and
reflect their opinions.” (Member of municipal council, personal communication,
August 25, 2016)
The channel to increase opportunities for civic engagement between local citizens
and their governments has widened from classical approaches such as face-to-face
interaction to include modern digital interaction. In the digital era, local governments
employ various forms of social media to interact and engage with citizens, such as
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websites, Facebook, Line, etc. Social media has become a vital instrument for local
governments to communicate with and engage citizens in times of political crisis.
Important information and some municipal resources were made available to the public
through municipal websites and Facebook in order to build trust and accountability. At
the same time, local citizens use social media as a channel to provide feedback and
follow the activities of local governments. Facebook became a practical and accessible
source for maintaining civic engagement in local communities. Regarding this point,
some participants indicated that:
“It is different from the past. It is related to advanced technology. This factor
encouraged people to express their voices, not just stay still and keep quiet.”
(Local resident, interpersonal communication, August 25, 2016)
“In my opinion, local people actively engaged with local governments and they
courageously expressed their views. They received news and information very
fast. They also reacted to problems very quickly. Whenever they had problems,
they came to see us immediately.” (Municipal official, interpersonal
communication, August 25, 2016)
“Local people actively engaged in local activities. When our kindergarten center
held some activities, we always invited parents to join us. Parents also followed
news and information from our Facebook page. In addition, if they know we
punish their kids, they will call directly and send complaints to the mayor.”
(Municipal official, interpersonal communication, August 30, 2016)
“The impact of current mass media and social media encourages local people to
quickly post and share their complaints on social media space. It spreads widely
…” (Municipal official, interpersonal communication, August 31, 2016)
Increased Community Building
The participants indicated that local residents were active in formal civic
engagement and politically-related activities. During the time of the elected government,
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the central government and central legislators remained a democratic regime. Later, these
political institutions were removed and replaced by the military-installed authorities, and
the political sphere became tumultuous, creating fears and uncertainty for local people.
Consequently, local people lacked a means of engagement in formal political activities.
However, they were apparently comfortable involving themselves in non-formal civic
engagement and non-political activities rather than formal civic engagement. Most
activities were organized by municipalities, e.g., local festivals, traditional activities,
religious activities, and town hall meetings.
Even though the political crisis remains unsettled, local residents in some
municipalities were motivated to engage in local political activities such as attending
council meetings or volunteering on municipal committees. Local citizens felt
comfortable getting involved in such local activities. They engaged in local activities by
ignoring political identity and political conflict—i.e. yellow and red identities. Hence, the
municipalities utilized these opportunities to increase community-building by stimulating
local civic engagement. The strong civic community helped enhance co-production in
local public services. Concerning this point, some participants said:
“According to the duty and structure of the municipality, the municipal office is
normally responsible for education, religion, and culture. When our municipality
held activities that involve local tradition and culture, most civil organizations,
local people, youth, local leaders, monks and other religious leaders actively
participate in our activities. (Municipal official, interpersonal communication,
August 25, 2016.
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“Local people mostly liked engaging in making merit, traditional activities, and
religious activities.” (Local resident, interpersonal communication, August 31,
2016)
“When our municipality held local activities that were related to local
development, sports, education, or public health, local people frequently
participated in our activities. They also helped us to create and develop those
activities. (Municipal official, interpersonal communication, August 24, 2016)
The effects of national political crisis induced not only positive impacts to civic
engagement at the local level in both formal and informal ways, but also improved the
capacity of political leadership.
Political Leadership
Most of the literature on leadership argues that leaders with high leadership
capacity help increase effectiveness and efficiency in public services (Wart, 2003). In
addition, difficult and challenging situations require leaders who can provide vision and
use their own problem-solving skills to make appropriate decisions on public service
management (Fiedler, 1996; Wart, 2003). For contingency leadership, task motivated
leadership style is necessary for leaders who wish to succeed in their goals, especially in
difficult situations (Fiedler, 1971; Northhouse, 2010).
In crisis situations, Boin et al. (2017) argue that strategic crisis leadership should
include the capacity to estimate and understand the qualities of a situation. The leaders
can then make decisions and use appropriate tools in response to each crisis. In addition,
leaders should have good communication skills in order to give a clear explanation and
provide an understanding to their followers and associates. Importantly, crisis is not
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always a bad thing; it is embedded with opportunities. In the midst of a crisis, people
expect that public leaders need to do something that can maintain public services and
bring back normalcy. Once the crisis situation and the people’s concerns are effectively
managed and eased by leaders, this leadership achievement can elevate leaders to be
heroes or “statesmen” (Boin & ‘t Hart, 2003, p. 544). So, political crisis is not always bad
news for leadership. Even though crisis causes change in governmental administration
and policy, this sort of change creates windows of opportunity that open for revising (or
even removing) policies and rearranging political institutions (Kingdon, 2003).
In the midst of political crisis, there is ultimately a political leadership opportunity
for local leaders and they need to identify and respond to these opportunities. Local
government leaders require leadership to mitigate and cope with political fears and
uncertainties that undermined local service delivery. In this study, political leadership
emphasizes municipal administrators. National political crisis creates leadership
opportunities for local leaders. Its effects result in elevating the role of mayors to respond
the needs of local residents. These findings are summarized in Table 5.3.
Table 5.3 Themes and Samples of Key Responses on Political Leadership
Samples of Key Responses
“I don’t know about the mayors in other places, but our
mayor went everywhere whenever he knew there was a
problem, responding to the requests of local citizens. At
least, he can help coordinate and provide some basic help.
He is concerned about the community’s needs and never
ignored what we needed.”
Source: Samples of key responses in this table are selected from quotes from full interviews.


Themes
Elevated role of mayors
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Elevated Role of Mayors
Even though the political crisis followed by the coup d’état has suppressed the
autonomy of local leaders, it also provides an opportunity for the mayors to demonstrate
their leadership qualities. This may have been driven by their desire to be recognized
within their own constituency; to be ready when the future election comes. They were
afraid that by doing business as usual, they would be relegated to obscurity.
Prior to the coups, national government and legislators asserted strong influence
over the municipal mayors in some types of public service. Since Thailand’s post-2006
national political crisis, there were frequent changes in the central government and their
policies. These changes created uncertainty that impacted local public services. However,
the effects of these crises stimulated municipal mayors to be more responsive to local
needs and solve local problems.
In addition, local citizens realized the role of local leaders who worked closely
with them and knew what their citizens needed. Therefore, the leadership opportunity
gained from the national political crisis elevated the roles of mayors in improving local
public services. Many participants also mentioned that mayors not only had a responsive
style, but also a capacity to coordinate with entities outside their jurisdiction in order to
serve basic needs of local citizens. This kind of leadership was not the same in all places
but depended on leaders’ capacity in serving various needs. Regarding this point, some
participants stated that:
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“The mayor has to be actively responsive to all local citizens and respond to what
they need. For example, if people do not have a car [for facilitating individual or
family activities], the municipality will provide a car for them. Whenever anyone
in our community passes away, we help their families to set up the tents and
provide utensils—plates and bowls [for the funeral service]. This role of the
mayor is a complete change. It depended on local administrators’ policies that
were designed in pursuit of accommodating local citizens. I think it’s likely good.
It’s not like it was with the central legislators.” (Municipal official, interpersonal
communication, August 25, 2016)
“Even though the central government allocated a budget for improving public
services, the technical problem still exists. We still have conflicts about service
boundaries and jurisdiction. It doesn’t involve only the Royal Highway
Department because the service boundary connects to other judicial boundaries.
It’s hard to coordinate. I don’t know about the mayors in other places, but our
mayor went wherever he knew there was a problem, responding to the requests of
local citizens. At least, he can help coordinate and provide some basic assistance.
He is concerned about the community’s needs and never ignored what we needed.
(Local resident, interpersonal communication, August 2016)
Governance
The literature on governance reports that the new governing process of public
organizations values networks and power sharing among multiple actors. In this sense,
government is no longer the key player in policy process and public service provision
(Enroth, 2011; Peters & Pierre, 1998; Renn, Klinke, & Asselt, 2011). Public service
delivery process is implemented by multiple actors and networks rather than a single
actor and centralized decision makers. Those involved are diverse and work together
across boundaries (Peters, 2011). In addition, non-hierarchical and bottom-up
administrative style replaces traditional hierarchical pattern that emphasizes command
and control administration. This new pattern of governing process values horizontal
collective action rather than state-centered administration (Kickert, 1997).
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Importantly, new public governance aims to enhance the quality and effective
public service provisions and to accommodate collective goals by stimulating
collaboration in decision making among various contributors within government
networks and with other societal actors. Moreover, collaboration among multiple sectors
opens up opportunities in which different institutional settings can share resources and
work together as a strategic partnership in order to provide effective public service
(Bevir, 2011; Bingham, 2011). Börzel and Risse (2015) support the findings of this report
that political institutional breakdown is not always harmful for governance at local level.
It is an opportunity for local governments to work with various groups and sectors
collectively and also collaborate across boundaries to achieve a high degree of
governance. This helps improve trust with their local communities and safeguard
governance from the effects of dysfunctional institutions.
According to participants, Thailand’s post-2006 national political crisis created
particular opportunities for governance as a moderating variable to local service delivery
in four traits: Lessening of central mandates, end of partisan gridlock, increased local
responsiveness, and increased intergovernmental collaboration. These themes are
summarized in Table 5.4
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Table 5.4 Themes and Samples of Key Responses on Governance


Themes
Lessening of central
mandates

Samples of Key Responses
“In the past, the central legislators and even the upper
level-local legislators tried to expand their political
influence. Nowadays, nothing happens. The military
installed legislators and members of the National Council
for Peace and Order apparently do not interrupt us. They
just look at national policy level.”



End of partisan gridlock

“Our… municipality is lucky because we don’t involve
ourselves much in political protest. As I mentioned, I am
from local level and work for a local community. I don’t rely
on national politics.”



Increased local
responsiveness

“Local people complained directly on social media or
by calling us. Then, we responded and solved that problem
right away. If it happens during the long holiday, we will
arrange and appoint our staff to stand by and respond to
emergency situations such as disease transmission.”

“We have collaborated with and sometimes requested
assistance from them [the district]. In the meantime, when
they wanted us to do something for them, we definitely
facilitated them. On some occasions, we needed some
support from them.”
Source: Samples of key responses in this table are selected from quotes from full interviews.


Increased
intergovernmental
collaboration

Lessening of Central Mandates
While there was less autonomy in local governance, the military government was
preoccupied with many other national issues, some of which were to further their own
popularity. The effect was that the military government did not have much incentive to be
mindful of what they saw as minor local issues. The net result was that local governments
felt less of a mandate to serve the military government’s agenda. Therefore, local
governments had a greater degree of freedom to make their decisions on local affairs and
perform their assigned duties with less intervention from central political influences than
in the past. Participants expressed their perspectives on this point:
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“In the past, the central legislators and even the upper level-local legislators tried
to expand their political influence. Nowadays, nothing happens [with the central
government]. The military-installed legislators and members of the National
Council for Peace and Order do not bother us. They just look at the national
policy level.” (Vice mayor, personal communication, August 25, 2016)
“Yes, we have freedom within the municipal council. Anyone here can freely
express their thoughts without any intervention from others.” (Municipal
councilor, personal communication, August 24, 2016)
Some local governments turned these political threats into administrative
opportunities. In the midst of political crisis, the prior elected national government and
legislators were overwhelmed with political turmoil at the national level. It seemed like
they isolated local governments and local communities. When the military-installed
government took power, they were more concerned about national political issues than
local issues. The national political isolation created an opportunity for local governments
and local communities. They could freely operate public services with the lessening of
central mandates. Regarding this point, participants described their experiences:
“I think we were lightly detached, but local government has to take action as the
front-line operator. The central legislators merely talked to us once or twice a
year.” (Municipal councilor, personal communication, August 31, 2016)
“Especially in the … area, the national senators and national representatives
rarely looked after their constituents.” (Municipal councilor, personal
communication, August 24, 2016)
“I feel like they [central legislators] have not coordinated with us much.”
(Member of municipal council, personal communication, August 25, 2016)
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End of Partisan Gridlock
Thailand’s post-2006 national political crisis induced political gridlock, especially
after the 2014 military coup. The NCPO took power away from the elected government
and appointed the military government. Its effects brought about a suspension of political
institutions such as the constitution, legislators, political parties, and elections. These
political institutions have been frozen in pursuit of reducing the political pressures caused
by the prolonged political crises. On the positive side, the national political crisis ended
partisan gridlock. Its effects mitigated the barriers for local development and decreased
political conflicts between Yellow Shirts and Red Shirts. In addition, local administrators
seemed to take a more politically neutral and flexible stance.
In order to maintain and improve local service delivery, local government could
work with every political sector and with anyone who may have a different political
stance. Moreover, it appeared that some local communities benefited from state-led
development projects when the military-installed government transferred the grants
directly to local communities without moderating actors—e.g., legislators, cabinet
members, political parties, and other political interest groups. In the past, these
moderating parties could intervene and influence the grant allocation process before those
grants were transferred to local communities. Regarding this point, participants shared
their experiences:
“For the … Municipality, national politics doesn’t affect us too much. Neither
central representatives nor senators influenced us”. (Member of municipal
council, personal communication, August 30, 2016)
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“… Municipality is lucky because we don’t involve ourselves much in political
protest. As I mentioned, I am from the local level and work for a local community.
I don’t rely on national politics.” (Mayor, personal communication, August 24,
2016)
Increased Local Responsiveness
Even though some local governments were undermined by political fears and
uncertainties in times of national political crises, these threats positively encouraged local
administrators to increase local responsiveness in local service delivery. Officials
changed their attitudes about responsiveness to citizens. They respected local residents as
guides rather than just service recipients. A change in the mindset of local officials
inspired by national political constraints helped enhance local responsiveness in service
delivery. Regarding this issue, some participants expressed that:
“When local citizens came to see us in our municipal office, we treated and
facilitated them respectfully. We are happy to serve people. We always ask, what
can we help you with today? Suffice to say, the municipal officials are here for
serving people.” (Municipal official, interpersonal communication, August 24,
2016)
“The municipal officials in the … municipality changed their attitude about the
citizens. In the past, they viewed local citizens as service recipients. Nowadays,
they view citizens as guides. The municipal officials performed as the
implementers, following guidance from the citizens.” (Municipal official,
interpersonal communication, August 24, 2016)
“It [the effects] contains both positive and negative impacts. The positive impact
helped improve the behavior of local administrators.” (Mayor, personal
communication, August 30, 2016)
Moreover, local leaders and officials were more responsive to solving problems
regarding public services occurring in local communities, such as road repair,
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waterworks, electricity, sanitary systems, and other environmental concerns. In fact,
some public works—i.e. highways, waterworks, electricity—were not the responsibility
of municipalities, but local residents perceived that local government was responsible for
these duties. Unavoidably, local leaders had to react to these problems because they
affected the lives of their local residents. To find a primary solution, local leaders
coordinated with the governmental departments that were responsible for those duties and
requested that they solve these problems. On this point, some participants indicated that:
“Local governments expanded very fast in order to respond to the developments.
We are with local citizens every day. If people complain about the bad roads in
our community, we have to provide budget in order to respond to that problem
immediately. In the past, it took more than ten years to get a gravel road, but
nowadays it is very fast.” (Member of municipal council, personal
communication, August 24, 2016)
“If people complain about local problems via the municipal Facebook page, the
municipal officials will reply to them and react to the survey and solve that issue
immediately.” (Municipal official, interpersonal communication, August 30,
2016)
“Local people complained directly on social media or by calling us. Then, we
responded and solved that problem right away. If it happens during a long
holiday, we will arrange for our staff to stand by and respond to emergency
situations such as disease transmission. We just call our appointed staff to
respond to the incident immediately.” (Municipal official, interpersonal
communication, August 30, 2016)
Some participants noted that local governments were responsive to financial
shortages whenever the national government’s fiscal transfer was delayed. Even though
the municipality did not have the autonomy or capacity to undertake the big tasks such as
the electric system or waterworks, local leaders and local legislators helped each other to
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figure out an appropriate solution by deciding to use existing funds while waiting for
fiscal transfer from the national government. In this political situation, local government
determined a fast and effective solution for helping local people. Sometimes, they
coordinated with the provincial administration in order to solve their local problems.
Regarding this point, participants shared their experiences:
“When the central government delayed the transfer of monthly subsidies for
elderly people, we solved this problem by using funds from other existing
municipal budgets.” (Member of municipal council, personal communication,
August 25, 2106)
“For the local government, you can come and see the mayor directly, even though
that duty is not the mayor’s responsibility. For example, [the people informed] the
mayor that the waterworks broke, but the waterworks authority is not the mayor’s
duty. People thought of us. The Provincial Electricity Authority should be
responsible for the electrical outage, but people called us. Eventually, I helped
coordinate with those authorities for solving the problem. This is the only thing I
can do under my authority. At least they called us, even though some duties are
beyond our control.” (Mayor, personal communication, August 24, 2016)
Increased Intergovernmental Collaboration
In the midst of national political crisis, local government suffers from
administrative inconvenience and concern about the influence of the military-installed
government. Being wary of the hierarchical structure and the strong power of the central
government, local governments attempted to insulate themselves by collaborating more
closely with other local governments. As an indirect effect of this greater collaboration,
the quality of public service at the local level somewhat improved. This fact was borne
out several times during the interviews.
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The municipalities collaborated with the provincial administrative authorities—
e.g. the chief district officers, the village headmen, and the village health volunteers—in
pursuit of sharing power and resources in providing public services. Regarding this point,
participants mentioned that:
“They [the municipality] collaborated with the village health volunteers very well
because they thought we worked closely with the community. When there was a
disease spreading in the community, they normally would inform us and would
also report to the hospital. This is the way we built our collaboration. We work
closely with local citizens.” (Local resident, interpersonal communication, August
24, 2016)
“We have collaborated with and sometimes requested assistance from them [the
district]. In the meantime, when they wanted us to do something for them, we
definitely facilitated them. On some occasions, we needed some support from
them. We normally assisted each other. It looks like the urban community
normally helps the rural community. We always supported each other.”
(Municipal official, interpersonal communication, August 30, 2016)
In addition, some municipalities tried to enhance collaborative governance across
jurisdictions and build networks with non-governmental sectors. For example, the mayor
of one municipality signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with a neighboring
municipality in order to mutually manage a joint sanitary and garbage incinerator.
Moreover, the municipalities created a collaborative network through the National
Municipal League of Thailand. This organization functions as a union of Thai
municipalities. The municipalities use this network to share resources, both tangible and
intangible. This collaboration became a vital mechanism to balance and coordinate the
power of local governments and the power of the national government. In this regard, the
participants noted that:
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“Once the mayor was elected, he requested a neighboring mayor to sign the
MOU. We have maintained this collaboration more than 10 years.” (Member of
municipal council, personal communication, August 31, 2016)
“It is good for reform. Local governments tended to build collaboration.
Nowadays, this collaboration became the National Municipal League of
Thailand. The chairman of this organization agreed to fight for local
governments. Currently, we are working on it.” (Mayor, personal communication,
August 24, 2016)
Political Economy
The literature on political economy notes that polity and economy are dissimilar
but interdependent. Each variable influences the other via interactive processes (Arndt,
1983; Stern & Reve, 1980). In policy perspective, political economy refers to policy
options that government provides to efficiently benefit everyone in the society (Wamsley
& Zald, 1973). In politically turbulent situations, the decline of political economy is
negatively impacted by political crisis. Its effects drive government failure to provide
basic services due to lack of resources and fiscal capacity (Menkhaus, 2007; Musekiwa &
Chatiza, 2015).
Although the threats caused by the national political crisis are not only a source
for the decline of political economy at the local level, they also can be conditions for
opportunities for improving political economy. These effects can have a positive impact
on local service delivery. The data analysis shows that the national political crisis created
opportunities for political economy in two ways; improved fiscal management and
central development support. These findings are also presented and summarized in Table
5.5.
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Table 5.5 Themes and Samples of Key Responses on Political Economy


Themes
Improved fiscal management



Central development support.

Samples of Key Responses
“The national economy got sick, while our local
government felt a smaller effect. But I will make it [the
economy] stronger by boosting some parts in order to move
our local economies forward.”
“…it is convenient and easy for municipal officers to
build a relationship with local people when they went out to
provide tax collection services. They’re familiar with the tax
payers.”

“The current state-led development policy was designed
and directed by the central government. They allocated the
grant (about 200,000 or 500,000 THB) directly to local
residents.”
“It took just two months. It [the state-led development
project] apparently helped stimulate local economies. Local
people have money to spend in the market.”
Source: Samples of key responses in this table are selected from quotes from full interviews.

Improved Fiscal Management
Although the effects of the political crisis led to political economy crises at both
the national and local levels as described in Chapter 4, the political crisis created the
conditions for opportunities to political economy. In the midst of political crisis, some
municipalities were able to improve fiscal management by boosting their revenues. Based
on the interviews, boosting revenues in the municipalities can be described in two
characteristic forms. First, by promoting local economic activities; second, by improving
the efficiency of revenue collection.
When some municipalities encountered an economic downturn, local people
resisted expanding investments and lacked confidence in the economic policies of the
national government. At the same time, some municipalities were able to boost local
revenues by stimulating local economic activities, with the aim of increasing the income
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of local citizens and urging local entrepreneurship. Local governmental leaders took this
opportunity to encourage basic economic activities by inviting investors from outside to
open department stores. Municipalities also provided space for expanding the local
market. It created another option for small investors in the community to begin new
businesses or renovate their existing businesses. In addition, one municipality helped
small and medium investors who did not have enough capital to invest in their businesses
by coordinating with financial institutions for providing the loans. Regarding this point,
the participants suggested that:
“The national economy got sick, while our local government felt a smaller effect.
But we will make it stronger by boosting some sectors in order to move our local
economies forward. We are a tiny mechanism within the big system; we cannot
make it stronger immediately but at least we started to do that. We began doing
this in terms of basic infrastructure and encouraging big department stores to
open their businesses in our area. In the meantime, we provided spaces as an
option for a local market.” (Mayor, personal communication, August 24, 2016)
“In [our] municipality, most areas are agricultural. People understood and tried
to adjust themselves to current conditions. Our municipality helped them by
creating a market space. We also allowed them a few months to farm on the
municipal land. For people who don’t want to do farming, we provide them
spaces for building a local market. There are two locations that we arranged for
them. Our aim is to create jobs for people and to boost their revenues from those
business activities. We provide them space for investment but they also have to
take some responsibilities, too. If they don’t have capital, we try to coordinate
with the banks and look for a low interest loan. Approval depends on the
consideration of each bank and their credit and we cannot guarantee that. We’ve
tried to assist them in this dimension.” (Mayor, personal communication, August
24, 2016)
Additionally, some municipalities faced the difficulty in collecting revenues from
local citizens due to the consequences of the national economic downturn and political
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uncertainty. Nevertheless, some participants indicated that the increase in local, selfcollected revenues depended not only the economic downturn and political instability, but
also the capacity for revenue collection in each municipality. In times of political crisis,
municipalities took this opportunity to boost self-collected revenue by improving tax
data, tax maps, and tax collection strategies. In addition, municipalities tried to
communicate with local citizens and build awareness concerning the outputs and
outcomes of tax collection and the consequences of tax compliance. Regarding this point,
the participants shared their experiences:
“Tax [collection] depends on the capacity of local governments. Can you collect
the tax effectively, such as the Department of Finance? It also depends on the
competency of tax collectors. Are you able to get information on the 3.7 sq. km. of
[this] municipal jurisdiction? How many rental homes do you have? Do you
entirely estimate the property tax? Tax collection depended not only on the
central government, but also the tax collectors at the local level. Can you
encourage people to pay their taxes? If people don’t pay their taxes, what strategy
do you employ to enforce the law?” (Member of municipal council, personal
communication, August 24, 2016)
“We tried to explain to and communicate with people about the regulations, laws,
and consequences of non-compliance. It is the duty of municipal officers to press
for payment and follow up. Our municipal jurisdiction is very small, so it is
convenient and easy for municipal officers to build a relationship with local
people when they went out to provide tax collection services. They’re familiar
with the taxpayers. They even know the houses of each taxpayer. If local people
don’t come to the municipality, we will go out and visit them on site. Sometimes,
local administrators helped us to communicate with their constituents. The local
administrators can help encourage them to pay their tax; they also explain the
impact of tax payments. For example, if people do not pay taxes, they won’t have
good roads. We won’t have the budget to repair roads. We won’t have beautiful
flowers and trees to decorate our local roads.” (Municipal official, interpersonal
communication, August 25, 2016)
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Central Development Support
The political economic disruption and slowdown that usually follows the seizure
of power by the military warrants the necessity of the national government to allocate
more economic stimulus packages for local entities, especially state-led development
projects. In times of national political crisis, the role of the national government
increases. When the private sector is less active, the government can become more active,
rebuilding and using that value. Most development projects and assistance grants at the
local level are subsidized directly by the central government.
The pattern of state-led development initiated by the current military government
looked different from the development projects undertaken by the previous elected
governments. The current military-installed government provided grants directly to local
communities instead of local governments. This created an opportunity for development
in local communities.
In addition, state-led development projects helped boost economic activities and
generated income for local citizens. For some infrastructure projects, local communities
hired laborers from the local citizenry to take on projects such as roads, drainage systems,
community halls, community waterworks, etc. These projects created jobs within the
community, resulting in income for local citizens that they could spend in boosting the
local economy. Having a vibrant local economy allows the local people to pay their taxes,
thus improving the quality of public service delivery. The business sector can also expand
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their investments. Eventually, local governments utilized those revenues to improve local
service delivery. Regarding this point, participants explained that:
“The current state-led development policy was designed and directed by the
central government. They allocated the grant (about 200,000 to 500,000 THB)
directly to local residents.” (Local resident, interpersonal communication, August
25, 2016)
“Currently, our economic status is gradually recovering because the militaryinstalled government has boosted the local economy through the provincial
administration. Local people can earn income of about 300 THB per day. It took
just two months. It [the state-led development project] helped stimulate local
economies. Local people have money to spend in the market.” (Local resident,
interpersonal communication, August 25, 2016)
“The economic downturn, right? They [the military-installed government] tried to
look for a strategy in order to generate money for grassroots people. They
believed that after money was received by the local community and circulated
within the local market, that 6-7 households would indirectly gain income from
the central government. Eventually that money will be circulated and will flow
within the markets.” (Local resident, interpersonal communication, August 25,
2016)
It is important to emphasize that some local governments still have organizational
strategies to recover and boost the local economy, even though those central interventions
undermined their local autonomy. Some local governments maintain intergovernmental
relationships and adapt themselves to changes in central politics and policies in order to
attract state-led development into their local communities. As we will see in the next
section, case performance analysis provides an explanation of how high- and lowperformance cases work with the opportunities resulting from the national political crisis.
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Comparison of the High- and Low-Performance Cases in Dealing with the
Opportunities Resulting from the National Political Crisis
Case performance analysis provides an explanation of how the four selected cases
are important in this study. This analytical approach is similar to the case performance
analysis initially described in Chapter 4. However, the focal points of the analysis are
different. For the high-performance cases, this analysis explores how characteristics of
their performance gain advantages from these opportunities. Conversely, investigation of
the low-performance cases shows their characteristics and their inability to take
advantage of these opportunities. Comparing those characteristics helps answer the
question concerning how each of the performance cases studied fared with respect to the
others.
In Table 5.6, the key findings are summarized in order to illustrate the
characteristics of each group. Then, the analysis provides some explanation on the
similarities and differences between high- and low-performance cases through each
analytical dimension.
Table 5.6 Case Performance Analysis (Opportunities)
Moderating
Variables

Political
Institutions

High Performance
(What characteristics of
high-performance cases
gain advantage from this
opportunity?)
Same Characteristics
 Improve local
institutional capacity
 Improve institutional
performance
Same Level but Different
Characteristic

Low Performance
(What characteristics of
low-performance cases lead
to the inability to gain from
this opportunity?)
Same Characteristics
 Improve local
institutional capacity
 Improve institutional
performance
Same Level but Different
Characteristic

Same/Different

Same
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Civic
Engagement

Political
Leadership

Governance

Political
Economy

 Increase institutional
inputs from local voice
 Increase institutional
trust
Same Characteristics
 More reactive to
feedback
 Boost local
voluntarism
 Open public spaces for
receiving local
feedback
 Increase transparent
action
 Enhance local trust
Same Level but Different
Characteristics
 Enhance co-production
between local
government and
citizens
Same Characteristics
 Improve
responsiveness
 Enhance coordination
across boundaries
Same Characteristics
 Collaborate across
boundaries
 Improve local
decision-making
autonomy
 Enhance local-citizen
collaboration

Same Characteristics
 Have proactive
economic solutions
 Inspire local
entrepreneurship
 Improve fiscal
performance

 Improve institutional
facilitation

Same Characteristics
 More reactive to
feedback
 Boost local voluntarism
 Open public spaces for
receiving local feedback
 Increase transparent
action
 Enhance local trust

Same

Same Characteristics
 Improve
Responsiveness
 Enhance coordination
across boundaries
Same Characteristics
 Collaborate across
boundaries
 Improve local decisionmaking autonomy
 Improve responsiveness
 Improve problem
solving capacity
Same Level but Different
Characteristics
 Improve local
administrative behavior
Same Characteristics but
Different Characteristics
 Inspire local awareness
on tax collection

Same

Same

Same
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Table 5.6 provides an explanation of characteristics found in both high- and lowperformances cases. The prominent characteristics are identified and summarized through
five analytical dimensions. The case performance analysis in this study can be explained
as follows:
Political Institutions. Even though the case performance analysis on institutional
dimensions in Chapter 4 indicated different characteristics between high- and lowperformance cases in dealing with political threats, it is important to address the issue that
both high- and low-performance cases were able to take advantage of opportunities
generated by the political crisis. In this analysis, both groups showed the same
characteristics.
Since local governments gained a degree of freedom from the central government
and the central ministries, local governments took this opportunity to improve local
institutional capacity and performance. Citizens perceived that local governments played
important roles as the political institutions and public service providers that are closest to
them. In addition, this helped local governments to increase institutional trust and
relationships with local citizens. This degree of freedom from central authority also made
local governments more adaptive to changes in politics and policy. For example, Section
44 often helped turn administrative constraints into administrative opportunities. Local
governments took advantage of the military laws to solve complicated issues within local
administration such as the patronage system and corruption within local personnel
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management, suspension and removal of corrupted mayors, local councilors, and local
officers.
Furthermore, the analysis of the high-performance cases showed that the political
crisis increased institutional inputs from local voices through national government offices
called Damrongdharma Centers. These became positive inputs for policy-making
processes and the improvement of public service provisions. The characteristics as
explained above indicated that the low-performance cases were capable of taking
advantage of an opportunity as much as were high-performance cases.
Civic Engagement. Based on case performance analysis, high-performance and
low-performance cases within the civic engagement dimension exhibited the same
characteristics. Low-performance cases were able to take advantage of this opportunity as
much as high-performance cases. Although the characteristics of civic engagement within
local governments as discussed in Chapter 4 seemed to be beyond local government’s
capacity to address political threats, the non-formal engagement and non-political
activities helped local governments from both groups to be more responsive to citizen
feedback. In addition, both groups were able to take advantage of these opportunities on
the same level.
For the high-performance cases, political threats impeded civic engagement in
local communities, especially political civic engagement. At the same time, these same
threats triggered opportunities for local governments to boost local voluntarism through
non-formal and non-political engagements, such as social, traditional, sporting, and
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religious activities. Consequently, these activities became a starting point to enhance coproduction between local government and citizens. Local governments utilized these
opportunities to open public spaces for local people to provide feedback and even work
together. Moreover, when local people became more closely engaged with local
governments, transparency and trust increased within local administrations.
The low-performance cases used this advantage to open public spaces for
enabling citizens to voice their concerns, as did the high-performance cases noted above.
Local residents felt more comfortable engaging with their municipal governments. In
addition, local governments tended to value citizen voices as a legitimate source of input
for improving services and local policies, while local people were eager to provide
feedback to local governments.
Political Leadership. Case performance analysis indicated that both high- and
low-performance cases were similar in their ability to take advantage of the opportunities
created by political crisis. It should be noted that the low-performance cases had as much
capacity to take advantage of these opportunities as the high-performance cases. Both
high- and low-performance cases appeared to be actively responsive to problems and
concerns within the local community. When local governments did not have enough
capacity to cope with certain problems, they used this opportunity to identify their true
capacity to coordinate with other public organizations that were beyond their autonomous
boundary. This coordination was a vital mechanism to help local governments resolve
their problems.
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Additionally, the uncertain political situation stimulated both groups to increase
their capacity for dealing with emerging issues that arise in times of political crisis such
as natural disasters, diseases, fire, and economic downturns. Moreover, it provided an
opportunity for both groups to maintain their horizontal networks with all levels of local
governments.
Governance. All cases shared this characteristic. They were able to take
advantage of the opportunities created from the political crisis to collaborate with
multiple sectors across jurisdictional boundaries. They also exchanged resources with the
upper levels of central government agencies. For example, the low-performance cases
provided assistance grants to local governments to support a sports activity organized by
the district—i.e. a provincial administrative agency. In addition, the low-performance
cases shared the same level of performance but with different characteristics. For lowperformance cases, local government administrators used this opportunity to improve the
behavior of local administrators. Local administrators and local officials should not be
influenced by specific political advocacy or interest groups. Due to the new legal
constraints, local governments are more cautious regarding local administration and
decision-making.
Political Economy. Case performance analysis indicated that both high- and lowperformance cases were capable of taking advantage of the opportunities created by the
political crisis. Specifically, the economic downturn created an opportunity to inspire
local government leaders to be more proactive with regard to economic solutions. For the
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high-performance cases, local governments tried to help local people to improve business
activities in order to boost local revenue. Local governments encouraged external
business sectors to expand and invest in their local areas, such as bringing in department
stores.
In addition, local governments utilized this opportunity to improve fiscal
performance by boosting self-collected revenues. The most efficient way that highperformance cases employed was to improve the tax database and tax collection
strategies. Local councilors and local officers helped each other communicate with local
people and motivate them to pay their taxes. The low-performance cases were similar to
the high-performance cases but with different characteristics. Specifically, the low
performance cases took this opportunity to improve revenue collection by enhancing their
local residents’ awareness of tax collection.
Summary
In conclusion, this chapter described the effects of Thailand’s post-2006 national
political crisis and the resulting opportunities for local government service delivery. The
key findings gained from the participants across four municipalities were presented
through five moderating variables, as shown in “Graphical Representation of Findings:
How National Political Crisis Creates Opportunities to Local Government Service
Delivery” (see Appendix B).
First, political institutional failure created particular opportunities for local
government service delivery. To solve legal limitations and find the way out of political
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gridlock, the military-installed government used Section 44 of the 2014 Interim
Constitution to lessen some complicated administrative procedures. They also provided a
fast-track channel through the office called Damrongdharma Centers in order to receive
citizens’ complaints regarding public services directly from local citizens. In addition,
political crisis encouraged local institutional capacity. Local governments used
institutional connections to share resources and build collaboration for improving public
services.
Next, the national political crisis created opportunities for improving civic
engagement at local level. Local residents felt comfortable with helping and working
together with their local governments. This helped increase trust between local
governments and their constituents. Due to local trust, residents were eager to participate
in the council and town hall meetings and shared their thoughts regarding public service
improvement and other local development issues. Meanwhile, local residents were
comfortable in sharing their thoughts with local leaders and also working together with
local governments in pursuit of increasing community building.
Third, as a way to appease their own constituency, many local mayors acted more
swiftly, thus emphasizing their leadership. Fourth, the national political crisis resulted in
a decline of central mandates. Its effects mitigated the political tensions or even ended
partisan gridlock in local communities. Moreover, the political crisis stimulated local
responsiveness and intergovernmental collaboration in order to serve the needs of local
residents and maintain quality of public services. Finally, from the political economy
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point of view, the economic disruption that usually follows a seizure of power by the
military warrants the necessity of the national government to allocate more economic
stimulus packages to local entities. It was an opportunity for local governments to
improve fiscal management. Importantly, the effects of national political crisis mediated
by political economy directly affected local government service delivery performance.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Discussion
Summary of Findings
Thailand’s local government service delivery has had to confront challenges
because of national political crises, especially a prolonged crisis that began in 2006. The
effects of these crises led to institutional breakdown and economic decline (Human
Rights Watch, 2016; Sussangkarn & Nikomborirak, 2016; United Nations, 2016).
Conventional scholarship generally accepts that political crisis will, as a rule, create
considerably more harm than good for local service delivery. Importantly, most literature
on the effects of political crises found that political crises create negative impacts for
local autonomy, civic capacity and engagement, local economy, and quality of local
public service provision (Bland, 2011; Menkhaus, 2007; Muchadenyika, 2017; Musekiwa
& Chantiza, 2015). Very few have shown positive effects, notably Börzel and Risse
(2015). These previous studies did not highlight the important moderating variables
(political institutions, civic engagement, political leadership, governance, and political
economy) that are influential to local service delivery (Batonon, 2015; Curristine, Lonti,
& Joumard, 2007; UNDP, 2016).
To answer whether Thailand’s post-2006 national political crisis affected local
government service delivery, the data analyzed in this study were derived from primary
sources that included semi-structured in-depth interviews and focus-group discussions.
Four municipalities located in Khon Kaen province were logically selected as the
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research sites. The interviews were conducted with key informants (mayors, chairpersons
of municipal councils, and municipal councilors) and focus group participants (heads of
municipal departments, community leaders, and local residents). The interview data were
transcribed and thematically analyzed, and some appropriate comments were selected and
translated from Thai to English. These direct quotes were brought into the relevant
theme.
Political crises have generally been seen or assumed as having negative impacts
on local service delivery, but this study shows that this depends on how it filters down to
the local level through the five moderating variables. According to the analysis of data in
this study, Thailand’s post-2006 national political turmoil created both threats and
opportunities for local service delivery performance through these five moderating
variables. The threats resulted in political institutional breakdown of local governments
weakened electoral mechanisms and caused the suspension of local authority. Political
fears and uncertainties reduced civic participation and weakened policy networks in local
communities. In addition, political crises reduced autonomy and increased civil conflict
and risks for local leaders. In addition, trust and communication between central and
local governments were decreased, resulting in a reversal of decentralization and
declining accountability. Also, hierarchical interactions in internal governance settings
were increased. Moreover, political turmoil induced negative impacts for political
economy. This caused local economic output declines, revenue declines within local
business sectors, and personal and household financial weakening.
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Conversely, political institutional breakdown enabled particular opportunities for
local service delivery. To solve legal limitations and find ways out of political gridlock,
the military-installed government used Section 44 of the 2014 Interim Constitution to
lessen some complicated administrative procedures. The government also provided a
fast-track channel called Damrongdharma Centers in order to receive citizens’ complaints
regarding public services. Furthermore, the political crisis encouraged local institutional
capacity, with local governments using institutional connections to share resources and
build collaborations for improving public services. Local residents felt comfortable in
engaging with their local governments, which helped to increase trust between local
governments and their residents. This resulted in increased trust, residents were eager to
participate in council and town hall meetings, and they were comfortable sharing their
thoughts regarding public service improvement. This helped increase community
building.
Moreover, as a way to appease their own constituency, many local mayors acted
more swiftly, thus accentuating their leadership abilities. These factors mitigated central
mandates and political tensions and even ended partisan gridlock in local communities.
Political crisis helped stimulate local responsiveness and intergovernmental collaboration
in order to maintain the quality of public services. Crucially, it was an opportunity for
local governments to improve fiscal management and boost local economic activities that
helped enhance local fiscal capacity to provide effective service.
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Discussion and Conclusion
According to the findings of the study, the threats caused by the national political
crisis in Thailand since 2006 are in accordance with conventional wisdom and in line
with the literature addressed in this study. Crisis is generally seen as causing a negative
effect on local government, while the opportunities gained from political crises have been
under-recognized. Hence, this study sought to examine the opportunities embedded
within national political crises.
The findings challenge the notion of Kurlantzick (2011), who argues that political
crisis caused government breakdown and undermined the development of democratic
activities. Even though Thailand’s national political crisis did undermine democratic
progress, there are some means by which local residents were able to provide feedback as
information to the central government. For example, the Damrongdharma Centers
provided an outlet for local people to send their complaints concerning local public
services and social problems through to the central government and there were positive
impacts on local institutional capacity through local partnerships. Moreover, this study
found that the continuing political crisis following the 2014 military coup reduced the
complicated approval processes due to the impacts of Section 44 of the 2014 interim
Constitution.
In addition, an issue of local institutional capacity found in this study is different
from a case in Zimbabwe studied by Musekiwa and Chatiza (2015). Their study found
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that in the midst of political crisis, local residents tried to establish citizen-led
organizations in order to help local governments provide some types of public service
when local authorities were incapable or had insufficient management capacity to address
the requirements of local residents. In the case of Thailand, although political crisis
triggered negative impacts to local government, local institutional capacity, especially
resource sharing among local governments, remained functional.
There were also some opportunities for civic engagement concealed within the
political crises. Local government and citizens increasingly worked together in local
affairs, especially in non-political activity. Residents trusted their local governments in
terms of responsiveness and local service delivery more than national government. They
were eager to be involved in formal policy decision-making processes organized by local
governments. Local residents were not hesitant to express their views regarding public
concerns and they attended public meetings and volunteering activities by overlooking
differences in political belief, i.e. Red Shirts and Yellow Shirts.
The findings in this study also differ from a study by Musekita and Chatiza
(2015). Their study found that a political crisis created political unification between
central and local government simply because, in the study they conducted, both the
central and local governments were from the same party. While that seemed to be
positive, it led to local governments not bothering with encouraging public participation
in local activities.
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Furthermore, the role of some mayors has been elevated after political
institutional breakdown, while the role of national legislators and their influence on local
leaders declined. Residents increasingly recognized the capacity of mayors who stayed
close to them and successfully responded their needs. The mayors were more proactive to
local concerns and problem solving. This finding supports the opinions of Fiedler (1996)
and Wart (2003) that effective public leaders should have personal skills and capacity to
serve the needs of citizens and to make decisions on service provision. Similarly, Boin
and ‘t Hart (2003) demonstrated that leaders are elevated to be “heroes” once they
successfully used their capacity and skills to cope with and diminish people’s concerns.
Thailand’s political unrest allowed local governments to gain some degree of
freedom from central mandates on local affairs because central government was
overwhelmed with political conflict at the national level. These impacts reduced political
pressures on local government and eased local civil conflicts. This helped local
governments to provide local services more easily than in the past, while
intergovernmental collaboration was improved. The current findings also contrast with a
study conducted by Muchadenyika (2015). He found that prolonged political crisis in
Zimbabwe induced central government interference in local affairs by bringing back
some local services to central authority. However, the current findings do support the
argument addressed by Börzel and Risse (2016), who argue that dysfunctional political
institutions are not always bad thing for governance. The institutional breakdown
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maintains the degree of governance at local level because local governments build trust
within local communities by coordinating with other partnerships across boundaries.
Finally, the effects of national political crises improved political economy. Some
local governments were able to boost local revenues by encouraging economic activities
and by enhancing the efficiency of revenue collection. State-led development projects
were initially perceived as threats to local governments in terms of interference and
recentralization, but they can be a vital source for enhancing local economy and
improving local service delivery.
There is also a conflict between the findings of this study and those of Menkhaus
(2007) and Musekiwa and Chatiza (2015), who argue that government collapse due to
political instability led to insufficient resources and fiscal restraints at local levels. In
addition, Sussangkarn and Nikomborirak (2016) asserted that Thailand’s political crisis
created negative impacts on the Thai economy as a whole and also triggered uncertainty
for foreign investment. Their findings are similar to what this study found under the
dimension of threats. Nevertheless, their work did not mention any opportunities
concealed within political crisis.
In conclusion, this study found that through the five moderating variables,
national political crisis in Thailand has had both positive and negative impacts on local
government service delivery. The findings in this study deviate from the conventional
wisdom that associates crisis only with threats while ignoring new opportunities.
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Another interesting point discovered in this study is that threats and opportunities coexist
side-by-side in both the cases of high-performing and low-performing local governments.
This makes it more encouraging that, while political crisis usually is a cause for concern,
there is also potential for rectification of existing problems. It is important, therefore, to
highlight that one of the explanations for the existence of both threats and opportunities
can be provided through the logic of action and reaction concept. Initially, national
political turmoil would create threats that influence local service delivery as negative
forces. These effects induce local governments to respond, as a reaction, to this crisis in
order to maintain quality or effectiveness of public service delivery. This reaction is seen
as a positive force or opportunity for maintaining or improving local service delivery.
With these findings, it is important to mention that with the qualitative research
design, we cannot evaluate the statistical interaction among the five moderating variables.
The uniformity of both threats and opportunities may be an artifact of the interaction of
the five moderating variables. There was evidence, as mentioned before, that the
suspension of political institutions affects political participation and civic engagement
which is also related to autonomy of the leaders, collaboration, and ultimately political
economy. At the outset, the author was able to observe the consequences of political
institutions on other moderating variables. This is analogous to the existence of the
problem of multicollinearity among the explanatory variables in quantitative research.
With this potential methodological query posing a challenge, the interpretation of the
results in this study should be done with caution, and the results should be taken as a
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preliminary. In part, it is because the data used in this research were collected from
individuals, which may entail subjective opinion, rather than objective performance
indicators of local governments
Implications
It is of particular interest to ask whether the opportunities embedded in the
political crises mentioned in Chapter 5 are specific to the current situation or can be
maintained over time. Only time and future research can provide an answer. The longterm implication is that if Thai local governments are not granted greater management
autonomy when the country returns to more democratic principles and when there is no
single person with the absolute power endowed by Section 44 to guide or shield the local
government, the central bureaucratic power may relentlessly exert a strong influence on
local governments again. With that scenario, Thailand is again threatened by the
prospect of highly centralized management.
As Fry (2014) noted, crises often conceal particular opportunities, especially for
political institutional rearrangement. In the optimistic implications of this study, a crisis
may provide opportunities for institutional transformation towards decentralized
governance. This could happen if local governments can unite in their interests under the
bargaining power of the National Municipal League of Thailand. The League can help
diverse local governments in developing and uniting them in promoting decentralization.
In addition, when general elections are again permitted, local governments could even
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propose and negotiate a policy mandate to all parties that commits to adopt
decentralization as a high-priority policy agenda. This strategy may attract more interest
among local voters. If the crisis does lead to this improvement, then over the long term
the benefits will certainly outweigh the price paid. In any event, whether it is a
centralized or decentralized system, local governments cannot function without strong
policy support from the central government.
The results of this study also provide a basis for advancing or revising the concept
of new public service under the stress of political crisis. As described earlier, crisis theory
generally explains that crises normally have negative effects on local government service
delivery. We found that some sorts of crises, such as political crises, are useful as
opportunities for institutional rearrangement, improving the role of public leadership,
opening a window of opportunity for policy or organizational change, and improving
strategy for management of future crises.
Policy Recommendations
It is notable that while we see windows of opportunity for social transformation,
we do not see any clear initiative by the NCPO to usher the country toward decentralized
management. Based on the political history of Thailand and its experience with 19 coups,
all had the hidden agenda of protecting the interests of the bureaucracy and the ruling
elites. Although all coups cited the public interest as a justification for staging the coup,
no coup endowed more self-governing power to people. In all likelihood, the next general
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election will be the beginning of a new political crisis. The sustainable solution to
avoiding political crises in Thailand lies in granting more management autonomy to local
government through fiscal decentralization, administrative decentralization, and political
decentralization. At present, the powers in Thailand do not seem be interested in any of
these.
Limitations
This study encompasses two major uncertainties, a data validity problem and a
reliability problem. The data validity problem arises in that some questions may be raised
whether the municipalities are representative of Khon Kaen province, and whether the
interviewees were honest in their answers or personal experiences or did political
perception discourage them in giving direct answers. In addition, this study used specific
cases for data collection and purposively recruited the interview participants by setting
the criteria that were influenced and set by the researcher. The opinions they provided
during the interviews were based on their personal experiences and perceptions. Both the
research sites and interview participants were considered as non-representative. This
could lead to influence by the researcher and biased data.
Regarding reliability, the confidence of any researcher in the social science field
is somewhat limited by the concern over whether data is reliable over time or if it is
unique to a very narrow period, in this case 2016. While the pattern of this particular
political crisis seems to be the same and will continue to be in this form, the nature and
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patterns of the political situation in Thailand 10 years from now might have changed.
When the situation changes, it affects people's perceptions. If this study had been
conducted in 2010 or in 2012, we may have produced a very different result. The concern
here is that the reliability of data collected in this study may be affected by effects
associated with the time and place when this research was conducted. It is important,
therefore, to note that time and the environment of the interviews may have influenced
the reliability. In the context of this study, the ongoing national political crisis may have
created apprehension among the participants about military investigation because the
research topic under study is related to politics and government performance. As a result,
the participants might have felt reluctant to be completely honest or open in discussing
issues related to the current political crisis in Thailand.
Future Research
As the results from this study are preliminary, future research is recommended.
The scope of the future research could be broadened to test the sustainability of
opportunity as well as to ensure a representative study population. An additional area of
research would be to focus on a better understanding of the impact of political crisis on
the cultural and behavioral aspects of society at large. Moreover, this research could be
conducted as a comparative case study using different regions in Thailand.
As a follow-up to this work, there are several tasks that should be carried out. For
example, based on inductive approach the author will develop an article to submit to a
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peer-reviewed journal. The paper will present an analytical framework to test the impact
of political crisis on local government service delivery. In short, the author is arguing
against the common belief that political crisis always undermines or disrupts the service
delivery system. The general framework will argue that when we want to assess the
impact of political crisis we need to look at both the negative and positive sides‒ threats
and opportunities. The working title of this article is, “Political Crisis and Local Service
Delivery: A Framework for Analysis.”
Additionally, the author proposes that, when the political situation returns to
normal, or at least after the next general election, research should be conducted to
evaluate the sustainability of the opportunities revealed in this study. Moreover, this
research should be carried out using a more representative sample of the population of
Khon Kaen Province, or even drawing on a representative sample of other provinces in
northeastern Thailand. In addition, this future study should investigate the scoped
conditions before 2006 to see how political crisis created negative or positive events in
that period of time. This research should add more understanding about the history of
political crisis and its course for the future. This study should provide a better
understanding of the impact of national political crisis on cultural and behavioral aspects
in Thai society.
Finally, the author is looking for an opportunity to conduct a comparative case
study, comparing Thailand with other countries that have prolonged national political
210

crisis and military interventions such as Turkey or some countries in Africa, using the
framework developed in this study.
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Appendix A
Graphical Representation of Findings: How National Political Crisis Creates Threats to
Local Government Service Delivery
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Appendix B
Graphical Representation of Findings: How National Political Crisis Creates
Opportunities to Local Government Service Delivery
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Appendix C
Interview Guide
A: Face-to Face, In-depth Interview Guide
Part I: Introduction
 Introduce myself, educational background, and research objective.
 Introduction of key informant, position, and job responsibilities.
 Explain informed consent, ask them to sign the form, and ask for a permission
to record the interview.
Part II: Questions regarding general information and political and administrative
background of the participant [10 minutes]
 “Please tell me about your administrative and political experience.”
 “How long have you serve in this position?”
 “What are your political and administrative experiences since 2006?”
Part III: Questions regarding the effects of national political crises, mediated by five
mechanisms, on local government service delivery [30 minutes]
Questions regarding political institutions:
 “Could you please describe to me the relationship and influence of political
institutions (e.g. constitution, laws, election, and political parties) and your
local government and local community since 2006?”
 “How do you see political crisis in Thailand since 2006 (change in national
politics and national policies) affecting local government service delivery and
your local community? Any example? Can you tell me the reasons why?”
Questions regarding civic engagement:
 Could you share with me about civic engagement in your local government
and your local community since 2006?
 How do you see Thailand’s post-2006 political turmoil affects civic
engagement, thus resulting effective or ineffective local service delivery? Any
example? Can you tell me the reasons why?
Questions regarding political leadership:
 Can you share with me your thoughts about how the mayor and local officers
responded to the national political crisis in order to maintain local service
delivery?
 How do you see Thailand’s post-2006 national political crises affecting local
political leadership in your local government and community? Any example?
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Questions regarding governance:
 “Please talk about your perceptions about current governing process of local
government and how does local government build collaboration and network
in the midst of crisis in order to maintain quality of public service.”
 “How do you see the national political crisis since 2006 affecting
collaboration and intergovernmental relationship within your local
governments? Any example? Can you tell me the reasons why?”
Questions regarding political economy:
 “Can you share with me your thoughts on the economic status of your local
community since 2006?” How about
 “How do you see the ongoing national political crisis becoming a factor that
may impact economy in your local community? And how its effects induce
effective or ineffective of local service delivery? Any examples? Can you tell
me the reasons why?”
Part IV: Wrap up [10]
 “Could you please tell me any points we have not discussed that you think are
important?”
 “Thank you for participating this interview.”
 Check the audio recorder and verify the completed consent form.
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B: Focus Group Discussion Guide [Heads of Municipal Department]
Part I: Introduction
 Introduce myself, educational background, and research objective.
 Introduction of participants, positions, and job responsibilities.
 Explain informed consent, ask them to sign the form, and ask for a permission
to record the interview.
Part II: Discussions
1. [5 minutes] You play an important role in local government as the
government officials. The political crisis since 2006 that has occurred at the
national level might affect your organization and local public service
delivery. So, I would like to hear some stories that you perceived from the
media and the actual situation.


We will start sharing about the general issues regarding the crisis, however
if you can specify the issue that is related to local government and you
frequently hear or watch the news from the medias. I provide you a card;
you can write those issues down on that card. After that I will allow each
of you to share your story.

1a. [5 minutes] Have you followed the national political crisis? Let’s share
your stories.
2. [10 minutes] This is a good start. We learn from the stories that you share,
especially the issues that impact local government administration and local
public service delivery. Let’s talk more about the effect of prolonged national
political crisis on local public service delivery through process of local
governance since 2006. Do you think the crisis affects the structure, function,
six major duties of local government? Please specify the occurrences during
2006-present.


Please feel free to share your thoughts. You may talk about the structure
first and then talk about the function later. Feel free to share as much as
you can, especially the issues that have had a direct impact on your local
government and your responsibilities.

2a. [10 minutes] Do you see yourself as key player in the local government
operation. During the prolonged political crisis, do you think local
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government can provide continue to provide the services during the midst of
the crisis? Why or why not?
2b. [5 minutes] I would like to know the impact of the crisis on your duties.
Do you think your duties are affected from the crisis? How?
2c. [10 minutes] there are several governing factors that can be affected by
the crisis, for example, political institutions, leadership, civic engagement,
collaboration and network, and fiscal management. Do you think the
political crisis at the national level impacts these governing factors? Do you
think these governing factors affect local public service delivery and how?
2d. [5 minutes] Do you think the political crisis is considered a positive or
negative influence on local government management and public service
delivery? Why?
3. [5 minutes] Crisis management strategy is also a governing tool in the
modern organization. How does local government respond crisis?


Let’s share your experience about the crisis management strategies that
you employ to deal with the political crisis. You can also mention about its
outcome and the way to improve that strategy.

4. [5 minutes] In ending, could you please tell me any points we have not
discussed that you think are important. Take a moment and I would like to
hear from each of you by going around the table.



Thank you for participating this focus group interview.
Check the audio recorder and consent form
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C: Focus Group Discussion Guide [Local Resident and Community Leader]
Part I: Introduction
 The moderator commences an interview by introducing name, background,
and research objective, and then allows each participant to introduce selves by
first name, position, and role in community.
 Explain the informed consent to the participants and ask them to sign the
form.
Part II: Discussions
1. [5 minutes] You play an important role as the stakeholders in local
government, the political crisis that currently occurs at the national level
since 2006 might affect your everyday life and public service delivery from
local government. So, I would like to hear some stories that you perceived
from the media and the actual situation.


We will start sharing about the general issues regarding the crisis, however
if you can specify the issue that is related to your own experience on local
government and you frequently hear or watch the news from the medias. I
provide you a card, you can write those issues down on that card. After
that I will allow each of you to share your story.

1a. [5 minutes] Do you follow the national political crisis? Let’s share about
your story.
2. [10 minutes] This is a good start. We learn from the stories that you share,
especially the issues that impact your community and local public service
delivery. Do you think the political crisis affects your community and local
public services? Please specify the occurrences during 2006-present.


Please feel free to share your experiences. Feel free to share as much as
you can, especially the issue that has a direct impact on your community
and local public service delivery.

2a. [10 minutes] You are the key stakeholders in local government. During
the prolonged crisis, do you think local government can provide you the
services as usual during the midst of the crisis? Why?
2b. [5 minutes] There are several governing factors that can be affected by
the crisis, for example, leadership, public engagement, and network. Do you
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think during the national political crisis the local government has a crisis in
these factors?
2c. [10 minutes] Do you think the political crisis is considered a positive or
negative effect on local governance and your community? Why?
3. [10 minutes] I think the crisis management strategy is also the governing tool
in modern organization. I would like to hear from you that do you know how
local government responds the crisis? And how does your community involve
in the crisis management process?


Let’s share your experience about the crisis management strategies that
you see the local government use them to deal with the political crisis.



You can also mention about its outcome and the way to improve that
strategy. I also would like to know the level of involvement in crisis
management process.

5. [5 minutes] In ending, could you please tell me any points we have not
discussed that you think are important. Take a moment and I would like to
hear from each of you by going around the table.



Thank you for participating this focus group interview.
Check the audio recorder and consent form
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Appendix D
Interview Guide [In Thai]

คำถำมสัมภำษณ์ เดีย่ วเชิงลึก
ส่ วนที่ 1: บทนำ
 ผมเริ่ มต้นการสัมภาษณ์ดว้ ยการแนะนาข้อมูลของตนเองที่เกี่ยวข้องกับการศึกษา เป้ าหมายการวิจยั และ
หลังจากนั้นก็เปิ ดโอกาสให้ผใู ้ ห้สมั ภาษณ์ได้แนะนาตัวเองและตาแหน่งหน้าที่รับผิดชอบในท้องถิ่น
 อธิบายข้อมูลเกี่ยวกับการกรอกแบบฟอร์มยินยอมให้สมั ภาษณ์และแจ้งผูใ้ ห้สมั ภาษณ์ลงนามใน
แบบฟอร์มนั้นหากยินดีร่วมการสัมภาษณ์ นอกจากนั้นขออนุญาตบันทึกเสี ยงขณะสัมภาษณ์
ส่ วนที่ 2: ข้ อมูลทัว่ ไปและข้ อมูลเกีย่ วกับประสบกำรณ์ ทำงกำรเมืองและกำรบริหำรองค์ กรปกครองส่ วนท้ องถิน่ (10
นำที)
 อยากให้ท่านได้โปรดเล่าถึงประสบการณ์การทางานด้านการเมืองและการบริ หารท้องถิ่นครับ
 ท่านได้ทางานในตาแหน่งนี้นานเท่าไหร่ แล้วครับ
 ท่านมีประสบการณ์การเมืองและการบริ หารท้องถิน่ นับตั้งแต่ปี 2549 เป็ นอย่างไรบ้างครับ
ส่ วนที่ 3: ผลของสภำวะวิกฤติกำรเมืองที่ส่งผลต่ อปัจจัยแทรกซ้ อน 5 ประกำรทีม่ ผี ลต่ อสัมฤทธิผลกำรบริกำร
สำธำรณะขององค์ กรปกครองส่ วนท้ องถิน่ (30 นำที)
สถำบันกำรเมือง:
 ขอให้ท่านเล่าถึงความสัมพันธ์และอิทธิพลของสถาบันทางการเมือง อาทิ รัฐธรรมนูญ กฎหมาย การ
เลือกตั้ง และพรรคการเมือง นับตั้งแต่ปี 2549 ที่มีต่อองค์กรปกครองท้องถิ่นของท่านและต่อชุมชนของ
ท่าน
 ท่านมองวิกฤติการเมืองไทยตั้งแต่ปี 2549 (การเปลี่ยนแปลงทางการเมืองและนโยบายระดับชาติ) ส่งผล
กระทบต่อการบริ การสาธารณะขององค์กรปกครองส่วนท้องถิ่นและต่อชุมชนท้องถิ่นของท่านอย่างไร
บ้าง ยกตัวอย่างประกอบได้ไหมครับ และท่านช่วยให้เหตุผลได้ไหมครับว่าทาไมถึงเป็ นเช่นนั้น
กำรมีส่วนร่ วมของภำคประชำชน:
 อยากให้ท่านได้เล่าถึงสภาวะการมีส่วนร่ วมของภาคประชาชนในการดาเนินงานของท้องถิ่นและการ
บริ การสาธารณะ นับตั้งแต่เกิดวิกฤติการเมือง 2549
 ท่านคิดว่าวิกฤติการเมือง 2549 จวบจนถึงปั จจุบนั ส่งผลต่อการมีส่วนร่ วมของภาคประชาชนอย่างไร
บ้าง และผลดังกล่าวส่งผลต่อการมีประสิ ทธิภาพหรื อไม่มีประสิ ทธิภาพในการบริ การสาธาณะของ
ท้องถิ่นอย่างไรบ้าง ช่วยยกตัวอย่างได้ไหมครับ และช่วยบอกได้ไหมครับว่าด้วยเหตุใดจึงเป็ นเช่นนั้น
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ภำวะผู้นำทำงกำรเมือง:
 อยากให้ท่านช่วยเล่าถึงความคิดเห็นของท่านเกี่ยวกับว่า นายกเทศมนตรี และบุคลากรท้องถิ่น
ตอบสนองหรื อรับมือกับวิกฤติการเมืองอย่างไร เพื่อที่จะรักษาและยังคงการให้บริ การสาธารณะไว้
ดังเดิม
 ท่านคิดว่าวิกฤติการเมืองนับแต่ปี 2549 ถึงปัจจุบนั ส่งผลต่อภาวะผูน้ าทางการเมืองในท้องถิ่นและชุมชน
ของท่านอย่างไร ลองยกตัวอย่างให้ฟังได้ไหมครับ
กำรบริหำรท้องถิน่ :
 ท่านช่วยเล่าได้ไหมครับว่าสภาวะการบริ หารของท้องถิ่นท่านปั จจุบนั เป็ นอย่างไรบ้าง และท่านได้สร้าง
การประสานงานร่ วมหรื อสร้างเครื อข่ายเพื่อที่จะช่วยรักษาและคงไว้ซ่ ึงการบริ การสาธารณะในท้องถิ่น
ของท่านนับตั้งแต่เกิดวิกฤติการเมือง อย่างไรบ้าง
 ท่านคิดว่าวิกฤติการเมืองตั้งแต่ปี 2549 ส่งผลต่อความสัมพันธ์ภายในโครงสร้างรัฐกับท้องถิ่นของท่าน
อย่างไรบ้าง พอจะเล่าตัวอย่างไหมครับ ท่านคิดว่าทาไมถึงเกิดแบบนั้นขึ้นครับ
เศรษฐศำสตร์ กำรเมือง:
 ท่านช่วยเล่าได้ให้ฟังได้ไหมครับว่า ท่านเห็นสภาพเศรษฐกิจในชุมชนท้องถิ่นของท่านเป็ นอย่างไรบ้าง
นับแต่วกิ ฤติการเมือง 25549 จวบถึงปั จจุบนั
 ท่านคิดว่าวิกฤติการเมืองที่กาลังเกิดอยูข่ ณะนี้สามารถเป็ นปัจจัยที่จะส่งผลต่อเศรษฐกิจในชุมชนท้องถิ่น
ของท่านได้อย่างไร และผลกระทบที่เกิดขึ้นจะส่งผลต่อประสิ ทธิภาพหรื อความไม่มีประสิ ทธิภาพใน
การบริ การสาธารณะของท้องถิ่นอย่างไร ลองยกตัวอย่าง และบอกเหตุผลได้ไหมครับว่าทาไมจึงเป็ น
เช่นนั้น
ส่ วนที่ 4: สรุปปิ ดท้ ำยกำรสัมภำษณ์ (10 นำที)
 ท่านพอจะมีประเด็นอะไรอื่นๆ อีกไหมครับที่ท่านอยากจะแลกเปลี่ยนหรื อประเด็นที่ผมไม้ได้กล่าวถึง
ในครั้งนี้ ซึ่งท่านเห็นว่ามีความสาคัญ
 ขอบพระคุณท่านมากนะครับสาหรับการให้สมั ภาษณ์
 ตรวจสอบความเรี ยบร้อยของการบันทึกเสี ยงและการกรอกแบบฟอร์มยินยอมให้สมั ภาษณ์
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คำถำมสัมภำษณ์ กำรประชุมกลุ่ม สำหรับผู้อำนวยกำรกองและหัวหน้ ำส่ วนงำนในเทศบำล
ส่ วนที่ 1: บทนำ
 ผมเริ่ มต้นการสัมภาษณ์ดว้ ยการแนะนาข้อมูลของตนเองที่เกี่ยวข้องกับการศึกษา เป้ าหมายการวิจยั และ
หลังจากนั้นก็เปิ ดโอกาสให้ผใู ้ ห้สมั ภาษณ์ได้แนะนาตัวเองและตาแหน่งหน้าที่รับผิดชอบในท้องถิน่
 อธิบายข้อมูลเกี่ยวกับการกรอกแบบฟอร์มยินยอมให้สมั ภาษณ์และแจ้งผูใ้ ห้สมั ภาษณ์ลงนามใน
แบบฟอร์มนั้นหากยินดีร่วมการสัมภาษณ์ นอกจากนั้นขออนุญาตบันทึกเสี ยงขณะสัมภาษณ์
ส่ วนที่ 2: คำถำมสัมภำษณ์
1. ท่านในฐานะที่เป็ นข้าราชการท้องถิ่น ท่านมีบทบาทสาคัญในองค์กรปกครองส่วนท้องถิ่น ซึ่งผมคิดว่าวิกฤติ
การเมืองที่เกิดขึ้นในระดับชาติลากยาวมาตั้งแต่ปี 2549 อาจจะส่งผลกระทบต่อหน่วยงานของท่านรวมถึง
หน้าที่ของท่านด้วย โดยเฉพาะที่เกี่ยวข้องกับการให้บริ การสาธารณะ ดังนั้นผมอยากจะฟังเรื่ องราวต่างๆที่
เกิดขึ้นเกี่ยวกับวิกฤติการเมืองไทยและผลกระทบทีเกิดขึ้น ที่ท่านอาจจะได้รับข้อมูลจากสื่ อต่างๆ หรื อท่าน
อาจจะประสบด้วยตนเอง (5 นาที)
เราจะเริ่ มการสนทนาโดยให้ทุกท่านได้แลกเปลี่ยนความเห็นเกี่ยวกับสภาวะวิกฤติการเมือง และ
หากท่านสามารถระบุประเด็นที่มีส่วนเกี่ยวพันกับองค์กรปกครองส่วนท้องถิ่น ที่ท่านเคยได้รับรู ้มาจาก
แหล่งต่างๆ ไม่วา่ จะเป็ นจากข่าวหรื อสื่ อต่างๆ ผมจะแจกแผ่นกระดาษโพสอิทให้ทุกท่านได้เขียนประเด็นที่
ท่านรับรู ้เกี่ยวกับภาวะวิกฤติการเมืองในทัศนะของท่าน ลงในกระดาษ และหลังจากนั้นผมจะให้แต่ละท่าน
ได้ร่วมแลกเปลี่ยนความเห็น
1a. ท่านได้ติดตามข่าวเกี่ยวกับวิฤติการเมืองไทยบ้างไหมครับ เรามาแลกเปลี่ยนกันในประเด็นนี้
กันนะครับ (5 นาที)
2. นี่เป็ นการเริ่ มต้นการสนทนาที่ดีมากเลยนะครับ พวกเราได้เรี ยนรู ้จากเรื่ องราวที่เกิดขึ้นที่ทุกท่านได้ร่วม
แลกเปลี่ยน โดยเฉพาะเรื่ องการบริ หารงานท้องถิ่นและการให้บริ การสาธารณะ ต่อไปเรามาคุยลงลึกถึง
ผลกระทบของภาวะวิกฤติการเมืองระดับชาติที่ส่งผลต่อการบริ การสาธารณะของท้องถิ่นกันนะครับ ท่านคิด
ว่าวิกฤติการเมืองที่เกิดขึ้น ส่งผลกระทบต่อโครงสร้าง การบริ หาร และหน้าที่หลักของท้องถิ่นทั้ง 6 ประการ
ไหมครับ อยากให้ท่านได้ระบุเป็ นชัดๆที่เกิดขึ้นในห้วงตั้งแต่ปี 2549 ถึงปัจจุบนั ครับ (10 นาที)
ท่านสามารถแลกเปลี่ยนประเด็นที่ท่านอยากนาเสนอได้ตามสะดวกเลยนะครับ ท่านอาจจะพูดถึง
ประเด็นโครงสร้างก่อนหรื อการบริ หาร หรื อหน้าที่ ก่อนก็ได้ครับ รบกวนทุกท่านแลกเปลี่ยนและนาเสนอ
ให้ได้มากที่สุดเท่าที่ท่านต้องการครับนะครับ โดยผมเน้นประเด็นที่ส่งผลกระทบโดยตรงต่อความรับชอบ
การบริ การสาธารณะของท้องถิ่น

238

2a. ท่านเป็ นกลไกที่สาคัญมากในการบริ หารท้องถิ่น ในช่วงที่เกิดวิกฤติการเมืองระดับชาติ ท่าน
คิดว่าท้องถิ่นยังคงสามารถให้บริ การสาธารณะได้เช่นเดิมไหม ทาไมเป็ นเช่นนั้นครับ (10 นาที)
2b. ผมอยากทราบว่าวิกฤติการเมืองส่งผลต่อหน้าที่ของท่านในการบริ การสาธารณะและของ
ท้องถิ่นอย่างไรบ้าง ท่านคิดว่าหน้าที่ของท่านได้รับผลกระทบบ้างไหม มีผลอย่างไรบ้าง (5 นาที)
2c. มีหลายปั จจัยทางการบริ หารที่อาจจะได้รับผลกระทบจากวิกฤติการเมืองที่ลากยาว เช่น
สถาบันการเมือง ภาวะผูน้ า การมีส่วนร่ วมของภาคประชาชน การประสานความร่ วมมือและเครื อข่าย การ
บริ หารการเงินการคลัง ตลอดจนสภาพเศรษฐกิจ ท่านคิดว่าวิกฤติการเมืองระดับชาติส่งผลต่อปัจจัยแทรก
ซ้อนเหล่านี้ไหม และท้ายสุดปัจจัยเหล่านี้ที่ได้รับผลกระทบจะส่งกระทบต่อเนื่องไปยังการให้บริ การ
สาธารณะของท้องถิ่นหรื อไม่ อย่างไร (10 นาที)
2d. ท่านคิดว่าวิกฤติการเมืองระดับชาติจะส่งผลทางบวกหรื อทางลบต่อการบริ หารท้องถิ่นและต่อ
การบริ การสาธารณะของท้องถิ่นไหม ทาไมท่านคิดเช่นนั้น (5 นาที)
3. ผมคิดว่าการจัดการในสภาวะวิกฤติเป็ นกลยุทธ์ที่สาคัญในการบริ หารองค์กรสมัยใหม่ ผมอยากให้ท่าน
ได้เล่าได้ไหมครับว่า เทศบาลของท่านได้จดั การรองรับผลกระทบอันเกิดจากวิกฤติการเมืองอันลากยาวครั้ง
นี้ อย่างไรบ้าง (5 นาที)
ช่วยแลกเปลี่ยนประสบการณ์ของท่านได้เลยนะครับ โดยเฉพาะเกี่ยวกับการบริ หารองค์กรใน
สภาวะวิกฤติการเมืองและกลยุทธ์การบริ หารต่างๆ ที่ท่านนามาใช้ในการรองรับภาวะวิกฤติการเมืองท่าน
สามารถพูดถึงผลลัพธ์ของการใช้กลยุทธ์น้ นั ๆด้วยนะครับ รวมถึงวิธีการปรับปรุ งในอนาคต
4. เรามาถึงช่วงสุดท้ายของการสนทนากลุ่มแล้วนะครับ ท่านสามารถยกประเด็นที่เราอาจจะไม่ได้สนทนา
กันและท่านเห็นว่ามีความสาคัญและเป็ นประโยชน์ได้นะครับ โดยผมจะให้เวลาท่านทบทวนสักครู่ หนึ่งนะ
ครับ และผมอยากให้ทุกท่านได้กล่าวสรุ ปสั้นๆ เป็ นรายบุคคลรอบโต๊ะนะครับ (5 นาที)
ผมขอขอบพระคุณทุกท่านมากๆนะครับ สาหรับการร่ วมสนทนากลุ่มในครั้งนี้
หลังจากนั้นตรวจสอบความเรี ยบร้อยของแบบฟอร์มการยินยอมให้สมั ภาษณ์และการบันทึกเสี ยง
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คำถำมสัมภำษณ์ กำรประชุมกลุ่ม สำหรับผู้นำชุมชน และ ประชำชนทัว่ ไป
ส่ วนที่ 1: บทนำ
 ผมเริ่ มต้นการสัมภาษณ์ดว้ ยการแนะนาข้อมูลของตนเองที่เกี่ยวข้องกับการศึกษา เป้ าหมายการวิจยั และ
หลังจากนั้นก็เปิ ดโอกาสให้ผใู ้ ห้สมั ภาษณ์ได้แนะนาตัวเอง โดยระบุชื่อนามสกุล และบทบาทหน้าที่ใน
ชุมชนท้องถิ่น
 อธิบายข้อมูลเกี่ยวกับการกรอกแบบฟอร์มยินยอมให้สมั ภาษณ์และแจ้งผูใ้ ห้สมั ภาษณ์ลงนามใน
แบบฟอร์มนั้นหากยินดีร่วมการสัมภาษณ์ นอกจากนั้นขออนุญาตบันทึกเสี ยงขณะสัมภาษณ์
ส่ วนที่ 2: คำถำมสัมภำษณ์
1. ท่านในฐานะที่มีบทบาทในฐานะประชาชนที่เป็ นหุน้ ส่วนสาคัญในองค์กรปกครองส่วนท้องถิ่น ซึ่งผมคิดว่า
วิกฤติการเมืองที่เกิดขึ้นในระดับชาติลากยาวมาตั้งแต่ปี 2549 อาจจะส่งผลกระทบต่อการดารงชีวติ ของท่าน
โดยเฉพาะที่เกี่ยวข้องกับการบริ การสาธารณะของท้องถิ่น ดังนั้นผมอยากจะฟังเรื่ องราวต่างๆที่เกิดขึ้น
เกี่ยวกับวิกฤติการเมืองไทยและผลกระทบทีเกิดขึ้น ที่ท่านอาจจะได้รับข้อมูลจากสื่ อต่างๆ หรื อท่านอาจจะ
ประสบด้วยตนเอง (5 นาที)
เราจะเริ่ มการสนทนาโดยให้ทุกท่านได้แลกเปลี่ยนความเห็นเกี่ยวกับสภาวะวิกฤติการเมือง และ
หากท่านสามารถระบุประเด็นที่มีส่วนเกี่ยวพันกับองค์กรปกครองส่วนท้องถิ่น ที่ท่านเคยได้รับรู ้มาจาก
แหล่งต่างๆ ไม่วา่ จะเป็ นจากข่าวหรื อสื่ อต่างๆ ผมจะแจกแผ่นกระดาษโพสอิทให้ทุกท่านได้เขียนประเด็นที่
ท่านรับรู ้เกี่ยวกับภาวะวิกฤติการเมืองในทัศนะของท่าน ลงในกระดาษ และหลังจากนั้นผมจะให้แต่ละท่าน
ได้ร่วมแลกเปลี่ยนความเห็น
1a. ท่านได้ติดตามข่าวเกี่ยวกับวิฤติการเมืองไทยบ้างไหมครับ เรามาแลกเปลี่ยนกันในประเด็นนี้
กันนะครับ (5 นาที)
2. นี่เป็ นการเริ่ มต้นการสนทนาที่ดีมากเลยนะครับ พวกเราได้เรี ยนรู ้จากเรื่ องราวที่เกิดขึ้นที่ทุกท่านได้ร่วม
แลกเปลี่ยน โดยเฉพาะเรื่ องผลกระทบที่เกิดกับตัวท่านและชุมชนของท่าน ต่อไปเรามาคุยลงลึกถึงผลกระทบ
ของภาวะวิกฤติการเมืองระดับชาติที่ส่งผลต่อการบริ การสาธารณะของท้องถิ่นกันนะครับ ท่านคิดว่าวิกฤติ
การเมืองที่เกิดขึ้น ส่งผลกระทบต่อหน้าที่หลักของท้องถิ่นทั้ง 6 ประการในการให้บริ การสาธารณะแก่พวก
ท่านไหมครับ อยากให้ท่านได้ระบุเป็ นชัดๆที่เกิดขึ้นในห้วงตั้งแต่ปี 2549 ถึงปั จจุบนั ครับ (10 นาที)
ท่านสามารถแลกเปลี่ยนประเด็นที่ท่านอยากนาเสนอได้ตามสะดวกเลยนะครับ ท่านอาจจะพูดถึง
ประเด็นใดก่อนก็ได้ รบกวนทุกท่านแลกเปลี่ยนและนาเสนอให้ได้มากที่สุดเท่าที่ท่านต้องการครับนะครับ
โดยผมเน้นประเด็นที่ส่งผลกระทบโดยตรงต่อชุมชนท้องถิ่นและต่อการบริ การสาธารณะที่ท่านได้รับ
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2a. ท่านเป็ นหุน้ ส่วนที่สาคัญมากในองค์กรปกครองส่วนท้องถิ่น ในช่วงที่เกิดวิกฤติการเมือง
ระดับชาติ ท่านคิดว่าท้องถิ่นยังคงสามารถให้บริ การสาธารณะแก่ชุมชนของท่านได้เช่นเดิมไหม ทาไมถึงคิด
ว่าเป็ นเช่นนั้นครับ ลองยกตัวอย่างได้ไหมครับ (10 นาที)
2b. มีหลายปัจจัยทางการบริ หารท้องถิ่นที่อาจจะได้รับผลกระทบจากวิกฤติการเมืองที่ลากยาว เช่น
สถาบันการเมือง ภาวะผูน้ า การมีส่วนร่ วมของภาคประชาชน การประสานความร่ วมมือและเครื อข่าย การ
บริ หารการเงินการคลัง ตลอดจนสภาพเศรษฐกิจในท้องถิ่น ท่านคิดว่าวิกฤติการเมืองระดับชาติส่งผลต่อ
ปั จจัยแทรกซ้อนเหล่านี้ไหม และท้ายสุดปั จจัยเหล่านี้ที่ได้รับผลกระทบจะส่งกระทบต่อเนื่องไปยังการ
ให้บริ การสาธารณะของท้องถิ่นหรื อไม่ อย่างไร (10 นาที)
2c. ท่านคิดว่าวิกฤติการเมืองระดับชาติจะส่งผลทางบวกหรื อทางลบต่อการบริ หารท้องถิ่นและต่อ
การบริ การสาธารณะของท้องถิ่นไหม ทาไมท่านคิดเช่นนั้น (10 นาที)
3. ผมคิดว่าการจัดการในสภาวะวิกฤติเป็ นกลยุทธ์ที่สาคัญในการบริ หารองค์กรสมัยใหม่ ผมอยากให้ท่าน
ได้เล่าได้ไหมครับว่า เทศบาลของท่านได้จดั การรองรับผลกระทบอันเกิดจากวิกฤติการเมืองอันลากยาวครั้ง
นี้ อย่างไรบ้าง และเทศบาลได้เปิ ดโอกาสให้ภาคประชาชนชุมชนท้องถิ่นมีส่วนร่ วมในกระบวนการบริ หาร
จัดการกับภาวะวิกฤติน้ ีอย่างไรบ้าง (10 นาที)
ช่วยแลกเปลี่ยนประสบการณ์ของท่านได้เลยนะครับ โดยเฉพาะที่ท่านเห็นว่า ท้องถิ่นใช้กลยุทธ์
ต่างๆ ในการรับมือหรื อแก้ปัญหาต่างๆ ในสภาวะวิกฤติการเมืองระดับชาติ เพื่อรักษาและคงไว้ซ่ ึงการบริ การ
สาธารณะของท้องถิ่น ตลอดจนการเอาภาคประชาชนเข้าไปมีส่วนร่ วมในขั้นตอนต่างๆ
4. เรามาถึงช่วงสุดท้ายของการสนทนากลุ่มแล้วนะครับ ท่านสามารถยกประเด็นที่เราอาจจะไม่ได้สนทนา
กันและท่านเห็นว่ามีความสาคัญและเป็ นประโยชน์ได้นะครับ โดยผมจะให้เวลาท่านทบทวนสักครู่ หนึ่งนะ
ครับ และผมอยากให้ทุกท่านได้กล่าวสรุ ปสั้นๆ เป็ นรายบุคคลรอบโต๊ะนะครับ (5 นาที)
ผมขอขอบพระคุณทุกท่านมากๆนะครับ สาหรับการร่ วมสนทนากลุ่มในครั้งนี้
หลังจากนั้นตรวจสอบความเรี ยบร้อยของแบบฟอร์มการยินยอมให้สมั ภาษณ์และการบันทึกเสี ยง
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Appendix E
Informed Consent Form
You are invited to participate in an interview that will be conducted by Sirisak
Laochankham, a Ph.D. Candidate in Public Affairs and Policy, Mark O. Hatfield School of
Government, College of Urban and Public Affairs, Portland State University. The goal of this
interview is to explore the effects of national political crises on local public service delivery in
upper Northeast Thailand.
If you decide to be part of this interview, you will be asked to participate in either an indepth interview or a focus group interview; both types of interviews will take about one hour to
complete. The interview will be recorded and a transcript will be used for doctoral dissertation
and educational purposes. The information will be used for research, including publication in
scholarly journals.
Your participation in this interview is entirely voluntary. If you decide to participate, you
can stop at any time without any effect on your relationship with me, Portland State University,
your local government, or anyone else associated with this interview. In addition to signing this
form, you will receive another copy to keep for your own records. Any information that is
obtained in connection with this interview will be kept confidential by the researcher, and any
identifying information will be removed. Specifically, any use of these recordings will require the
removal of:
1. Your name and any other information that would make it possible to identify you;
2. The name and any other information that would make it possible to identify any other
person or organization that you mention during the interview, including your local
government/local community.
However, confidentiality cannot be guaranteed in a group setting. Please respect one another’s
privacy by not repeating what was said at the meeting or who attended.
If you have concerns or problems about your participation in this interview, you may contact:
Human Subjects Research Committee Research and Strategic Partnerships (RSP) P.O. 751
Portland OR 97207-0751 (503) 725-4288 hsrrs@lists.pdx.edu
If you have any questions about the interview itself, you may contact:
Sirisak Laochankham, Ph.D. Candidate in Public Affairs and Policy,
Mark O. Hatfield School of Government, College of Urban and Public Affairs,
Portland State University (573) 529-4773 sirisak@pdx.edu
----------------------------------------Name of Interviewee (type or print)

-----------------------------------------(Signature of Interviewee)

--------------------------(Date)
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Appendix F

Informed Consent Form [In Thai]
หนังสื อยินยอมให้ สัมภำษณ์
ท่านได้รับเชิญเข้าร่ วมการสัมภาษณ์ ที่ดาเนินการสัมภาษณ์โดย นายศิริศกั ดิ์ เหล่าจันขาม นักศึกษาปริ ญญาเอก สาขา
กิจการสาธารณะและนโยบายสาธารณะ ภาควิชาการปกครอง มาร์ค โอ แฮทฟิ ลด์ วิทยาลัยกิจการเมืองและกิจการสาธารณะ
มหาวิทยาลัยพอตแลนด์สเตท วัตถุประสงค์ของการสัมภาษณ์ครั้งนี้เพือ่ ศึกษาผลกระทบอันเกิดจากวิกฤติการเมืองระดับชาติที่
ส่ งผลต่อการบริ การสาธารณะขององค์กรปกครองส่ วนท้องถิ่นในภาคตะวันออกเฉียงเหนือของประเทศไทย หากท่านตัดสิ นใจ
ยินดีเข้าร่ วมการสัมภาษณ์ครั้งนี้ ท่านจะได้รับการร้องขอให้ร่วมการสัมภาษ์เดี่ยวเชิงลึกหรื อการสนทนากลุ่ม โดยการสัมภาษณ์
จะใช้เวลาประมาณไม่เกิน 1 ชัว่ โมง การสัมภาษณ์ครั้งนี้จะมีการบันทึกเทป และการถอดเทปสัมภาษณ์เพื่อนาไปใช้ในการ
วิเคราะห์ขอ้ มูลในการเขียนดุษฎีนิพนธ์ระดับปริ ญญาเอกและกิจกรรมทางการศึกษาอื่นๆ ข้อมูลต่างๆที่ได้รับจากท่านจะใช้ใน
การทาวิจยั รวมถึงการเผยแพร่ ตีพิมพ์ในวารสารวิชาการ
การเข้าร่ วมสัมภาษณ์ครั้งนี้ถือว่าเป็ นความสมัครใจ หากท่านไม่ประสงค์จะร่ วมสัมภาษณ์ท่านสามารถหยุดการให้
สัมภาษณ์ได้ทุกเวลาโดยจะไม่มีผลต่อสัมพันธภาพใดกับข้าพเจ้า มหาวิทยาลัยพอตแลนด์สเตท องค์กรปกครองส่ วนท้องถิ่น
ของท่าน หรื อบุคคลอื่นใดที่เกี่ยวข้องกับการสัมภาษณ์น้ ี หลังจากที่ท่านลงชื่อในแบบแสดงความยินยอมนี้แล้ว ท่านจะได้รับ
สาเนาอีกหนึ่งฉบับเพื่อเก็บไว้เป็ นหลักฐาน ข้อมูลทุกอย่างที่เกี่ยวข้องกับการสัมภาษณ์น้ ี จะเก็บไว้อย่างมิดชิดและรักษาความ
เป็ นส่ วนตัวของท่านโดยนักวิจยั รวมถึงข้อมูลอื่นๆที่แสดงให้เห็นความเป็ นส่ วนตัวของท่านจะถูกลบออก โดยเฉพาะข้อมูล
ส่ วนบุคคลดังต่อไปนี้จะถูกลบออก:
1. ชื่อของท่านและข้อมูลอื่นๆที่สามารถสื่ อถึงตัวท่านได้
2. ชื่อหรื อข้อมูลอื่นๆ ที่อาจจะสื่ อถึงบุคคลหรื อองค์กรอื่นๆ ที่ท่านกล่าวถึงในระหว่างการสัมภาษณ์
รวมถึงชื่อของเทศบาลและชื่อของหมู่บา้ นท่าน
อย่างไรก็ตาม ความเป็ นส่ วนตัวข้างต้นไม่สามารถรับรองได้ในการประชุมกลุ่ม โปรดเคารพในความเป็ นส่ วนตัวซึ่ง
กันและกันโดยไม่ตอ้ งไปกล่าวซ้ าถึงอะไรก็ตามที่สนทนากันในการประชุมกลุ่มหรื อบ่งบอกถึงผูเ้ ข้าร่ วมประชุม หากท่านมีขอ้
ห่วงใยหรื อมีปัญหาใดๆ เกี่ยวกับการเข้าร่ วมสัมภาษณ์ในครั้งนี้ ท่านสามารถติดต่อได้ที่ สานักงานคณะกรรมการการวิจยั ใน
มนุษย์และความร่ วมมือ ที่ ตู ้ ป.ณ. 751 เมืองพอตแลนด์ รัฐออริ กอน สหรัฐอเมริ กา โทรศัพท์ 97207-0751 (503) 725-4288 อีเมล์
hsrrs@lists.pdx.edu หรื อหากมีขอ้ สงสัยเกี่ยวกับการสัมภาษณ์ ท่านสามารถติดต่อที่ นายศิริศกั ดิ์ เหล่าจันขาม นักศึกษาปริ ญญา
เอก สาขากิจการสาธารณะและนโยบายสาธารณะ ภาควิชาการปกครอง มาร์ค โอ แฮทฟิ ลด์ วิทยาลัยกิจการเมืองและกิจการ
สาธารณะ มหาวิทยาลัยพอตแลนด์สเตท โทรศัพท์ 081-7174430 อีเมล์ sirisak@pdx.edu
----------------------------------------ชื่อผูใ้ ห้สัมภาษณ์ (พิมพ์หรื อตัวบรรจง)
-----------------------------------------(ลายมือชื่อผูใ้ ห้สัมภาษณ์)

--------------------------(วันที่สัมภาษณ์)
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Appendix G
Letter of Request for Interview Permission from Local Government
Public Affairs and Policy Ph.D. Program,
Mark O. Hatfield School of Government,
Portland State University, P. O. Box 751,
Portland, OR 97207-0751
Date…., 2016
Dear (Name & Title of Municipal Mayor or Appropriate Person),
My name is Sirisak Laochankham. I am a Ph.D. candidate in Public Affairs and Policy at Hatfield
School of Government, College of Urban and Public Affairs, Portland State University, Oregon,
the United States of America. As part of my dissertation I am conducting a research study titled:
“Local Government Service Delivery under Crisis Conditions: The Case of Thailand”. The
purpose of the research is to explore the effects of national political crisis on local government
service delivery and discover the coping strategies and mechanisms that local governments use in
times of political crisis in Thailand.
This research is a case study that uses both face-to-face, semi-structured interviews and focusgroup interviews to collect the data from the targeted participants. Prior to conducting the
interviews, I would like to request for your permission to approach the following targeted
participants: municipal mayor, municipal councilors, municipal division managers, municipal
officers, community leaders, and local residents within your municipality to take part in the study.
I will recruit the targeted participants to the study using phone and person to person conversation.
I expect to recruit approximately 10-13 of participants.
I can assure you that I will make every effort to ensure the interviews do not disturb the working
environment in any way and data collection will remain highly confidential. I am applying ethical
approval for the interviews from Human Subjects Research Review Committee, Office of
Research and Strategic Partnerships at Portland State University, the United States of America.
My dissertation research is supervised by Dr. Bruce Gilley, a professor of political science, Mark
O. Hatfield School of Government, College of Urban and Public Affairs, Portland State
University. If you have any question please contact (503) 725-3056 or email: gilleyb@pdx.edu.
Yours Sincerely,
(Sirisak Laochankham)
Ph.D. candidate in Public Affairs and Policy
Contact email: sirisak@pdx.edu
Mobile phone: USA-573-529-4773, Thailand-081-7174430
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Appendix H
Letter of Request for Interview Permission from Local Government (In Thai)

หลักสู ตรปริ ญญาเอกกิจการสาธารณะและนโยบายสาธารณะ
ภาควิชาการปกครอง มาร์ค โอ แฮทฟิ ลด์, วิทยาลัยกิจการเมืองและกิจการสาธารณะ
มหาวิทยาลัยพอตแลนด์สเตท ตู ้ ป.ณ. 751 เมืองพอตแลนด์ รัฐออริ กอน 97207-0751
วันที่ ..................................2559
เรื่ อง
ขออนุญาตเก็บข้อมูลวิจยั ปริ ญญาเอก
เรี ยน

(ชื่ อ/ตำแหน่ งนำยกเทศมนตรี )

ข้าพเจ้าชื่อ นายศิริศกั ดิ์ เหล่าจันขาม เป็ นนักศึกษาปริ ญญาเอก สาขากิจการสาธารณะและนโยบายสาธารณะภาค
วิชาการปกครอง มาร์ค โอ แฮทฟิ ลด์ วิทยาลัยกิจการเมืองและกิจการสาธารณะ มหาวิทยาลัยพอตแลนด์สเตท สหรัฐอเมริ กา
ข้าพเจ้ากาลังทาการวิจยั หัวข้อ “การบริ การสาธารณะขององค์กรปกครองส่ วนท้องถิ่น ภายใต้สภาวะวิกฤติ: กรณี ศึกษาประเทศ
ไทย” อันเป็ นส่ วนหนึ่งในการศึกษาปริ ญญาเอกของข้าพเจ้า วัตถุประสงค์ของการวิจยั ครั้งนี้เพื่อศึกษาผลกระทบอันเกิดจาก
วิกฤติการเมืองระดับชาติที่ส่งผลต่อการบริ การสาธารณะขององค์กรปกครองส่ วนท้องถิ่นในภาคตะวันออกเฉียงเหนือของ
ประเทศไทย งานวิจยั นี้เป็ นการศึกษากรณี ศึกษาโดยใช้การสัมภาษณ์เดี่ยวแบบเชิงลึก และการสนทนากลุ่มจากผูเ้ ข้าร่ วมการ
สัมภาษณ์ ก่อนที่จะดาเนินการสัมภาษณ์ ข้าพเจ้าจึงใคร่ ขออนุญาตท่านสัมภาษณ์บุคลากรในหน่วยงานของท่านและประชาชน
ในเขตเทศบาลของท่านโดยขอความอนุเคราะห์ท่านในการคัดเลือกและติดต่อบุคคลที่มีตาแหน่งต่อไปนี้ในเทศบาลของท่านเข้า
ร่ วมการสัมภาษณ์ประกอบด้วย นายกเทศมนตรี ประธานสภาเทศบาล สมาชิกสภาเทศบาล ผูอ้ านวยการกองหรื อหัวหน้าส่ วน
งาน รวมถึงผูน้ าชุมชนและประชาชน ข้าพเจ้าจะประสานคัดเลือกผูเ้ ข้าสัมภาษณ์ทางโทรศัพท์หรื อติดต่อพบตัวต่อตัว โดยหวัง
อยากจะได้ผเู ้ ข้าสัมภาษณ์ประมาณ 10-13 คน
ข้าพเจ้าขอยืนยันว่า ข้าพเจ้าจะพยายามทุกวิถีทางในการสร้างความมัน่ ใจว่า การสัมภาษณ์จะไม่กระทบกับการทางาน
ประจาและจะรักษาความเป็ นส่ วนตัวของผูใ้ ห้สัมภาษณ์ไว้เป็ นอย่างดี ทั้งนี้ ข้าพเจ้าได้รับความเห็นชอบจากคณะกรรมการวิจยั
ในมนุษย์และยุทธศาสตร์ความร่ วมมือของมหาวิทยาลัยพอตแลนด์สเตท สหรัฐอเมริ กา แล้ว
ดุษฎีนิพนธ์ของข้าพเจ้า อยูภ่ ายใต้การให้คาปรึ กษาของ ดร.บรู ซ กิลลี ศาสตราจารย์ดา้ นรัฐศาสตร์ จากภาควิชาการ
ปกครอง มาร์ค โอ แฮทฟิ ลด์ วิทยาลัยกิจการเมืองและกิจการสาธารณะ มหาวิทยาลัยพอตแลนด์สเตท หากท่านมีขอ้ สงสัยใดๆ
โปรดติดต่อ (503) 725-3056 หรื ออีเมล์ gilleyb@pdx.edu.
ขอแสดงความนับถือ
(นายศิริศกั ดิ์ เหล่าจันขาม)
นักศึกษาปริ ญญาเอก สาขากิจการสาธารณะและนโยบาย
อีเมล์ sirisak@pdx.edu มือถือ 081-7174430
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Appendix I
Examples of Codebook for Interview Data Analysis
Moderating
Variable
Political
Institutions

Civic
Engagement

Code

Description

Example of Data Excerpt

Lack of
representation

Participant refers to the
effect of electoral
suspension eliminating the
roles of elected
representatives.

“…Nowadays, it seems like
we don’t have people who
represent us. We don’t have
people who can help us. It’s
broken and disconnected.”

Facilitating local
administrative
procedures

Participant refers to the
legal mechanism (i.e.
Section 44) that the junta
government used for
solving complicated
procedures in
governmental
administration.

“Frankly speaking, I would
say that in the absence of an
[elected] government, when
we needed something, Section
44 provided a convenience for
us. It makes things easier for
us. It’s convenient. In the past,
we had to get approval from
the provincial governor or
district chief officer. Section
44 can order and terminate the
inconvenient issues or the
limitations of those
regulations in order to
facilitate our work when we
want to assist people.”

Political fears

Participant refers to fears
caused by political crisis
and the junta laws
prohibiting political
engagement.

“Nowadays, municipality
avoided organizing the
activity that may involve in
politics. They were afraid of
being investigated for a
gathering of more than four
persons. Some people said,
any activity that was
organized by municipality, I
didn’t want go.”

Eager to speak
out and involving
in local decisionmaking

Participant refers to civic
participation improved at
local level, especially in
local affairs.

“When we had a town hall
meeting, local citizens were
actively engaged in the
meeting. They shared their
thoughts on development
projects.”
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Political
Leadership

Governance

Fears to do thing
wrong

Participant refers to the
effects of legal constraints
on decision-making of
local leaders.

“It looks like we did
everything wrong. Why I have
to do that? I can’t sleep and I
am concerned about what I
don’t want to do. I want to do
the things that local residents
agree is good for them. When
we do something, the national
auditing office told us that we
were non-compliant on that
project. We’ve encountered
difficulties. We would like to
do right, but at least they
should provide us the right
laws that help avoid the act of
non-compliance. We’re happy
if having that.”

More recognition
of local leaders

Participant refers to
positive perceptions of
local residents on their
local leaders in times of
political crisis.

“I don’t know how about the
mayor in other places, but our
mayor went everywhere
whenever he knew there was a
problem, responding to the
request of local citizens. At
least, he can help coordinate
and provide some basic help.
He is concerned about the
community’s needs and never
ignored what we needed.”

More centralized
administration

Participant refers to the
interaction between central
and local government was
more hierarchical in the
midst of crisis (e.g. topdown).

“These things are ordered by
central government. The
government directed central
ministries and central
departments. Those central
authorities then ordered the
Ministry of Interior. After
that, the Ministry of Interior
delivered an order to
provincial and district
authorities. The districts then
ordered local governments.
This is the pattern of their
work.”
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Political
Economy

Active reaction to
local issues

Participant refers to local
governments actively
responding to solve local
problems.

“Local governments expanded
very fast in order to respond
to the developments. We are
with local citizens every day.
If people complain about the
bad roads in our community,
we have to provide budget in
order to respond to that
problem immediately. In the
past, it took more than ten
years to get a gravel road, but
nowadays it is very fast.”

Uncertain to
spend money or
invest in business

Participant refers to
political instability causing
uncertainty for spending
and investing in some
local businesses.

“…Wherever I went, I heard
people complain about
economic constraints. It’s
difficult for them to make any
money. It also affected me.
My wife runs a grocery store
business; she said her business
was not good. She observed a
decline of consumption. It
looks like people work but
they did not earn good
income. When people have
less money to spend, it caused
the decline of money to spend
in our local community.”

Central
facilitation

Participant refers to
intervention of central
government rather help to
support local development.

“Currently, our economic
status is gradually recovering
because the military-installed
government has boosted the
local economy through the
provincial administration.
Local people can earn income
of about 300 THB per day. It
took just two months. It [the
state-led development project]
helped stimulate local
economies. Local people have
money to spend in the
market.”
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